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This thesis focuses on the impact of non-tariff measures (NTMs) on 
merchandise trade. NTMs are broadly defined as policy measures, other than 
tariffs, which may have an impact on international trade in goods and services. This 
is an area of emerging importance, for both researchers and policy makers.  
 
My research involves three main contributions. I propose new approaches 
to econometrically estimating the effect of NTMs. In addition, I take novel 
approaches to modelling these effects in a computable equilibrium (CGE) 
framework.  In order to utilise these econometric and CGE techniques to contribute 
to an improved understanding on the impacts of NTMs it was necessary for me to 
gather new data on New Zealand NTMs, which were contributed to an international 
collaborative project coordinated by the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD). 
 
This thesis comprises four applications. The first (chapter two) focuses on 
an examination of the effect of animal diseases on beef trade; NTMs are frequently 
applied to protect importers from diseases. The remaining three applications 
(chapters three, four and five) draw on the new UNCTAD NTM database, to which 
I contributed New Zealand data; my data contribution was significant covering 
3,096 measures from 530 regulations. Chapter three is an econometric application 
drawing on these new data, while chapters four and five combine econometric and 
CGE analysis. 
 
The first application focuses on the impact of foot and mouth disease (FMD) 
and bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) on beef trade. I find that during and 
after a FMD outbreak, exporting countries substitute away from markets 
recognised as FMD-free toward lower value markets not recognised as FMD-free. 
Similarly, a country that has experienced BSE will export less to markets that have 
not experienced BSE and more to markets that have. Regaining official recognition 
of FMD-free status may aid recovery but does not negate the effects of a recent 




The second application uses data from the UNCTAD NTM database for four 
developed markets. I apply a novel parsimonious regression approach which shows 
that NTMs that impose a conformity requirement, i.e. testing, certification or 
inspection, will reduce the number of countries exporting to these markets. 
 
The third application uses data that I collected on the geographical 
restrictions imposed by New Zealand. These restrictions mean that plant products 
presenting a biosecurity risk cannot be imported unless the exporting country is 
covered by an import health standard for that particular commodity. Using the 
Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model, I find that if, in a counterfactual 
scenario, all countries were able to export all fruit and vegetable products to New 
Zealand, imports from Europe, Latin America, Middle East and Africa and East 
Asia would increase at the expense of imports from Australia, Oceania, South East 
Asia, South Asia and North America. 
 
The fourth application models the impact of NTMs on supply chains, with a 
focus on exports to major ASEAN countries. I first use the detailed UNCTAD NTM 
database to obtain econometric estimates of the effect of different types of NTMs on 
imports into major ASEAN countries, using a gravity model framework. I then use 
these econometric estimates in an extended version of the GTAP model to examine 
the impact of eliminating the types of NTMs that are found to have significant 
negative effects on trade. My research illustrates the benefits, both to the major 
ASEAN countries themselves and to their exporting partners, from the partial 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION: DATA AND 
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN ESTIMATING THE EFFECT 





BACKGROUND, MOTIVATION AND OBJECTIVES 
 
This PhD focuses on the impact of non-tariff measures (NTMs) on 
merchandise trade. NTMs are broadly defined as policy measures, other than tariffs, 
which may have an impact on international trade in goods and services (UNCTAD, 
2013). This is an emerging and important area of focus, not only for researchers, 
but also for policy makers. (See Beghin, Maertens and Swinnen, 2015 for a 
summary.) This topic provides significant scope for contributions through 
proposing new approaches to econometrically estimating the effect of NTMs, and 
taking novel approaches to modelling these effects in a computable general 
equilibrium (CGE). In order to utilise these econometric and CGE techniques to 
contribute to an improved understanding on the impacts of NTMs it was necessary 
for me to gather new data on New Zealand NTMs, which were contributed to an 
international collaborative project. 
NTMs affect trade because they can raise either the fixed or variable costs 
of firms. Moreover, at a firm level, learning about foreign markets can be complex 
(Rauch and Watson, 2003) and NTMs exacerbate this cost. While NTMs are 
frequently applied for legitimate public policy reasons – such as food safety or 
environmental reasons -  the setting of NTMs can reflect protectionist pressures  
(Marette and Beghin, 2010). It is therefore difficult to determine the extent to which 
NTMs can, or should, be removed or modified. 
There has been a dramatic increase in the number of NTMs notified to the 
WTO since 2000, both Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures and Technical 
Barriers to Trade (TBT) measures. This has coincided with growing concern for 
health, quality and environmental attributes and externalities (Beghin, Maertens and 
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Swinnen, 2015). At the same time, there has been a shift in emphasis in trade 
negotiations from tariff reductions to the removal of NTMs (Berden and Francois, 
2015). For instance, New Zealand’s Trade Agenda 2030 released in 2017 
emphasises an increased focus on non-tariff barriers as one of four “shifts”.1 The 
focus of this PhD is therefore highly topical. 
The overarching objective of this PhD is to provide more sophisticated and 
nuanced analysis of the impact of NTMs on merchandise trade. Such analysis 
requires detailed data. With NTMs being so broadly defined and pervasive, 
previous research has been constrained by the lack of detailed data on NTMs, an 
issue which is discussed subsequently. This PhD therefore contributes detailed data 
on New Zealand NTMs to a major international database coordinated by the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), making extensive use 
of the new data available in this database. 
Previous literature has often treated NTMs as homogenous, whereas 
throughout this thesis I aim to focus on the different effect of various categories of 
NTMs. Given my objective of undertaking more nuanced analysis than has 
previously been possible, I avoid trying to estimate and model “headline” numbers 
for the overall impact of NTMs. Instead, I start “small” with econometric estimation 
of a single product (beef) and the most significant issue from a sanitary perspective 
– animal diseases.  
I then move on to examine a broad range of NTMs – using the 
comprehensive UNCTAD NTM database to which I contributed – but starting with 
                                                          
1 https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/nz-trade-policy/trade-agenda-2030  
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separate estimates of four developed markets, to understand the different 
interactions, for instance with market size. 
I then move to a very narrow question – what is the effect of a particular 
type of NTM (geographical restrictions on fruit and vegetable imports) for a single 
country (New Zealand)? The CGE techniques applied, which involve the direct 
implementation of “quantity” shocks into CGE can then form the basis for 
approaching broader NTM modelling.  
I take this forward in the final substantive chapter of this PhD, which is 
some ways the culmination of the PhD. This research first uses the detailed 
UNCTAD NTM database to obtain econometric estimates of the effect of different 
types of NTMs on imports into major ASEAN countries, using a gravity model 
framework. I then use these econometric estimates in a CGE framework to examine 
the impact of eliminating the types of NTMs that are found to have significant 
negative effects on trade. While this work is broader, it still stays focused on 
detailed analysis of particular types of NTM. 
THESIS OVERVIEW 
 
This PhD comprises four main chapters, along with the contribution of New 
Zealand NTM data to a major international database, as described in appendix 1.2 
The four substantive chapters of this thesis are: 
1. The Impact of Diseases on International Beef Trade: Market Switching and 
Persistent Effects (the “animal diseases” chapter).  
                                                          
2 I was the lead author for each of these papers, working with co-authors as detailed in appendix 2. 
The first, second and third of these papers have been published in peer reviewed journals (Food 
Policy, The World Economy and the Journal of International Agricultural Trade and 
Development). The final paper has been submitted for publication. 
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2. Market Access Implications of Non-Tariff Measures: Estimates for Four 
Developed Country Markets (the “extensive margin” chapter).  
3. Impacts of Geographical Restrictions: New Zealand Fruit and Vegetable 
Imports (the “geographical restrictions” chapter).  
4. Modelling the Impact of Non-Tariff Measures on Supply Chains in the Asia 
Pacific Region (the “ASEAN supply chains” chapter).  
THESIS CHAPTERS IN THE CONTEXT OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
 
The chapters that constitute this thesis form part of the wider literature on non-
tariff measures. In broad terms, the empirical literature on NTMs can be divided 
across two dimensions: the number of countries studied and the number of measures 
or products under investigation. With these two types of divisions, four categories 
emerge (See table 1). This thesis includes an example of each type of work. 
Typically, analysis of the effect of NTMs on trade value is undertaken through 
econometric estimation of a gravity model, which is described later in this chapter. 
Chapters two (animal diseases), four (geographical restrictions) and five (ASEAN) 
utilise this framework. Many papers in the literature, including chapters four 
(geographical restrictions) and five (ASEAN supply chains), incorporate 
econometric estimates into a CGE framework to enable general equilibrium 
interactions and estimates of welfare effects. In this thesis, the Global Trade 
Analysis Project (GTAP) is the CGE model used, with chapter five using the 
ImpactECON Supply Chain model, which is an extension of the comparative static 





Table 1: Main Categories of NTM Research and Selected Examples 
Single country (or bilateral 
relationship), multiple measures 
 
Chapter 3 (extensive margin), 
Francois, Berden, Tamminen, Thelle, 
& Wymenga (2013), 
Egger, Francois, Manchin, & Nelson 
(2015)   
Winchester (2009), 
Peterson, Grant, Roberts, & Karov 
(2013); 
Examples of gravity models with a 
single country include Alam, Uddin, 
and Taufique (2009)  
 
Multiple measures and countries 
 
 
Chapter 5 (ASEAN supply chains), 
Kee, Nicita, & Olarreaga (2009) (as 
utilised in various CGE applications),  
Fontagné et al. (2005), 
Hoekman & Nicita (2011), 
Winchester et al. (2012) 
Crivelli & Gröschl (2016)  
 
Single measure, single country (or 
bilateral relationship) 
 
Chapter 4 (geographical restrictions), 
Boulanger, Dudu, Ferrari, & 
Philippidis (2015), 
Kutlina-Dimitrova & Narayanan 
(2015), 
Philippidis (2010) , 
Henseler et al. (2013). 
 
 
Single measure or product, multiple 
countries 
 
Chapter 2 (animal diseases), 
Otsuki, Wilson, & Sewadeh (2001), 
Ferro, Otsuki, & Wilson (2015), 
Schlueter, Wieck, and Heckelei (2009),  
Yang, Reed, & Saghaian (2013),  
Arita, Mitchell, & Beckman (2015) 
applied in Grant & Arita (2017)  
 
There is a tension in empirical NTM research, with a trade-off between 
targeted research that reflects the particular characteristics of certain types of NTMs 
and work that has more general application. This is shown by contrasting cross-
country studies which focus on a single measure of product with cross country work 
that includes multiple measures (the bottom right and top right quadrants of table 
1). 
Some of the earliest research on NTMs focuses on a single measure. The 
seminal paper in this area is Otsuki et al. (2001) which applies a gravity model 
framework to estimate the effect of differing aflatoxin standards on cereal, nut, fruit 
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and vegetable imports of 15 European countries from nine African countries.3 To 
provide a more recent example, Ferro, Otsuki and Wilson (2015) utilise a gravity 
model framework to estimate the effect of maximum residual limits for pesticides 
on trade for 66 fruit and vegetable products for 61 importing countries. 
As an illustration of product specific research, Schlueter, Wieck and 
Heckelei (2009) utilise a gravity model to assess the effect of six classes of SPS 
regulatory measures on meat trade between the world’s ten largest exporters and 
ten largest importers. Similarly, Arita et al. (2015) examine, separately, NTM 
measures on beef, pork, poultry, corn and soy,  and fruit and vegetables. These 
results were then applied in a CGE framework in Grant and Arita (2017).  
 Chapter two (animal diseases) follows this approach by applying a gravity 
model framework to estimate the effects of outbreaks of foot and mouth disease 
(FMD) and bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) on beef trade. While this 
chapter does not explicitly draw on data on NTMs, the approach in this paper 
recognises that the barriers and costs placed on exporters, NTMs in other words, 
vary depending on the disease status of both importing and exporting countries, 
which can manifest itself in restrictions or requirements placed on some countries 
by others (typically by disease free countries on those that present risks). In this 
way, my approach builds on previous literature - particularly Yang, Reed, and 
Saghaian (2013) which examines the impact of FMD on pork trade – with my paper 
accounting for official FMD status and for the impact of recent disease outbreaks, 
both for exporters and importers. This chapter is the only one in this thesis that does 
not make use of NTM data collected as part of the UNCTAD project; it was 
                                                          




completed first, including as an opportunity to develop new gravity modelling and 
data management techniques. 
 While research focusing on a single product has the advantage of not 
combining effects that might be quite distinct for different sectors, large numbers 
of these studies would be necessary to understand the impact that NTMs have on 
trade generally. Moreover, through focusing on a single product, the number of 
observations is much lower than in studies which combine imports of multiple 
products, which reduces the statistical power of econometric estimation.4 
 Similarly, while research on – for instance – aflatoxin or maximum residue 
limit standards is useful for policy makers concerned with these issues, and focusing 
on specific measures enables a detailed consideration of the measures themselves 
including their stringency, a very large number of studies would be necessary to 
understand the effects of all the different types of NTM applied globally. Moreover, 
through focusing on a single NTM there is a risk of omitted variable bias, if other 
NTMs not included in the study are correlated with the measure under 
investigation.5 
A further challenge for research looking at multiple types of NTM affecting 
diverse products is the detailed data requirements for this analysis. The paucity of 
data has constrained research in this area. A significant component of this PhD was 
the collection of data on all New Zealand NTMs affecting goods trade, as part of a 
major international project coordinated by UNCTAD, in partnership with other 
international organisations including the World Bank, and the Economic Research 
                                                          
4 By “combining imports”, I mean separately including variables for the level of imports of different 
products, rather than a single aggregate. 
5 This issue does not arise in my animal disease paper because I do not focus on specific measures. 
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Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA). The data contribution is described 
in appendix 1, and these data are used in three chapters. In addition to the chapters 
in this thesis, Cadot and Gourdon (2016), Cadot, Asprilla, Gourdon, Knebel, and 
Peters (2015) and Vanzetti, Peters, and Knebel (2014) provide pertinent 
applications of the new UNCTAD NTM database. 
Chapter three (extensive margin) is the first of three papers using the 
UNCTAD NTM database. It provides a unique contribution by estimating the 
effects of NTMs on the number of countries exporting particular products to 
Canada, the European Union, New Zealand and the United States, with separate 
regressions for each market.6 I start by looking at individual countries to understand 
the factors that may be at play here. 
Papers which empirically estimate the effects on NTMs for a single 
country’s imports are rare, particularly because gravity models are often intractable 
with insufficient variation.7 Work in this area is often based on alternative 
approaches such as surveys (see, for instance, Francois, Berden, Tamminen, Thelle, 
and Wymenga, 2013), or through considering historical evidence of FTAs (see, for 
instance, Egger, Francois, Manchin, and Nelson, 2015, and Winchester, 2009).  
By concentrating on the number of countries exporting a product, I am able 
to adopt a parsimonious regression that abstracts from the level of detail about the 
importer-exporter dyads that are required in gravity model estimation. I can 
therefore undertake separate regressions for each of the individual markets, which 
provides flexibility with regard to possible regulatory differences between 
                                                          
6 These are the first developed markets for which detailed and comprehensive NTM data have been 
collected. 
7 A rare example of a single importing country gravity model is Alam, Uddin, & Taufique (2009) 
although this is not concerned with imports. 
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countries, and allows the potential for interactions with country-level attributes such 
as market size. 
I find that NTMs that impose a conformity requirement - i.e. testing, 
certification, and inspection requirements - significantly reduce the number of 
countries exporting to a market. Conformity requirements imposed for sanitary or 
phytosanitary reasons have the largest effect in Canada, reducing the number of 
exporting countries by 47 percent compared to the situation where no compliance 
requirement is imposed. Conformity requirements imposed for other reasons 
covered by the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade have the largest 
effect in Canada and New Zealand, reducing the number of exporting countries by 
27 percent compared to the situation where no compliance requirement is imposed.  
In contrast, I generally find a statistically significant positive effect for non-
tariff measures that do not impose a compliance burden, suggesting that such 
measures may facilitate trade. Previous research by Crivelli and Gröschl (2016) 
finds that sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) compliance measures that have been 
raised as a concern at the WTO reduce the number of countries exporting to a 
market. However, my research is much broader in showing that compliance 
measures have an effect more generally, and the effect is not just for those NTMs 
that are sufficiently problematic to be raised at the WTO.  
Chapter four (geographical restrictions) takes an even narrower 
approach, focusing on a particular type of NTM (geographical restrictions on fruit 
and vegetable imports) for a single country (New Zealand). Such narrow papers are 
relatively uncommon, with examples including two recent analyses of Russia’s 
import ban on specified agri-food products from certain countries (Boulanger, 
Dudu, Ferrari, and Philippidis, 2015 and Kutlina-Dimitrova and Narayanan, 2015), 
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as well as studies of a hypothetical EU import ban on GM soybeans and maize/oil 
seeds from Argentina, Brazil and the USA (Philippidis, 2010, and Henseler et al., 
2013). Outside the CGE field, a notable gravity modelling application is Peterson 
et al. (2013) which estimates the effects of different types of phytosanitary measures 
applied by the United States. 
Chapter four examines the trade effects of New Zealand restricting, for 
biosecurity reasons, the countries from which particular fruit and vegetable 
products can be imported. I propose a new index to quantify the extent to which 
fruit and vegetable exports from each region are constrained by these restrictions. 
This index is validated econometrically and simulations are undertaken to 
determine expected imports if all fruit and vegetable products could be imported 
from all countries. In this counterfactual scenario, we expect increased fruit and 
vegetable imports from Europe, Middle East and Africa, the Americas (excluding 
the United States), and East Asia at the expense of imports from Oceania, Australia, 
the United States, South East Asia and South Asia.  
Despite the narrow focus, my paper makes significant novel contributions 
to the more general NTM literature by presenting a new approach to modelling, 
within a CGE framework, NTMs that restrict imports. In particular, my approach 
begins by estimating the direct effect of a policy on imports, and then implements 
this estimate into a CGE framework to allow for general equilibrium effects. This 
methodology has potentially wide application to other types of NTMs. The 
approach is well-suited to analysing policies that affect countries to different 
extents, for instance, where there are geographical restrictions on eligibility 
preventing the import of specified products from particular countries. Moreover, 
the direct implementation of “quantity” shocks into CGE can form the basis for 
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approaching broader NTM modelling– which I take forward in the final substantive 
chapter of this PhD. 
 At the other end of the spectrum from papers focused on a single 
type of NTM, are papers which seek to explore the overall impact of NTMs. In such 
papers, the NTM variable often combines various different types of NTMs. These 
include papers such as Fontagné et al. (2005), Hoekman and Nicita (2011) and 
Winchester et al. (2012). Li and Beghin (2012) and Beghin, Maertens and Swinnen 
(2015) provide useful surveys.  
Perhaps the most well-known work in this area is Kee et al. (2009). This 
paper estimates the effect of non-tariff measures at the product line level using data 
for 78 countries. The paper has been widely cited in CGE work because the authors 
have used estimates of demand elasticity to obtain an estimate of the ad valorem 
equivalent (AVE) of these NTMs i.e. the level of tariff (in percentage terms) that 
would have the same effect as the NTM protection. Various CGE applications have 
incorporated these estimates, including Boughanmi, Al-Shammakhi, and Antimiani 
(2016), Kawasaki (2015), and Fontagné, Gourdon, Jean, et al (2013).  
While the approach in Kee et al. (2009) is relatively sophisticated in its 
econometrics, a key limitation is it treats all NTMs under investigation – described 
as “core non tariff barriers” in the paper - as having the same effect and does not 
take into account the cumulative effect of multiple NTMs: in their paper the core 
non tariff barrier dummy variable is unity if a country imposes at least one core non 
tariff barrier on the product. The weakness of this approach is that not all NTMs 
have the same effect, and some can actually facilitate trade.8 Indeed a recent paper, 
                                                          
8 See Cadot and Gourdon (2014) for a discussion of the trade facilitating effect of NTMs. 
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Beghin, Disdier, and Marette (2015), re-estimates the database in Kee et al. (2009)  
but focuses only on measures classified as “technical regulations” which are 
described by the authors as “standard-like measures potentially addressing market 
imperfections”. Beghin, Disdier, and Marette (2015) find that about 39 percent of 
the product lines affected by NTMs exhibit negative AVEs which they interpret as 
“indicating a net trade-facilitating effect of these measures”. 
The database in Kee et al. (2009) and used in Beghin, Disdier, and Marette 
(2015) draws on an earlier version of the current UNCTAD database and is missing 
the detailed classification system and robust collection methodology of the latest 
iteration. Two of the authors of the Kee et al. (2009) paper have presented at 
conferences recently with research that uses new UNCTAD data. As presented thus 
far, this work continues the approach of a single NTM dummy variable. 
An alternative and significant econometric paper, which focuses solely on 
SPS measures is Crivelli and Gröschl (2016).9 This paper applies a gravity model 
(the Heckman selection model) and data on specific concerns about SPS measures 
raised at the WTO at the 4 digit level of the Harmonized System classification.10  
The authors find that such SPS measures reduce the probability of exporting to these 
markets but, conditional on trade occurring, values exported are higher. In a key 
innovation which I mirror in chapter three, they further distinguish between on SPS 
concerns relating to conformity assessment (i.e. certificate requirements, testing, 
                                                          
9 This is more detailed than similar earlier work by Disdier, Fontagné and Mimouni (2008). 
10 WTO data on NTMs includes those notified or raised either notified to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) under obligations imposed by the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, or raised as specific 
concerns by WTO members. While a rich source of data, this database may give rise to measurement 
errors, because the agencies responsible for notifying the WTO, often trade ministries, may not be 
aware of all regulations that may constitute NTMs or they may not have the resources and incentives 
to report these fully in a systematic manner. Moreover, measures raised as specific concerns at the 
WTO constitute a subset of all NTMs, as only the most problematic are raised (see Grant & Arita, 
2017, for a discussion focused on the sanitary and phytosanitary context). 
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inspection and approval procedures) and concerns related to product characteristics 
(i.e. requirements on quarantine treatment, pesticide residue levels, or labelling and 
packaging) finding that only conformity requirements have negative effects, both 
on the likelihood of market entry and the value of trade if it takes place. 
Chapter five (ASEAN supply chains) fits alongside these papers which 
examine multiple measures and multiple countries. In contrast to papers such as 
Kee et al. (2009) it takes advantage of the detail of the UNCTAD NTM database 
with different dummy variables capturing the incidence of different types of non-
tariff measures. I focus on six major ASEAN countries: Indonesia, Viet Nam, 
Singapore, the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand.  
I first use the detailed NTM database to obtain econometric estimates of the 
effect of different types of NTMs on imports into the major ASEAN countries, 
using the ppml gravity model framework, proposed in Santos Silva and Tenreyro 
(2006). I then use these econometric estimates in a global computable general 
equilibrium model to examine the impact of liberalising the types of NTMs that are 
found to have significant negative effects on trade. I use a newly available Global 
Supply Chain Model, based on the well-known Global Trade Analysis Project 
(GTAP model), which is discussed in the next section. By utilising this model, I can 
capture separately the effects of removing the NTMs identified as particularly 
problematic, on products sold for intermediate production and those sold to final 
consumers. This enables quantification and in-depth analysis of the impact of 




METHODOLOGICAL TECHNIQUES APPLIED 
Gravity modelling 
All four chapters have an econometric component. I make use of gravity 
model estimation which is widely considered to be the “workhorse” of applied trade 
work (Shepherd, 2013). In particular, I make use of the two types of gravity model 
estimation used in contemporary analysis: the poisson pseudo maximum likelihood 
(ppml) estimator proposed in Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and the Heckman 
Selection estimator, including an extension proposed in Helpman, Melitz, and 
Rubinstein (2008). These estimators have proven themselves well suited to some of 
the issues encountered in trade data, including zero trade flows and – in the case of 
the ppml estimator – heteroskedasticity. Both have over 2500 citations on Google 
Scholar. They are each suited to different purposes, so I use the estimator most 
suited for each application: Chapters four (geographical restrictions) and five 
(ASEAN supply chains) apply the ppml estimator, whereas chapter two (animal 
diseases) applies the Heckman Selection estimator and the Helpman, Melitz and 
Rubinstein extension as I am particularly interested in exploring instances of zero 
trade. 
A gravity model posits that the trade between two countries depends on their 
GDPs and bilateral transaction costs, for instance arising from distance; the latter 
costs are referred to as “multilateral resistance” (Anderson and Wincoop, 2003). In 
addition to distance, shared borders, common languages, past colonial relationships 
and regional trade agreements are commonly used as controls variables affecting 
the cost of trade. It is worth noting that unobserved variables, such as cultural 
affinity, therefore enter the residual term. This only poses issues where they are 
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correlated with variables of interest. A useful summary of gravity modelling from 
a practical perspective is provided by Shepherd (2013). 
The most widely used estimator to estimate gravity models is currently the 
Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (ppml) estimator presented in Santos Silva 
and Tenreyro (2006). As explained in Shepherd (2013), this estimator is consistent 
in the presence of fixed effects, accounts for observations of zero trade and can be 
estimated to allow for heteroskedasticity which is important because errors are 
likely to be clustered by country. 
Negative binomal regressor and zero inflated negative binomial estimators 
have also been used in gravity modelling.  There are, however, some practical 
challenges with negative binomal regressors, including that the estimates are not 
scale invariant (see Shepherd, 2013) so the general preference is now for ppml 
estimation.  
One disadvantage of the ppml estimator is that it assumes that the 
probability of trade occurring is generated by the same function that explains the 
volume of trade if it takes place. As noted by Crivelli and Gröschl (2016): “In 
contrast to the Heckman model, the Poisson method assumes that there is nothing 
special about zero trade”. Alternative estimators based on the Heckman selection 
model, are therefore preferred in some applications, including Crivelli and Gröschl 
(2016). As explained in Shepherd (2013), the Heckman method, including as 
proposed in Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) requires specifying two 
equations, a selection equation which describes the probability of trade taking place 
and an outcome equation which describes the expected volume of trade conditional 
on it taking place. Recent papers, have, however, emphasised the importance of the 
distributional assumptions, stressing, in particular, the sensitivity of results from the 
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Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (HMR) estimator to the presence of 
heteroskedasticity. (See Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2015 and Martin and Pham, 
2015.) This suggests that the HMR estimator is best confined to circumstances 
where explaining effects on the probability of trade occurring is the central area of 
focus. 
Computable General Equilibrium Modelling 
My thesis also utilises computable general equilibrium modelling, 
particularly the Global Trade Project (GTAP) model (Hertel, 1997), along with the 
version 9 database (Aguiar, Narayanan, and McDougall, 2016). GTAP is a well-
known and fully-documented CGE model that has been widely used for a variety 
of policy applications.11 The GTAP model specifies trade bilaterally, with imperfect 
substitution between foreign and domestic goods and between imports from 
different sources. Chapter four (geographical restrictions) uses the GTAP 
framework to allow us to take account of the substitutions between potential 
exporters as well as other inter-sectoral and inter-regional linkages in my scenario 
that involves the removal of all New Zealand geographical restrictions enabling all 
countries to export all products. Chapter five (ASEAN) is at the frontier of CGE 
modelling, and I am among the first to utilise channels that enable NTM reductions 
to have different effects on the exporting country, and for imports of intermediates 
and final goods. 
  
                                                          





In addition to the gravity modelling approaches, and CGE analysis, detailed above, 
various other techniques have been applied to assess the impact of NTMs. These 
include price-based work, firm level study and analysis of regulatory heterogeneity. 
 Perhaps the most notable alternative to gravity modelling, is econometric 
work that uses unit price rather than the trade values used in gravity modelling. Key 
examples of this research include Dean, Signoret, Feinberg, Ludema, and 
Ferrantino (2009), Cadot and Gourdon (2014) and Cadot and Gourdon (2016). In 
broad terms, such papers aim to compare the domestic price of a good relative to 
the reference price of a comparable good. Two major challenges with this work are 
possible differences and changes in the quality of good, as well as possible 
distortions due to omitted trade costs. (Beghin, Disdier, and Marette, 2015). Some 
research aims to minimise these issues through utilising retail data, but product 
coverage is often limited and this data generally not reconciled with the Harmonized 
System; to illustrate Dean et al. (2009) focused on 47 consumer products, and the 
data in the World Bank International Comparisons Project used in Cadot and 
Gourdon (2014) only covers approximately 100 products - not the over 5,000 
products classified at the 6 digit level in the Harmonized System (HS). I considered 
using New Zealand retail price data for fruit and vegetables in Chapter four, but the 
data available (from Statistics New Zealand) was limited to a small number of 
products. While good quality unit value data is available from CEPII 
(http://www.cepii.fr/cepii/en/bdd_modele/bdd.asp) and was used to good effect in 
Cadot and Gourdon (2016), there is a lag in its production and it is still subject to 
distortion by differences in product quality. 
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There is also an emerging field of research using firm level data to assess 
the impacts of non-tariff measures, which includes papers such as El-Enbaby, 
Hendy, and Zaki (2016) and Fontagné, Orefice, Piermartini, and Rocha (2015) who 
examine the effect of examine sanitary and phytosanitary measures notified to, or 
raised as concerns at, on exports by Egyptian and French firms respectively. This 
seems a promising area for future research but is outside the scope of this PhD. 
Finally, while my research goes further than many papers in examining 
different types of NTMs, particularly in Chapter five, it does not explicit consider 
harmonisation or other alignment of requirements in NTMs. The significance of 
this is well understood with pioneering work by Reyes (2011) showing the gains 
from harmonisation of electrical product standards in the EU. Cadot et al. (2015) 
make a significant contribution using the UNCTAD NTM data to calculate 
measures of “regulatory distance” between countries but they stop short of 
econometric analysis. Future work could apply these concepts into an econometric 
framework, perhaps using the UNCTAD NTM database to extend the work in 
Winchester et al. (2012) to a wider range of countries and products. This would, 
however, likely require a large project team, such as that assembled in Winchester 
et al. (2012). 
DATA COLLECTION 
My data collection involved collecting data on all New Zealand Acts, 
regulations and other delegated legislation which affected merchandise trade. This 
involved identifying all sources of these regulations and then collecting detailed 
information including implementation date, description and objectives. I classified 
each NTM according to a common classification framework (UNCTAD, 2013) and 
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(UNCTAD, 2014), and detailed the exact tariff lines affected by the product to 
enable researchers using this database to match NTMs with trade data. 
The data was initially collected under a project supported by the World Bank 
and overseen by UNCTAD between September 2014 and June 2015: these were 
included in the UNCTAD NTM database publicly launched in July 2016. For a 
subsequent ERIA-UNCTAD project, I updated the data with changes made to 
measures between September 2014 and May 2016. In the 2016 version, there are 
3,096 measures from 530 regulations. I collected all data, with my chief supervisor 
providing quality control. This data collection is set out in appendix 1, which draws 
on material published as a chapter in an UNCTAD ERIA report. The data is publicly 
available at http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DITC/Trade-Analysis/Non-Tariff-
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A B S T R A C T
We quantify effects of disease outbreaks on agricultural trade with a gravity model of impacts of foot and mouth
disease (FMD) and bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) on beef trade. We account for official FMD status
and for the impact of recent disease outbreaks. During and after a FMD outbreak, exporting countries substitute
away from markets recognized as FMD-free toward lower value markets not recognized as FMD-free. Similarly, a
country that has experienced BSE will export less to markets that have not experienced BSE and more to markets
that have. Regaining official recognition of FMD-free status may aid recovery but does not negate the effects of a
recent FMD outbreak. Models of FMD impacts should incorporate these market-switching effects, while analysis
of FMD outbreaks should not focus solely on the loss of markets but rather should incorporate our finding that
these loses are somewhat mitigated by market substitution. For countries not free of FMD, if the disease were to
be eradicated an exporter should eventually be able to substitute towards higher value FMD-free markets. The
value of this change in export market profile should be counted when considering the benefits of FMD eradi-
cation programs.
1. Introduction
Animal disease outbreaks, particularly foot and mouth disease
(FMD) and bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), may have severe
economic consequences for international beef trade.1 With global ex-
ports valued at US$40 billion in 2015, beef is a large contributor to
world agriculture trade and so understanding the effects of diseases on
beef trade is an important food policy concern. The salience of this issue
for exporting countries is increased by the fact that the effects of a
disease outbreak on market access may persist long after the outbreak
has ended. For example, the full United States ban on Canadian beef
imports after a 2003 BSE outbreak in Alberta lasted only four months,
but the border opened only partially thereafter and it took four more
years to end all restrictions on Canadian beef imports. Thus, as noted by
Jones and Davidson (2014), the policy concern with animal disease
outbreaks may quickly shift from issues of food safety to issues of
market access.
These market access issues may not be well understood in the lit-
erature. Trade barriers that importers erect in response to a disease
outbreak may force exporters to switch to lower value markets, such as
those not FMD-free, so costs of the outbreak may exceed what is shown
by studies that focus just on the immediate trade impact. If exports by
other countries rise to fill the gaps left by a traditional exporter whose
market access is affected by a disease outbreak, it may take several
years for the disease-affected exporter to regain market share in higher
value markets after the outbreak is over. It may take even longer for a
country to be officially recognized as disease-free and this lack of re-
cognition may further hinder market access.
These multiple and time-varying effects on market access may
confound studies of how animal disease outbreaks affect international
food trade. For example, Yang et al. (2013) use a gravity model to show
that a FMD outbreak reduces exports during the period of the outbreak,
with the impact possibly varying with whether a vaccination or
slaughter policy is in place. This research does not, however, consider
differences in response when the importer has FMD, whether there are
persistent effects of the outbreak on trade, or whether official re-
cognition of disease-free status reduces trade impacts. A similar possible
understatement of long run effects on market access may be present in
scenarios provided by Tozer and Marsh (2012) of a hypothetical FMD
outbreak in Australia (the second largest beef exporter in the world).
Some scenarios assumed that it would take just one year for beef prices
to return to baseline levels after implementation of FMD mitigation
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measures. This assumption of a relatively quick recovery differs from
what we find in the current study, which is that disease outbreaks affect
trade for several years after they are contained.
In this paper we use a gravity model of international beef trade, for
195 countries from 1996 to 2013, to study the trade impacts of FMD
and BSE. Our approach is novel in taking into account both a country’s
official disease status and the impact of recent disease outbreaks. The
distinction between disease outbreaks and being officially recognized as
disease-free also matters for policy makers; there are often costly
compliance activities required in order to gain disease-free recognition
and some exporters may question the value of gaining this status. By
accounting for these factors separately we can address important food
policy issues such as whether a disease outbreak has persistent trade
effects even after it is eradicated and whether official recognition of
disease-free status can facilitate trade after disease eradication. The
value of distinguishing between recent disease outbreaks and official
disease status is shown by our finding that, in the case of FMD, the
substitution by exporters away from markets that are recognized as
FMD-free towards lower value markets that are not recognized as FMD-
free occurs both during and after a disease outbreak. Similarly, a
country that has experienced BSE tends to subsequently export less to
markets that have not experienced BSE and more to markets that have.
While exporting to a lower value market may be a better alternative
than not exporting, it is still a negative shock from the exporter point of
view. This substitution to lower value markets can create persistent
impacts, so that the costs of a disease outbreak may be rather higher
than what is shown by models that just consider the immediate impacts
on trade. On the other hand, a narrative about the effect of disease
outbreaks should not focus solely on markets that become closed, since
these loses are somewhat mitigated by market substitution.
Our approach can be applied to any commodity affected by pests or
diseases, although meaningful results are more likely for commodities
with a small number of significant diseases subject to periodic out-
breaks, such as FMD and BSE. It is also worth noting that FMD and BSE
themselves have different characteristics: while FMD is highly con-
tagious among animals it is not typically classified as a zoonotic disease
since it rarely crosses the species barrier to affect humans; in contrast
BSE is not highly contagious but is of concern as it is zoonotic so can
affect humans. The growing literature using the gravity model to esti-
mate the impact of food safety standards on trade flows, which we
review in Section 2, might be informed by our approach. A disease
outbreak typically means that a country no longer meets the require-
ments of importing markets, so exporters switch to markets that impose
less stringent standards – this is analogous to the case of the food
standards literature; however, we explicitly consider conditions in the
exporting country in a way that the food standards literature does not.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 summarizes
prior studies; Section 3 describes our data and the gravity model
methodology; Section 4 covers the empirical results; and, Section 5
discusses the implications and concludes the paper.
2. Previous literature
Simulated impacts of animal disease outbreaks in several countries
are reported in recently commissioned studies. For example, the
Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Sciences
and the New Zealand Ministry of Primary Industries have combined
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) and epidemiology models to
assess the economic impact of a foot and mouth disease outbreak
(Buetre et al., 2013; Forbes and van Halderen, 2014). Similarly, in the
United States, the Department of Homeland Security has modelled the
costs of a FMD outbreak originating from a National Bio and Agro-
Defense Facility (Pendell et al., 2015). Recent modelling studies focused
on the United States are surveyed by Schroeder et al. (2015). These
papers generally rely on assumptions about the likely time taken for
market access to be restored after an outbreak.
While simulations inform studies of animal diseases, econometric
work using cross country data to assess impacts on trade is less
common. Important issues for modelling that may not have been
thoroughly considered include: whether a disease outbreak has persis-
tent effects even after it is eradicated; and, whether official recognition
of disease-free status can facilitate trade after disease eradication. In the
broader literature on the impact of product standards and food safety
standards on trade flows, the gravity model is the most common ap-
proach (Ferro et al., 2015; Wilson et al., 2003). Drawing upon this
approach, our modelling is further informed by the body of work ap-
plying gravity models to the impact of Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS)
measures; many of which are aimed at preventing the introduction of
diseases. Perhaps the most comprehensive research into SPS measures is
Crivelli and Gröschl (2016), who estimate a gravity model examining
different effects of SPS measures in the WTO database of specific trade
concerns, considering trade at the relatively disaggregated (HS4) level.2
The SPS measures include: conformity assessments and certification
requirements; testing, inspection and approval procedures; and product
characteristics, including requirements for quarantine treatment, pes-
ticide residue levels, labeling or geographic application of measures.
Some studies focus more narrowly on meat. Yang et al. (2013) apply
a gravity model to international pork trade, finding that a FMD out-
break does reduce exports during the period of the outbreak, with im-
pacts that may depend on whether a vaccination or slaughter policy is
in place. Schlueter et al. (2009) utilize a gravity model to assess the
effect of six classes of SPS regulatory measures on meat trade between
the world’s ten largest exporters and ten largest importers. More de-
tailed analysis is available in Schlueter (2009). A more limited analysis
by Tapia et al. (2011) considers Germany and Argentina and the sani-
tary measures affecting their beef trade.
Other than Yang et al. (2013) none of these papers take into account
the disease circumstances of an exporting country. This can matter
because effects of an importing country’s measures may depend on the
exporting country’s actual or perceived SPS status. Thus, an exporter
may find a particular measure more or less stringent due to its disease
status.
3. Data and methods
To analyze impacts of FMD outbreaks and of official international
recognition of disease-free status we use International Animal Health
Organization [OIE] data (http://www.oie.int). The changes in the in-
cidence of FMD and BSE, according to the OIE data for the countries
included in our panel, are shown in Fig. 1. On average, between 50 and
70 countries in our panel are recorded as having an FMD outbreak
while the number of countries not recognized as FMD-free is about
twice as high; although the latter has declined over time as more
countries have become officially recognized as FMD free (without
vaccination). The number of countries who have reported a BSE out-
break is much lower, but increased with the spate of outbreaks in Japan
and various European countries in 2000 and 2001.
We derive two FMD outbreak variables (FMD outbreak exporter and
FMD outbreak both) from OIE databases. Between 1996 and 2004, the
OIE data contains the number of reported cases of FMD and the year in
which an outbreak was last recorded. From 2005, the OIE uses cate-
gories for disease presence or absence; we consider there to be no
outbreak if the country was classified as “Never reported” or “Disease
not reported during this period”.
The duration of trade impacts after an outbreak is of key interest for
policy makers and modellers. The conditions and timing for regaining
market access are generally not specified ex ante by importing coun-
tries, and in practice can depend on various features of the exporting
and importing countries, including the risk tolerance of the importing
2 This is more detailed than similar earlier work by Disdier et al. (2008).
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country, protectionist pressures and even the political relationship be-
tween the countries. In many markets, exporting countries must first ne-
gotiate sanitary approval to export their animal products, which are often
conditional on the absence of diseases such as FMD.3 This means that trade
can be discontinued quickly, but regaining access can be a lengthy and
uncertain process. The experience of Argentina after FMD outbreaks be-
ginning in 2001 shows different responses from different importers; access
to many markets was regained after the OIE recognized part of Argentina
as FMD free, but in 2012, after Argentina had failed to regain access to the
United States market 6 years after its last reported case of FMD it brought a
dispute to the WTO (Bown and Hillman, 2017). Uncertainty around how
importers may respond is recognized by Agriculture Ministries. For ex-
ample, for New Zealand it is noted that “despite [a] generally strong re-
putation and its importance as a supplier, current health certificates of
many trading partners have a clause saying that FMD ‘does not occur in
New Zealand’ and in a few cases that ‘New Zealand has been free of FMD
for the previous 12months’ and that in practice there could be further
delays following an outbreak, including to reactivate supply chains (Forbes
and van Halderen (2014).
Given this uncertainty, we consider a range of time windows for our
variables capturing recent outbreaks (Recent FMD exporter and Recent
FMD both). These vary from an outbreak in the previous year to an
outbreak sometime in the last six years. As we explain in the results
section, however, a window of the past five years appears most ap-
propriate. This is within the range in the literature. For example, for
New Zealand it is suggested trade would recover the year after, even for
a large outbreak (Forbes and van Halderen, 2014) while for Australia a
study assumes that after a large outbreak beef exports would recover
only slowly, increasing to 80% of original levels the tenth year after the
outbreak (Buetre et al., 2013). Earlier work by the Australian
Productivity Commission (2002) assumed full recovery by the eighth
year.
Separately from outbreaks, the OIE also officially recognize
countries as being free from FMD (Fig. 1 shows the gap between these
two concepts). Our data on official disease status comes from historical
records of OIE resolutions. The variables FMD risk status exporter and
FMD risk status both consider a country to be recognized as FMD-free
without vaccination if the OIE recognizes the entire country as FMD-
free, if FMD vaccination was not practiced, and if there was no recorded
outbreak of FMD that year.
We distinguish between a country with FMD exporting to countries
with, and without, FMD since biosecurity and consumer responses may
be quite different if the importing country already has FMD. We also
control for the official FMD status of the importing country through
including the variable No FMD importer. We calculate, using unit price
data for imports in the dataset described below, that FMD-free markets
command higher prices; import prices are 132% higher, on average,
than for markets that are not FMD-free.
The other main disease affecting international beef trade is BSE.
Data on outbreaks of this disease are also available from the OIE.4 The
dummy variable BSE occurrence exporter equals one if the exporting
country has experienced at least one case of BSE but their trading
partner has not. The variable BSE occurrence both equals one if both the
exporter and importer have reported at least one case of BSE as re-
corded in the OIE database which begins in 1989. As with FMD, we
distinguish between a country that has reported BSE exporting to
countries with, and without, BSE due to the likelihood of different
biosecurity and consumer responses. However, unlike with FMD, we do
not take into account the BSE risk status as recognized by the OIE be-
cause there does not appear to be sufficient variation over the period;
for instance, after its three BSE cases between 2003 and 2006, the
United States was not able to achieve a “negligible risk” status until




































Number of countries that have reported BSE
Number of countries with a reported FMD outbreak
Number of countries not recognized as FMD free (without vaccination)
Fig. 1. FMD and BSE incidence.
Source: OIE data and authors’ calculations. Based on a panel of 188 exporting countries.
3 For example, in the case of the United States, such requirements are contained in title
9, chapter III, part 327 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
4 http://www.oie.int/animal-health-in-the-world/bse-specific-data/annual-incidence-
rate/4.
5 Unlike for FMD, we do not distinguish between an outbreak period and the periods
after an outbreak because of the limited number of cases – in our panel just 26 countries
had an instance of BSE.
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through including the variable No BSE importer.
Beef trade data are the aggregate of total annual imports of pro-
ducts in HS headings 0201 (fresh beef) and 0202 (frozen beef) from
the UN COMTRADE database; we use import data as they are likely
more accurate.6 GDP data are from the World Development Indicators.
Beef production data are from FAO for “cattle meat” production,
which covers beef and veal.7 As these values were expressed in tonnes
of dressed carcass weight, we multiplied them by the average import
price of carcasses (HS020110 and 020220) in that year to get data in
monetary terms.8 Typical gravity model controls affecting trading
costs and thus trade flows – distance, contiguity, colonial history and
a common legal system – are from the widely used CEPII database.9
The existence of a regional trade agreement between two trading
partners is based on data available in the CEPII database. As
these data are only available until 2006, we update by adding new
agreements that enter into force from 2006 and are notified to the
WTO.10
Tariffs are from the World Trade Organization’s Integrated Tariff
Data Base (IDB).11 This contains both the MFN tariff rate applied gen-
erally to all countries and the preferential rate applied to some coun-
tries, for instance when a RTA is in place. Data are missing for some
years but since tariffs typically are relatively stable over time, where
there was a gap between reported rates, the rate from the last available
year was assumed to be in place until superseded by a new reported
rate. Specific tariff rates were converted to ad valorem equivalents using
data on the average price of imports in the same HS 6 digit subheading
for that year, adjusted by national currency information within the
WTO dataset.
Our data starts in 1996 – the first year the OIE data, detailed above,
became available. Also, in 1996 a link was found between consuming
BSE-infected meat and a variant of Creutzfeldt-Jackob disease, trans-
forming BSE into a major concern in international trade. Our time-
series ends in 2013. In terms of the cross-sectional element of our panel,
we have data for 195 countries. As we exclude countries that did not
export any beef between 1996 and 2013, we have 188 exporting
countries, although some data are missing for some countries in some
years.
Table 1 has some stylised facts to motivate our econometric ana-
lysis, by comparing the profile of import markets across different types
of disease status. For beef exporters who do not have a currently re-
ported FMD outbreak, just over three-quarters (77%) of the value of
beef exports goes to markets that are recognized as FMD free (without
vaccination). Conversely, for countries currently reporting a FMD out-
break only 31% of their exports, by value, go to markets that are re-
cognized as FMD free (without vaccination) and these markets are just
28% of the countries they export to. The same patterns exist if we
consider whether an exporter is officially recognized as FMD free
(without vaccination), or whether exporters and importers have ever
reported BSE. Thus, being free of an animal disease, and being re-
cognized as such, allows an exporter to trade more with higher value
import markets that are disease-free. However, it is important to note
that for exporters who are not disease-free, there are still markets
available given that many countries are not recognized as FMD-free
(Fig. 1). Obviously, there are other reasons that might explain these
patterns, if, say, countries not recognized as FMD are geographically
closer. To untangle these possible effects, econometric analysis is ne-
cessary.
Table 2 has another way of considering possible effects of FMD
and BSE, based on the unconditional mean probability of beef trade
occurring between countries (and the average value of that trade
where it occurs). For an exporter without a FMD outbreak and an
importer that is recognized as FMD-free, there is a 9.4% chance of
trade occurring (and it has an average value of $26.6 million if it
occurs). However, the odds of trade occurring fall to only 2.9% if the
exporter has an FMD outbreak and the conditional value of trade falls
by almost two-thirds. In contrast, if the importer is not recognized as
FMD-free then the adjustment by the exporter is rather less, and in
fact if an exporting country loses its FMD free status the average value
of exports (when they occur) to the importer who is not FMD-free
increases. Table 2 suggests that markets may be adjusting to disease
outbreaks, which provides a hypothesis for testing with the econo-
metric estimation that can control for other variables that affect trade
between country pairs. We see a stronger suggestion of market
switching in the case of BSE, where both the probability of exporting
to a market that has reported BSE and the value of trade when it
occurs are higher if an exporting country has reported BSE.
3.1. Gravity modelling methodology
A gravity model posits that trade between two countries depends
on their incomes and bilateral transaction costs, such as those arising
from distance, which are often referred to as “multilateral re-
sistance”.12 Disease or pest status can enter the model as another
multilateral resistance term; as used by Yang et al. (2013). Metho-
dological underpinnings of gravity modelling and estimation issues
are addressed in Anderson and Wincoop (2003) and Helpman et al.
(2008), among others. A useful summary is provided by Shepherd
(2013), while Bergeijk and Brakman (2010) present a survey of
gravity models.
Two principal estimation techniques are applied in contemporary
work: the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (ppml) approach, as
applied in Yang et al. (2013) and Schlueter et al. (2009); and, the
Heckman selection approach, as applied in Crivelli and Gröschl
(2016) and Ferro et al. (2015). Both allow for the fact that zero trade
flows are frequent, particularly in disaggregated data, and these zero
trade flows are often explained by high trade costs. The Heckman
selection approach has the advantage of estimating the impact of
disease outbreaks on both the probability of trade occurring between
countries – the “selection equation” may show if prohibitive restric-
tions are imposed – and impacts on the volume of trade, where the
“outcome equation” could show how trade is reduced by compliance
requirements.
There are two main ways to implement Heckman selection esti-
mates. One has selection and outcome equations estimated simulta-
neously using a maximum likelihood estimator. (See Shepherd (2013)
for more detail and Crivelli and Gröschl (2016) for an example.) Al-
ternatively, Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008) propose an esti-
mator to control for firm heterogeneity using two-step estimation.
This estimator is widely referred to as the HMR estimator after the
surnames of the three co-authors. (See WTO (2012) for a discussion
and Ferro et al. (2015) for an example.) We use both but focus our
discussion on the results of the HMR estimator. As a robustness check
we also estimate the first step of the HMR estimator with a logit rather
than probit specification. These results, set out in our sensitivity
6 From http://comtrade.un.org/ which is reported in current US$. As these are official
statistics they exclude product smuggled or otherwise informally traded. They also ex-




9 http://www.cepii.fr/cepii/en/bdd_modele/bdd.asp. As an example, Crevelli and
Groschl (2012) use GDP, population, distance, adjacency, common language, “ever
colony”, “common colonizer”, “colonizer post 1945” and “common religion” as their
gravity controls. A weighted average tariff is included for robustness.
10 http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx. A RTA is considered to be
in force for a given year if its date of entry into force was on or before 1 January of that
year.
11 http://tariffdata.wto.org.
12 Recent examples applied to agricultural trade include Ferro et al. (2015), Yang et al.
(2013), Crivelli and Gröschl (2016) and Schlueter et al. (2009).
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analyses, are consistent with the main results from the HMR specifi-
cation but show a greater selection effect of FMD and BSE on the
probability that a country exports to a market free of these
diseases.
Given the economic theory underpinning modern gravity models,
demand and supply must both be incorporated into the model
(Anderson and Wincoop, 2003). In our model, the GDP of the im-
porting country reflects demand and their own beef production cap-
tures any production shocks that might affect their import demand.
Supply is incorporated principally through beef production in the
exporting country but we also allow for any changes in the GDP of the
exporting country which may lead to increased domestic demand and
thus less beef being exported. We include typical gravity control
variables, along with both exporter and importer fixed effects that
control for country specific factors affecting beef imports or exports.
We initially included time fixed effects, but these showed clear evi-
dence of a time trend and were absorbing some of the information
related to outbreaks in particular years, so we use a linear time trend
instead. Our initial specification is summarized in Table 3, and the
equations are as follows:
Probit selection equation:
> = + + +
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The selection equation for the Heckman and HMR estimators re-
quires that a variable affects the probability of trade occurring between
two countries but not the volume of trade, if it occurs. We use common
language between the importer and exporter. To determine if this
variable was appropriate, we first estimated the equation with common
language in both the selection and outcome equation, with a variable
Table 1
Descriptive profile of markets for exporters according to disease status.
Source: Authors calculations based on OIE and COMTRADE data.
Percentage of Trade (by Value) Percentage of Trade (by number of markets)
Importer recognized as FMD
free
Importer not recognized as FMD
free
Importer recognized as FMD
free
Importer not recognized as FMD
free
No FMD outbreak exporter 77.50% 22.50% 53.57% 46.43%
FMD outbreak exporter 31.20% 68.80% 27.61% 72.39%
Exporter recognized as FMD free 84.57% 15.43% 56.59% 43.41%
Exporter not recognized as FMD free 38.61% 61.39% 33.62% 66.38%
Percentage of Trade (by Value) Percentage of Trade (by number of markets)
Importer has never reported
BSE
Importer has reported BSE Importer has never reported
BSE
Importer has reported BSE
Exporter has never reported BSE 76.84% 23.16% 76.84% 23.16%
Exporter has reported BSE 61.24% 38.76% 61.24% 38.76%
Table 2
Unconditional probability of trade occurring (and value of trade) for various exporter-importer pairs according to disease status.
Source: Authors calculations based on OIE and COMTRADE data. To more accurately show extensive margin changes only countries with a change in FMD outbreak, FMD recognition
status or BSE outbreaks are included in each of these calculations.
Probability of Trade Occurring Average Value of Trade (Where it Occurs) (US$)
Importer recognized as FMD
free
Importer not recognized as FMD
free
Importer recognized as FMD
free
Importer not recognized as FMD
free
No FMD outbreak exporter 9.37% 4.52% 26,642,864 9,697,284
FMD outbreak exporter 2.87% 2.73% 9,821,184 4,857,565
Exporter recognized as FMD free 8.20% 2.87% 28,787,783 4,170,861
Exporter not recognized as FMD free 2.08% 1.36% 10,608,614 6,247,133
Probability of Trade Occurring Average Value of Trade (Where it Occurs) (US$)
Importer has never reported
BSE
Importer has reported BSE Importer has never reported
BSE
Importer has reported BSE
Exporter has never reported BSE 14.50% 49.47% 17,474,373 24,143,802
Exporter has reported BSE 11.45% 54.76% 8,955,393 33,499,135
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for common religion in the selection equation.13 This showed that
common language had no statistically significant effect on the volume
of trade, so it was an appropriate choice for the exclusion restriction.
4. Results
The results of the selection and outcome equations for our initial
specification (as outlined in Table 3) are reported in Table 4. If a
country that had no recent history of FMD – i.e. no outbreak within the
preceding five years – has an outbreak, they can be expected to export
to approximately 12–13% fewer FMD-free markets, but to 5–7% more
markets not recognized as FMD-free.14 These effects are shown by the
coefficients on FMD outbreak exporter and FMD outbreak both. In-
dependently of currently having an FMD outbreak, and of official dis-
ease status, a recent outbreak (defined as occurring any time in the
preceding five years) reduces the probability of exporting to a FMD free
market by between 11% and 13%, while raising the odds of exporting
to a non FMD free market by up to 6%. In addition to these market
participation effects, the value of exports is up to 17% lower for a same-
year FMD outbreak and about 23% lower for a recent outbreak (using
the results of the HMR model in column (1) of Table 4).15 These trade
effects are conditional on beef production in the exporting country, so
to the extent that an FMD outbreak reduces production (e.g. due to
slaughter and disposal) there is an additional pathway to reduced ex-
ports (given the elasticity of 0.7 for export values with respect to pro-
duction in the exporting country).
Even after controlling for FMD outbreaks, whether current or in the
past five years, there appear to be additional effects on beef trade from
the official recognition of disease risk status. A country not recognized
as FMD-free is 8% more likely to export to countries also not recognized
as FMD-free, according to results for the variable FMD risk status both.
However, we caution that the FMD status variables are highly corre-
lated with current or past outbreaks, so it is difficult to separate the two
sets of effects. In order to ensure that our findings are not contaminated
by multicollinearity, we also report estimates that omit these risk status
variables, in columns (3), (4), (7) and (8). The general pattern of results
for the current and recent FMD outbreak variables are the same, with or
without the risk status variables, although the selection towards import
markets that also have FMD gets a bit stronger.
The models in Table 4 are also informative about trade effects of
BSE. A country that has developed BSE is about 12% less likely to ex-
port to a market that has not had BSE. The value of trade that does take
place is reduced by 20% according to the HMR model, and by 30%
according to the Heckman model. Again there is evidence of market
switching, with a country that has had BSE exporting significantly more
to other countries that have also had BSE.
For the control variables, a 10% rise in importing country GDP in-
creases beef demand from each supplying country by just over five
percent, and appears slightly higher with the Heckman model than with
the HMR estimator. Richer countries get beef from more countries.16
Beef production in the exporting country affects the value of exports to
Table 3
Summary of variables included in initial specification.
Variable Description Expected effect on the value of trade
(if it occurs)
Expected effect on the probability of trade
occurring
FMD outbreak exporter Exporter has a FMD outbreak; importer recognized as FMD free Negative Negative
FMD outbreak both Exporter has a FMD outbreak; importer not recognized as FMD
free
Uncertain Uncertain
No FMD importer Importer recognized as FMD free Uncertain Uncertain
FMD risk status exporter Exporter not recognized as FMD free; importer recognized as
FMD free
Negative Negative
FMD risk status both Exporter not recognized as FMD free; importer not recognized as
FMD free
Positive/Uncertain Positive/Uncertain
Recent FMD exporter Exporter has had a FMD outbreak in preceding (5) years;
importer recognized as FMD free
Negative Negative
Recent FMD both Exporter has had a FMD outbreak in preceding (5) years;
importer not recognized as FMD free
Positive/Uncertain Positive/Uncertain
BSE occurrence exporter Exporting country has had a case of BSE but importing country
has not
Negative Negative
BSE occurrence both Both trading partners have had a case of BSE Uncertain Uncertain
No BSE importer Importing country has had a case of BSE Uncertain Uncertain
Year Time trend Positive Positive
GDP importer Nominal GDP in importing country (expressed in logarithmic
form)
Positive Positive
GDP exporter Nominal GDP in exporting country (expressed in logarithmic
form)
Negative Negative
Beef production exporter Nominal beef production in exporting country (expressed in
logarithmic form)
Positive Positive
Beef production importer Nominal beef production in importing country (expressed in
logarithmic form)
Negative Negative
Tariff Applicable tariff rate for beef imports Negative Negative
Distance Distance between trading partners Negative Negative
Contiguity Trading partners are contiguous Positive Positive
Colony A colonial relationship has ever existed between partners Positive Positive
Common legal system Trading partners have a common legal system Positive Positive
RTA A RTA is in force between trading partners Positive Positive
Common language Official language is the same NAa Positive
a Common language is the exclusion restriction and so only appears in the selection equation.
13 This is from http://scholar.harvard.edu/helpman/pages/data-1. We only use this to
check if common language is a plausible exclusion restriction because using the common
religion variable limits our sample size.
14 Outbreaks may occur partway through the year so annual imports will be non-zero
even if they are prohibited for the rest of the year; hence, estimates of the reduction in the
number of markets are likely to be conservative.
15 Since the dependent variable is in logarithms, percentage changes are estimated as
([exp (j)− 1]×100).
16 We use GDP of the exporting country to proxy for income changes that might affect
domestic beef demand and thus beef exports, but did not find this to be significant.
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a given market but not the probability of trade occurring. A RTA be-
tween countries raises the likelihood of trade occurring by 23–24% and
the volume of trade is increased by 57% in the HMR model and by 45%
in the Heckman model. These large effects may be because RTAs pro-
mote transparency (Lejárraga et al., 2013) and potentially reduce non-
tariff barriers (see, for instance, Winchester, 2009) and are in addition
to the effects of a reduction in tariffs – which have a negative effect on
the probability of trade occurring but a less precisely estimated effect
on the value of trade, if it occurs. The distance and contiguity between
countries, their common legal system, and a colonial history all have
the expected effects.
The final notable result from Table 4 is that if the selection and
outcome equation are estimated simultaneously, a statistically sig-
nificant positive selection term (lambda, on the inverse Mills ratio) is
apparent.17 Thus, the unobserved factors that affect the probability of
beef trade between two countries also affect the volume of that trade.
This correlation in the unobservable terms highlights the importance of
Table 4
Results from estimation of initial specification (where a FMD outbreak affects exports for the following 5 years).
Helpman, Melitz & Rubinstein Model Heckman Selection Model

















FMD outbreak exporter −0.191* −0.121*** −0.121 −0.130*** −0.167 −0.124*** −0.120 −0.134***
(0.0984) (0.0288) (0.0922) (0.0274) (0.118) (0.0353) (0.106) (0.0321)
FMD outbreak both −0.0157 0.0505** −0.00431 0.0693*** −0.0506 0.0519* −0.0213 0.0703***
(0.0814) (0.0239) (0.0780) (0.0230) (0.103) (0.0283) (0.0934) (0.0258)
No FMD importer −0.643*** −0.0841** −0.594*** −0.117*** −0.638*** −0.0766 −0.629*** −0.110***
(0.112) (0.0380) (0.107) (0.0352) (0.130) (0.0482) (0.118) (0.0424)
FMD risk status exporter 0.240** 0.00190 ….. ….. 0.200 −0.000864 ….. …..
(0.110) (0.0341) (0.148) (0.0469)
FMD risk status both 0.120 0.0836** ….. ….. 0.183 0.0805* ….. …..
(0.109) (0.0327) (0.152) (0.0429)
Recent FMD exporter −0.262*** −0.113*** −0.219*** −0.134*** −0.261*** −0.109*** −0.246*** −0.131***
(0.0769) (0.0262) (0.0735) (0.0240) (0.0876) (0.0333) (0.0865) (0.0318)
Recent FMD both −0.366*** 0.0397* −0.377*** 0.0611*** −0.417*** 0.0407 −0.405*** 0.0618**
(0.0772) (0.0232) (0.0724) (0.0217) (0.0975) (0.0276) (0.0988) (0.0271)
BSE occurrence exporter −0.233*** −0.122*** −0.229*** −0.123*** −0.356*** −0.124*** −0.356*** −0.125***
(0.0718) (0.0233) (0.0718) (0.0233) (0.0969) (0.0325) (0.0972) (0.0325)
BSE occurrence both 0.142* 0.0516 0.134 0.0582* 0.441*** 0.0623 0.440*** 0.0689
(0.0845) (0.0315) (0.0844) (0.0314) (0.135) (0.0568) (0.136) (0.0568)
No BSE importer 0.00578 −0.0260 −0.00202 −0.0232 0.112 −0.0203 0.108 −0.0176
(0.0868) (0.0288) (0.0867) (0.0288) (0.123) (0.0399) (0.124) (0.0399)
Gravity Model Control Variables
GDP importer 0.544*** 0.0628*** 0.542*** 0.0634*** 0.566*** 0.0627** 0.564*** 0.0633**
(0.0738) (0.0225) (0.0738) (0.0225) (0.104) (0.0311) (0.104) (0.0311)
GDP exporter −0.0963 −0.0163 −0.104 −0.0191 −0.146 −0.0177 −0.157 −0.0202
(0.0770) (0.0232) (0.0768) (0.0231) (0.104) (0.0310) (0.103) (0.0311)
Beef production exporter 0.699*** 0.00668 0.696*** 0.00606 0.703*** 0.0105 0.701*** 0.00987
(0.0812) (0.0238) (0.0811) (0.0239) (0.0990) (0.0312) (0.0989) (0.0312)
Beef production importer −0.108 0.00589 −0.113* 0.00444 −0.116 0.00357 −0.121 0.00215
(0.0664) (0.0187) (0.0664) (0.0187) (0.0824) (0.0262) (0.0825) (0.0263)
Tariff 0.00194* −0.00153*** 0.00182* −0.00148*** 0.00133 −0.00154*** 0.00130 −0.00149***
(0.00103) (0.000304) (0.00102) (0.000302) (0.00184) (0.000558) (0.00184) (0.000558)
Distance −1.53*** −0.680*** −1.52*** −0.681*** −1.607*** −0.683*** −1.608*** −0.684***
(0.136) (0.00999) (0.136) (0.00999) (0.0784) (0.0228) (0.0781) (0.0228)
Contiguity 0.556*** 0.312*** 0.557*** 0.312*** 0.938*** 0.321*** 0.940*** 0.321***
(0.0925) (0.0267) (0.0927) (0.0267) (0.180) (0.0659) (0.180) (0.0659)
Common language ….. 0.309*** ….. 0.308*** ….. 0.306*** ….. 0.305***
(0.0188) (0.0188) (0.0424) (0.0424)
Colony 0.580*** 0.339*** 0.578*** 0.339*** 0.677*** 0.330*** 0.677*** 0.330***
(0.110) (0.0286) (0.111) (0.0286) (0.208) (0.0708) (0.208) (0.0708)
Common legal system 0.437*** 0.130*** 0.435*** 0.130*** 0.473*** 0.134*** 0.473*** 0.134***
(0.0510) (0.0120) (0.0511) (0.0120) (0.0942) (0.0275) (0.0942) (0.0276)
RTA 0.454*** 0.232*** 0.438*** 0.238*** 0.370*** 0.238*** 0.363*** 0.243***
(0.0743) (0.0177) (0.0742) (0.0175) (0.132) (0.0393) (0.130) (0.0391)
Year 0.00930 0.0203*** 0.0102 0.0206*** 0.0174* 0.0208*** 0.0187* 0.0210***
(0.00883) (0.00268) (0.00882) (0.00267) (0.0103) (0.00348) (0.0102) (0.00347)
Importer/Exporter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Number of Observations 23,628 385,100 23,628 385,100 23,628 387,349 23,628 387,349
Number of Censored Obs 361,472 361,472 363,721 363,721
Lambda 0.740*** 0.740***
(0.0574) (0.0573)
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < .01.
** p < .05.
* p < .1
17 Also notable is that the fixed effects for exporters and importers are jointly statis-
tically significant, as confirmed by likelihood ratio tests.
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using selection models rather than restricting the sample to the (non-
random) sub-set of country-pairs where trade actually occurred.
4.1. Robustness analyses: searching over alternative windows for “recent”
outbreaks
To see if the results in Table 4 depend on how “recent” is defined,
we estimated HMR and Heckman models for windows ranging from one
year (i.e. an outbreak the previous year) to six years. The results are in
Table A1 for our full specification and in Table A2 for a truncated
specification without the risk status variables. The effect of a recent
outbreak on both market participation and the value of trade becomes
stronger as the time window lengthens, albeit with effects on market
participation that begin to decrease from the five year window on-
wards. For the smallest possible window, that considers outbreaks oc-
curring one year previously, the pattern of results are quite different
than in all of the other variants. We also considered model selection
tests based on Akaike and Bayesian Information Criterion (AIC and
BIC), where the lower values that are preferred are seen when using the
longer windows. On balance we consider a five-year window to be the
best compromise between statistical fit for the model as a whole and the
significance of key disease outbreak variables. The remainder of our
analysis focuses on results from this framework.
4.2. Sensitivity analyses: an alternative, more structured, specification
The model outlined in Table 3, with estimates in Table 4, is rela-
tively unstructured, in the sense that contemporaneous and previous
disease outbreaks, and the official recognition of disease status, all
entered the model in an unconstrained way. A more structured speci-
fication that captures a common progression where a country may
eradicate a disease, and then obtain official recognition of disease-free
status but still encounter market access challenges if FMD has only
recently been eradicated is outlined in Table 5. This model uses four
new variables: FMD risk without outbreak exporter, FMD risk without
outbreak both, FMD recent without risk status exporter, and FMD recent
without risk status both. These variables capture different combinations
of either having FMD or not, and official recognition as FMD-free or
not. The equations for this specification are as follows:
Probit selection equation:
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The HMR and Heckman selection estimates of this more structured
model are reported in Table 6.18 The interpretation of FMD estimates
from this specification can be illustrated by considering an exporter that
is making advances in the eradication of FMD. If a country eradicates
FMD, the coefficient on the FMD outbreak exporter suggests it can expect
to export to 22% more FMD-free markets. Almost as many markets
(specifically, 19%) that are not FMD-free would be substituted away
from.
If an exporter is then able to obtain official recognition of being
FMD-free (without vaccination), they could expect to continue to sub-
stitute away from those markets that are not FMD-free towards higher
value markets that are FMD-free. Specifically, the results in Table 6
suggest that an exporting country which does not have an FMD out-
break but is not recognized as FMD-free is 6% less likely to export to a
FMD-free market, according to the coefficient on FMD risk without
outbreak exporter. Conversely, this exporter is 12% more likely to export
to a non FMD-free market, according to the coefficient on FMD risk
without outbreak both. In other words, independently of actual out-
breaks, there is a trade effect that follows from official recognition of
disease-free status; these results are consistent with the estimates from
our first, less structured, specification.
Obtaining FMD-free status is not sufficient to negate the trade ef-
fects of a recent FMD outbreak. An exporter that was recognized as
FMD-free without vaccination but that had an FMD outbreak within the
preceding five years is likely to export to 10% fewer countries that are
without FMD, according to the coefficient on the FMD without risk status
exporter variable. For this exporter, the export values to all markets are
also reduced quite substantially.
4.3. Sensitivity analysis: alternative estimators
4.3.1. Use of a logit specification
As a robustness check, we estimated the HMR estimator with a logit
specification for the market participation (selection) equation rather
than with a probit equation as used previously. The results are set out in
Tables A3 and A4, which can be compared with Tables 4 and 6 re-
spectively.
The main difference is that both FMD and BSE appear to have a
much larger effect on the probability of trade occurring in the logit
specification; these effects are typically twice as large as the earlier
estimates. For example, the estimates from the logit estimator imply
that during a FMD outbreak the probability of exporting to a FMD free
market is reduced by 29% whereas there was just a 13% reduction with
the probit specification. Conversely, the probability of exporting to a
market that is not FMD-free increases by 13% for a current outbreak,
compared to a 7% rise shown by the probit specification (these effects
are shown by FMD outbreak exporter and FMD outbreak both). Using a
window of the five years following an outbreak, the logit model sug-
gests that the probability of exporting to a FMD-free market is reduced
by 24–26% while this persistent effect was estimated by probit as just a
13% fall in the odds of exporting to these markets (as seen from Recent
FMD exporter). Meanwhile, an outbreak within the previous five years
increases the odds of exporting to a market that is not FMD-free by
between 9% and 11%, whereas this substitution into lower valued
markets was just 6% with the probit specification. For outbreaks of BSE,
the logit model suggests that a country that has developed BSE is 23%
less likely to export to a market that has not had BSE (and conditional
on trade occurring, the value of exports goes down 19%); in contrast,
the probit specification had a fall in the odds of exporting to BSE-free
markets of just 12%.
The increased effects of outbreaks, of risk, and of official recogni-
tion, on the likelihood of trade occurring under the logit model com-
pared to the probit model also shows up in our more structured spe-
cification (the one based on Table 5). The estimates from the logit
estimator imply that if a country eradicates FMD, it can expect to export
to 49% more FMD free markets, whereas the expected increase was just
22% with the probit estimator. Conversely, eradicating FMD facilitates
substitution away from non-FMD markets: the logit estimator implies
18 With the alternative specification, there is minimal change in the estimated coeffi-
cients on variables other than those relating to FMD so these results are not discussed.
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that a country exports to 31% fewer markets that are not FMD-free
whereas the probit estimator suggests that this substitution effect was to
just 19% fewer markets that are not FMD-free (these effects are shown
by FMD outbreak exporter and FMD outbreak both in Tables 6 and A4).
With the logit estimator, an exporter that is recognized as FMD-free
without vaccination but which has experienced FMD within the pre-
ceding five years is likely to export to 23% fewer countries without
FMD, whereas the estimated effect was 10% from probit estimation (see
FMD recent without risk status exporter and FMD recent without risk status
both).
4.3.2. Estimation with Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood estimation
The microfoundations of the HMR estimator are widely accepted,
and this class of estimator remains the only gravity modelling approach
generally accepted and able to disentangle outcome and selection ef-
fects. Recent papers, have, however, emphasized the importance of the
distributional assumptions, stressing, in particular, the sensitivity of
results from the HMR estimator to the presence of heteroskedasticity.
(See Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2015; Martin and Pham, 2015.) We
therefore estimate our regressions using the other estimator commonly
applied for gravity model estimation: the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum
Likelihood (PPML) estimator proposed in Santos Silva and Tenreyro
(2006).
These results are set out in Table A5. When FMD status is included,
in column (1), this appears to be the decisive variable: a country not
recognized as free of foot and mouth is expected to export 47% less to
markets recognized as FMD free and 149% more to markets that are
also not recognized as FMD free (these come from the coefficients of
−0.64 and 0.91 on FMD risk status exporter and FMD risk status both).
With PPML estimation, neither a current nor a recent outbreak have
statistically significant effects on the value of exports. However, as
noted earlier, the FMD status variables are highly correlated with cur-
rent or past outbreaks, so it is difficult to separate these effects.
Column 2 in Table A5 therefore excludes these risk status variables.
We see that a current outbreak leads to a 37% decrease in exports to
markets recognized as FMD free, and no change to other markets. A
recent outbreak – within the past 5 years – leads to a 21% decrease in
exports to markets recognized as FMD free, but a 116% increase in
exports to markets not recognized as FMD free. This evidence of market
substitution is consistent with the results from the HMR specification,
but the changes in market values are larger with ppml estimation. As
with our HMR and Heckman estimation, we find that having reported
BSE will lead to a decrease in exports to markets that have not reported
BSE.
The estimates of our alternative, more structured, specification are
broadly consistent, but it is notable that the ppml estimates suggest a
large and statistically significant decrease in exports to markets re-
cognized as FMD free during an outbreak. Overall, these robustness
tests with the ppml estimator further support our conclusion of market
switching although they do suggest that the estimates of the effect of
disease outbreaks coming from the Heckman and HMR estimators may
be understated.
5. Discussion and conclusions
The results reported here add to the literature that examines the
impact of animal diseases on international trade. In particular, we have
shown how the widely used gravity model of international trade can
provide meaningful estimates of the implications for exporters of an
outbreak of diseases such as FMD and BSE, both during and after an
outbreak. A key insight from our analysis is that there is clear evidence
that even after FMD is eradicated, an outbreak will continue to affect
exports in the medium term. Regaining official recognition of FMD-free
status may assist in recovering access to markets, which is important for
exporters because there is clear evidence of there being a shift in the
export profile towards lower value markets that are not recognized as
FMD-free following an outbreak.
For countries that are free of FMD, our results suggest that the
modelling of potential impacts of an FMD outbreak should incorporate
these medium-run substitution effects. If medium-run effects are ig-
nored, one may misunderstand the trade impacts of an outbreak. Our
analysis suggests that incorporating trade effects that last for five years
after an outbreak is consistent with the patterns in the international
trade data, as revealed in our gravity models. On the other hand, an
analysis solely focused on “lost” markets does not tell the full story, as
we find evidence of substitution towards lower value markets that are
not FMD-free. Given this possibility of market switching, policy makers
and exporters in FMD free countries may wish to develop relationships
and market access arrangements to facilitate exports to these markets if
an outbreak does occur.
For countries that are not free of FMD, we show that if the disease
were to be eradicated, after several years an exporter should be able to
substitute towards higher value FMD-free markets. Moreover, there is
an effect of official recognition of disease-free status, on top of the ef-
fects of actual (current or past) outbreaks. We see similar market-
switching effects for outbreaks of BSE, although we are not able to
separately estimate the effects of current and previous episodes or the
effect of official recognition of disease-free status because there are far
fewer episodes of BSE than of FMD in our data. An overall implication is
that the value of these changes in export market profile should be taken
into account when considering the benefits of disease eradication pro-
grams, biosecurity efforts, and also trade policy more generally.
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Table 5
Summary of alternative FMD variables.
Variable Description Expected sign in Outcome
Equation
Expected sign in Selection
Equation
FMD outbreak exporter If exporter country has a FMD outbreak and importer is recognized as FMD
free
Negative Negative
FMD outbreak both If exporter has a FMD outbreak and importer is not recognized as FMD free Uncertain Uncertain
No FMD importer If importing country is recognized as FMD free Uncertain Uncertain
FMD risk without outbreak
exporter
If exporter does not have a FMD outbreak, but is not recognized as FMD free
while importer is recognized as FMD free
Negative Negative
FMD risk without outbreak both If exporter does not have a FMD outbreak and both importer and exporter are
not recognized as FMD free
Positive/Uncertain Positive/Uncertain
FMD recent without risk status
exporter
If exporter has had a FMD outbreak in preceding 5 years but is recognized as
FMD free; importer is recognized as FMD free
Negative Negative
FMD recent without risk status
both
If exporter has had a FMD outbreak in preceding 5 years but is recognized as
FMD free; importer not recognized as FMD free
Positive/Uncertain Positive/Uncertain





Results with alternative specification of FMD variables.









FMD outbreak exporter −0.0718 −0.222*** −0.0972 −0.226***
(0.121) (0.0356) (0.148) (0.0456)
FMD outbreak both −0.065 0.191*** −0.0660 0.190***
(0.116) (0.0331) (0.152) (0.0404)
No FMD importer −0.402*** 0.0329 −0.396*** 0.0363
(0.0874) (0.0288) (0.102) (0.0377)
FMD risk without outbreak exporter 0.127 −0.0643* 0.0857 −0.0649
(0.108) (0.0329) (0.146) (0.0454)
FMD risk without outbreak both −0.0845 0.116*** −0.0523 0.113***
(0.107) (0.0318) (0.155) (0.0423)
FMD recent without risk status exporter −0.226*** −0.104*** −0.238** −0.0965*
(0.100) (0.0379) (0.118) (0.0520)
FMD recent without risk status both −0.660*** 0.0347 −0.733*** 0.0338
(0.113) (0.0353) (0.152) (0.0459)
BSE occurrence exporter −0.211*** −0.120*** −0.338*** −0.122***
(0.0718) (0.0232) (0.0969) (0.0323)
BSE occurrence both 0.156* 0.0583* 0.461*** 0.0687
(0.0846) (0.0314) (0.135) (0.0567)
No BSE importer 0.0121 −0.0209 0.118 −0.0151
(0.0868) (0.0287) (0.123) (0.0398)
Gravity Model Control Variables
GDP importer 0.526*** 0.0598*** 0.550*** 0.0597*
(0.0736) (0.0224) (0.104) (0.0309)
GDP exporter −0.0524 −0.0156 −0.100 −0.0169
(0.0766) (0.0229) (0.104) (0.0307)
Beef production exporter 0.705*** 0.0127 0.709*** 0.0164
(0.0810) (0.0236) (0.0986) (0.0308)
Beef production importer −0.114** 0.00630 −0.119 0.00411
(0.0662) (0.0185) (0.0823) (0.0260)
Tariff 0.00188** −0.00152*** 0.00125 −0.00153***
(0.00103) (0.000303) (0.00184) (0.000556)
Distance −1.47*** −0.677*** −1.580*** −0.680***
(0.136) (0.00989) (0.0787) (0.0228)
Contiguity 0.544*** 0.313*** 0.938*** 0.323***
(0.0927) (0.0264) (0.179) (0.0655)
Common language ….. 0.305*** ….. 0.301***
(0.0185) (0.0419)
Colony 0.579*** 0.347*** 0.701*** 0.339***
(0.112) (0.0284) (0.208) (0.0705)
Common legal system 0.439*** 0.125*** 0.482*** 0.130***
(0.0504) (0.0118) (0.0934) (0.0275)
RTA 0.448*** 0.233*** 0.374*** 0.239***
(0.0744) (0.0175) (0.132) (0.0391)
Year 0.00685 0.0201*** 0.0157 0.0205***
(0.00881) (0.00266) (0.0103) (0.00347)
Importer/Exporter FE YES YES YES YES
Number of Observations 23,842 373,763 23,822 397,818
Number of Censored Observations 349,921 373,976
Lambda 0.735***
(0.0570)
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < .01.
** p < .05.
* p < .1.
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Table A3
Results from estimation of initial specification (logit estimation).











−0.186* −0.284*** −0.110 −0.289***
(0.0986) (0.0561) (0.0921) (0.0534)
FMD outbreak
both
−0.00916 0.112** −0.007 0.129***
(0.0811) (0.0455) (0.0774) (0.0436)
No FMD importer −0.644*** −0.216*** −0.586*** −0.238***
(0.112) (0.0712) (0.106) (0.0664)
FMD risk status
exporter








−0.252*** −0.244*** −0.205*** −0.258***
(0.0767) (0.0493) (0.0724) (0.0453)
Recent FMD both −0.364*** 0.0893** −0.386*** 0.107***
(0.0770) (0.0440) (0.0719) (0.0410)
BSE occurrence
exporter
−0.215*** −0.232*** −0.210*** −0.233***
(0.0709) (0.0433) (0.0708) (0.0433)
BSE occurrence
both
0.136 −0.0366 0.128 −0.0326
(0.0833) (0.0587) (0.0832) (0.0585)
No BSE importer −0.00427 −0.114** −0.0128 −0.111**
(0.0869) (0.0548) (0.0868) (0.0548)
Gravity Model Control Variables
GDP importer 0.525*** 0.128*** 0.521*** 0.129***
(0.0734) (0.0429) (0.0734) (0.0429)
GDP exporter −0.0813 −0.0118 −0.0886 −0.0150
(0.0766) (0.0436) (0.0764) (0.0435)
Beef production
exporter
0.691*** −0.00117 0.689*** −0.00235
(0.0808) (0.0469) (0.0808) (0.0469)
Beef production
importer
−0.105 0.0127 −0.110* 0.0112
(0.0661) (0.0360) (0.0661) (0.0360)
Tariff 0.0023** −0.00299*** 0.00218** −0.00295***
(0.00102) (0.000596) (0.00101) (0.000595)
Distance −1.465*** −1.333*** −1.46*** −1.334***
(0.126) (0.0190) (0.126) (0.0190)
Contiguity 0.592*** 0.592*** 0.594*** 0.592***
(0.0880) (0.0510) (0.0881) (0.0510)
Common
language
….. 0.654*** ….. 0.652***
(0.0363) (0.0362)
Colony 0.522*** 0.620*** 0.521*** 0.621***
(0.104) (0.0561) (0.1038) (0.0561)
Common legal
system
0.415*** 0.248*** 0.413*** 0.248***
(0.0492) (0.0228) (0.0492) (0.0228)
RTA 0.429*** 0.458*** 0.410*** 0.461***
(0.0723) (0.0339) (0.0717) (0.0337)
Year 0.00739 0.0382*** 0.00821 0.0386***











Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < .01.
** p < .05.
* p < .1
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Table A4
Results from estimation of alternative specification (logit estimation).
Variables Outcome Selection
FMD outbreak exporter −0.0622 −0.487***
(0.121) (0.0690)
FMD outbreak both −0.0945 0.314***
(0.113) (0.0632)
No FMD importer −0.412*** 0.0327
(0.0869) (0.0546)
FMD risk without outbreak exporter 0.128 −0.131**
(0.107) (0.0631)
FMD risk without outbreak both −0.118 0.155**
(0.105) (0.0607)
FMD recent without risk status exporter −0.227** −0.230***
(0.100) (0.0696)
FMD recent without risk status both −0.659*** 0.0810
(0.112) (0.0660)
BSE occurrence exporter −0.195*** −0.228***
(0.0708) (0.0430)
BSE occurrence both 0.153* −0.0226
(0.0833) (0.0586)
No BSE importer 0.00215 −0.103*
(0.0868) (0.0546)
Gravity Model Control Variables
GDP importer 0.507*** 0.122***
(0.0732) (0.0427)
GDP exporter −0.038 −0.0107
(0.0762) (0.0432)
Beef production exporter 0.698*** 0.0128
(0.0806) (0.0464)



















Number of Observations 23,842 373,763
Number of Censored Observations 349,921
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < .01.
** p < .05.
* p < .1.
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Table A5
Results from Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (ppml) estimation (where a FMD outbreak affects exports for the following 5 years).
Initial Specification Alternative Specification






FMD outbreak exporter −0.205 −0.468*** FMD outbreak exporter −0.875***
(0.159) (0.154) (0.234)
FMD outbreak both −0.159 0.0769 FMD outbreak both 0.857***
(0.182) (0.180) (0.226)
No FMD importer 0.390** −0.0199 No FMD importer 0.365**
(0.165) (0.150) (0.153)
FMD risk status exporter −0.641*** NA FMD risk without outbreak exporter −0.642***
(0.236) (0.245)
FMD risk status both 0.914*** NA FMD risk without outbreak both 0.995***
(0.248) (0.232)
Recent FMD exporter 0.0129 −0.246** FMD recent without risk status exporter 0.120**
(0.0634) (0.112) (0.0537)
Recent FMD both 0.153 0.772*** FMD recent without risk status both −0.0955
(0.135) (0.160) (0.343)
BSE occurrence exporter −0.196 −0.195 BSE occurrence exporter −0.209
(0.194) (0.202) (0.193)
BSE occurrence both −0.382*** −0.294* BSE occurrence both −0.394***
(0.147) (0.158) (0.146)
No BSE importer 0.211 0.262 No BSE importer 0.217
(0.167) (0.178) (0.167)
GDP importer 1.189*** 1.253*** GDP importer 1.169***
(0.214) (0.230) (0.207)
GDP exporter −0.200 −0.159 GDP exporter −0.230
(0.143) (0.154) (0.144)
Beef production exporter 0.967*** 0.920*** Beef production exporter 0.985***
(0.199) (0.218) (0.195)
Beef production importer −0.680*** −0.671*** Beef production importer −0.670***
(0.172) (0.182) (0.171)
Tariff −0.00749*** −0.00467** Tariff −0.00772***
(0.00202) (0.00217) (0.00200)
Distance −1.595*** −1.555*** Distance −1.591***
(0.128) (0.130) (0.127)
Contiguity −0.0125 0.0346 Contiguity −0.00854
(0.181) (0.183) (0.180)
Common language 0.0413 0.0640 Common language 0.0513
(0.206) (0.223) (0.206)
Colony −0.0316 −0.0607 Colony −0.0305
(0.267) (0.260) (0.268)
Common legal system 0.629*** 0.595*** Common legal system 0.620***
(0.136) (0.143) (0.136)
RTA 0.872*** 1.064*** RTA 0.869***
(0.286) (0.300) (0.285)
Year 0.0130 0.00947 Year 0.0148
(0.0104) (0.0108) (0.0105)
Importer/Exporter FE YES YES Importer/Exporter FE YES
Number of Observations 361,472 361,472 Number of Observations 373,763
Number of Dropped Obs 25,877 25,877 Number of Dropped Obs 24,055
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < .01.
** p < .05.
* p < .1.
M. Webb et al. Food Policy 75 (2018) 93–108
107
Implications (Chapter 4).
Lloyd, T.A., McCorriston, S., Morgan, C.W., Rayner, A.J., 2006. Food scares, market
power and price transmission: the UK BSE crisis. Eur. Rev. Agric. Econ. 33 (2),
119–147.
Martin, Will J., Pham, C.S., 2015. Estimating the Gravity Model when Zero Trade Flows
are Frequent and Economically Determined. World Bank Working Paper.
Pendell, D.L., Marsh, T.L., Coble, K.H., Lusk, J.L., Szmania, S.C., 2015. Economic as-
sessment of FMDv releases from the national bio and agro defense facility. PLoS ONE
10 (6), e0129134. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0129134.
Santos Silva, J.M.C., Tenreyro, S., 2006. The log of gravity. Rev. Econ. Stat. 88 (4),
641–658.
Santos Silva, J.M.C., Tenreyro, S., 2015. Trading partners and trading volumes: im-
plementing the Helpman-Melitz-Rubinstein model empirically. Oxford Bull. Econ.
Stat. 77 (1), 93–105.
Schlueter, Simon Wilhelm, 2009. Impact of Regulatory Measures on International Trade
in Meat Products (Ph.D. Thesis). University of Bonn.
Schlueter, Simon W., Wieck, Christine, Heckelei, Thomas, 2009. Regulatory policies in
meat trade: is there evidence for least trade-distorting sanitary regulations? Am. J.
Agric. Econ. 91 (5), 1484–1490.
Schroeder, Ted C., Pendell, Dustin L., Sanderson, Michael W., Mcreynolds, Sara, 2015.
Economic impact of alternative FMD emergency vaccination strategies in the mid-
western United States. J. Agric. Appl. Econ. 47 (01), 47–76.
Shepherd, Ben, 2013. The gravity model of international trade: a user guide. ARTNeT
Books Res. Rep.
Tapia, Ciro, Iglesias, Daniel, Lema, Daniel, Ghezan, Graciela, 2011. Assessment of
Sanitary NTM upon Beef Trade Flows for the UE (Germany) and Argentine. 11/08.
NTM-IMPACT Working Paper.
Tozer, Peter, Marsh, Thomas L., 2012. Domestic and trade impacts of foot-and-mouth
disease on the Australian beef industry. Aust. J. Agric. Resour. Econ. 56 (3), 385–404.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2012. National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility
(NBAF): Updated Site-Specific Biosafety and Biosecurity Mitigation Risk Assessment.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate.
Wieck, Christine, Holland, David W., 2010. The economic effect of the Canadian BSE
outbreak on the US economy. Appl. Econ. 42 (8), 935–946.
Wilson, J.S., Otsuki, T., Majumdsar, B., 2003. Balancing food safety and risk: do drug
residue limits affect international trade in beef?. J. Int. Trade Econ. Dev. 12 (4),
377–402.
Winchester, Niven, 2009. Is there a dirty little secret? Non-tariff barriers and the gains
from trade. J. Policy Model. 31 (6), 819–834. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpolmod.
2009.08.004.
WTO, 2012. A Practical Guide to Trade Policy Analysis. Available at<www.wto.org/
english/res_e/publications_e/practical_guide12_e.htm> .
Yang, Shang-Ho, Reed, Michael, Saghaian, Sayed, 2013. International pork trade and
foot-and-mouth disease. J. Int. Agric. Trade Dev. 9 (1), 1–19.










CHAPTER III: MARKET ACCESS IMPLICATIONS OF NON-













Market access implications of non-tariff measures:  
Estimates for four developed country markets 
 
Mike Webb 




University of Waikato 
 
We quantify the effects of non-tariff measures on the extensive margin of trade, 
examining the number of countries exporting particular products to Canada, the 
European Union, New Zealand and the United States. We find that non-tariff measures 
that impose a conformity requirement, i.e. testing, certification or inspection, will 
reduce the number of countries exporting to these markets. Conformity requirements 
imposed for sanitary or phytosanitary reasons have the largest effect in Canada, 
reducing the number of exporting countries by 47 percent compared to the situation 
where no compliance requirement is imposed. Conformity requirements imposed for 
other reasons covered by the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade have the 
largest effect in Canada and New Zealand, reducing the number of exporting countries 
by 27 percent compared to the situation where no compliance requirement is imposed. 
However, we generally find a statistically significant positive effect for non-tariff 
measures that do not impose a compliance burden, suggesting that such measures may 
facilitate trade.  
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Non-tariff measures (NTMs)1 have been receiving increased attention in recent 
years, both by policy makers and in the literature (see Beghin, Maertens, & Swinnen, 
2015, for a summary). NTMs can be much more significant barriers to trade than tariffs, 
particularly as many tariffs have already been substantially lowered over time (see, for 
instance, Egger, Francois, Manchin, & Nelson, 2015; Kee, Nicita, & Olarreaga, 2009). 
However, obtaining reliable data on NTMs is a challenge due to their frequency, variety 
and the fact that they are enshrined in a wide range of domestic regulations.  
Empirical papers have responded to NTM data challenges in various ways. 
Some use surveys (Berden & Francois, 2015). Others change the focus from 
measurement to instead studying additional benefits of Free Trade Agreements – 
beyond their tariff-reducing effects – which is that they can also assist in reducing the 
effects of NTMs on trade (Egger et al, 2015; Winchester, 2009). However, with the 
exception of papers related to seminal work by Kee et al (2009), which uses an early 
version of the UNCTAD TRAINS database, most previous research seeking to quantify 
effects of NTMs across wide panels of countries has relied on data on NTMs either 
notified to the World Trade Organization (WTO) under obligations imposed by the 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and the 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, or raised as specific concerns by WTO 
members. These notifications and specific concerns may give rise to measurement 
errors, because the agencies responsible for notifying the WTO, often trade ministries, 
                                                           
1 NTMs are typically defined as policy measures, other than tariffs, which may have an impact on 
international trade in goods and services. 
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may not be aware of all regulations that may constitute NTMs or they may not have 
the resources and incentives to report these fully in a systematic manner. Moreover, 
measures raised as specific concerns at the WTO constitute a subset of all NTMs, as 
only the most problematic are raised (see Grant & Arita, 2017, for a discussion focused 
on the sanitary and phytosanitary context). 
In this paper we contribute to the literature on NTMs by applying a count data 
framework in a novel way to a comprehensive new database of NTMs. We examine 
the effect of NTMs on the “extensive margin” of trade, in terms of the probability that 
bilateral trade in particular products will occur between countries. The extensive 
margin of trade is an important area of focus in the theoretical and empirical trade 
literature (see Foellmi, Hepenstrick, & Zweimuller, 2017; Santos Silva, Tenreyro, & 
Wei, 2014; Debaere & Mostashari, 2010; Feenstra & Ma, 2014; Bernard, Jensen, 
Redding, & Schott, 2007; Felbermayr & Kohler, 2006). Changes to the extensive 
margin have been shown to have important implications for international trade. On the 
one hand, increasing the number of exporting countries increases the welfare of the 
importing country (see Broda & Weinstein, 2006, building on the seminal “love-of-
variety” work by Krugman, 1979, and  Feenstra & Weinstein, 2017, for an exploration 
of competition effects).  However, perhaps even more important for global welfare are 
the productivity benefits to firms and countries from participating in exporting (see, for 
instance, Feenstra & Kee, 2008), especially when they export to developed countries.  
It is difficult to untangle effects of firms self-selecting into export markets 
(Clerides et al, 1998) from learning-by-exporting effects (de Loecker, 2007). However, 
a randomized intervention that reduced trade costs shows that exporting raises the 
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technical efficiency of participating firms  (Atkin, Khandelwal, & Osman, 2017).2 
Moreover, if exports are from firms in developing countries to buyers in developed 
countries, there are stronger knowledge flows, and greater incentives for the firms to 
absorb and implement this knowledge. It is therefore no surprise that quality positively 
co-varies with income per capita in the export destination (Hallak, 2006; Hallak and 
Sivadasan, 2013). To the extent that NTMs imposed by developed countries may limit 
participation of developing country firms in exporting, they can be expected to 
reinforce the large cross-country gaps in productivity. 
The new NTM database that we utilize in this paper is compiled under the 
leadership of UNCTAD and other international agencies.3 For each country in this 
database, teams of researchers worked through the country’s legislation, regulations, 
and other official rules to identify all NTMs that might affect merchandise trade. A 
common classification framework was used, with UNCTAD working closely with all 
research teams to ensure consistency of approach (UNCTAD, 2013, and UNCTAD, 
2014).4 We focus here on the effect of NTMs on the number of countries exporting 
specific products to Canada, the European Union, New Zealand and the United States. 
These are the first developed country markets for which these types of detailed and 
comprehensive NTM data have been collected.  
                                                           
2 A survey of the literature on the effects of exporting on productivity is provided by Wagner (2007). 
3 Other early applications of this database include Cadot & Gourdon (2014 and 2016) and Vanzetti, 
Peters, & Knebel (2014) - though these focus primarily on developing economies. 
4 This database is a considerable extension of that used in Kee, Nicita, & Olarreaga (2009) as it has a 
more detailed NTM classification and was compiled in a more systematic and comprehensive manner. 




We find that NTMs imposing a conformity requirement, i.e. testing, 
certification or inspection, significantly reduce the number of countries exporting to a 
market. This is consistent with previous research by Crivelli & Gröschl (2016) which 
finds that sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) compliance measures that have been raised 
as a concern at the WTO reduce the number of countries exporting to a market. 
However, our current research is much broader, showing that compliance measures 
have an effect for both SPS and technical barriers to trade (TBT) related measures, and 
the effect is not just for those measures that are sufficiently problematic to be raised at 
the WTO. 
The validity of our inferences is enhanced by the fact that we analyze separately 
four quite different markets with different approaches to trade policy. At one end of the 
spectrum, New Zealand is a small open economy with little influence on international 
standard adoption, given the size of its economy. At the other end of the spectrum, both 
the United States and European Union have significant scope for negotiating and 
bargaining within their trade policy and their standards are more likely to be adopted, 
given the importance of their markets to manufacturers. 
By concentrating on the number of countries exporting a product, we are able 
to adopt a parsimonious regression modelling approach that abstracts from the level of 
detail about each of the importer-exporter dyads that is required in gravity model 
estimation. We can therefore undertake separate regressions for each of the individual 
markets, which provides flexibility with regard to possible regulatory differences 
between countries, and allows the potential for interactions with country-level 




Gravity analysis is the benchmark for analyzing the effects of policy measures 
on trade, including NTMs. Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008) detail a gravity 
model specification allowing for fixed costs and variable transport “melting iceberg” 
costs for exporting from one market to another. Compliance requirements from NTMs 
can readily be conceptualized within this framework: fixed costs from NTMs include 
transactions costs associated with learning import requirements or obtaining any 
necessary certification; variable costs could include testing of all, or a sample of, 
products shipped. 
Gravity modelling is widely applied, but two applications are of particular 
relevance to our work.5 Crivelli & Gröschl (2016) use a Heckman selection model and 
data on specific concerns about SPS measures raised at the WTO. They find that such 
SPS measures reduce the probability of exporting to these markets but, conditional on 
trade occurring, values exported are higher. When they separate effects of conformity 
and other requirements, they find that it is the conformity measures that have negative 
effects on market entry. Ferro, Otsuki and Wilson (2015) apply the Helpman, Melitz 
and Rubinstein (2008) framework to examine the effect that maximum residual limits 
for pesticides have on trade for 66 fruit and vegetable products for 61 importing 
countries. They find that the main effect of tighter standards in a market is to reduce 
the likelihood of an exporting country exporting to this market. The effect on the 
volume of trade – if trade takes place – is less robust but likely to be indistinguishable 
                                                           
5 To illustrate how widespread gravity modeling is, Google Scholar records over 2,500 citations to 
each of the two seminal papers which set out the main approaches to estimating these models: 
Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008) and Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006). 
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from zero. Other applications of gravity models to NTMs include an influential paper 
by Otsuki, Wilson and Sewadeh (2001), and Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2009), which 
is frequently cited in computable general equilibrium (CGE) modelling of the effects 
of NTMs.6 
A separate strand of the literature examines an alternative definition of the 
extensive margin: the number of products that a country exports to a market. Export 
diversification by developing countries has received particular attention (Dennis & 
Shepherd, 2007; Santos Silva et al., 2014). Another set of papers extend the Poisson 
pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator proposed by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006). 
This approach is suited for variables that vary across country pairs, but not across 
products, with applications including: Bista & Tomasik (2017) on the effect of time 
zones; Flam & Nordström (2006) on effects of Euro membership; and Dutt, Mihov, & 
Van Zandt (2013) on effects of WTO membership.  
Other papers use firm level data to examine the effects of NTMs on the 
probability of exports occurring, and the value of exports. El-Enbaby, Hendy, & Zaki 
(2016) examine the impact of SPS measures notified to the WTO on Egyptian firm 
exports. They find that SPS measures reduce the probability of a firm exporting to that 
market but find no statistically significant effect on the intensive margin. Fontagné, 
Orefice, Piermartini, & Rocha (2015) find that SPS measures that have been raised as 
concerns at the WTO reduce the probability of French firms exporting and the value of 
exports. These effects are reduced for larger firms. 
                                                           
6 See Berden & Francois (2015) for a discussion of different measures drawn on in CGE research. 
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Also relevant is the work of Jaud, Cadot, and Suwa-Eisenmann (2013), which 
examines effects of SPS measures on the concentration of supply of agricultural 
products exported to the EU. Their measure of concentration is the Theil entropy index, 
which they calculate for EU-12 agri-food imports at the tariff line level between 1988 
and 2005.7 This concentration index is regressed on a measure of sanitary risk that is 
developed by using food alert notifications, with the authors finding that both the 
number of exporters and the market share of the top exporters are higher for higher risk 
products. 
In the current paper, we concentrate on a framework centred on the number of 
exporters (extensive margin), based on the underlying theory of the gravity model. 
Consequently, our outcome measure is the number of exporters, rather than a 
concentration index such as the Theil index used in Jaud, Cadot, and Suwa-Eisenmann 
(2013). As explained later in this paper, we find our specification to be more tractable 
than a gravity model. Our framework is appropriate because the policy issue under 
investigation is whether NTMs reduce the number of suppliers, rather than any effect 
on the relative value of trade supplied by each exporting country. A change in the 
number of supplying countries is also more readily measured, and may be better 
understood by policy makers. Indeed, some of the same policy makers in rich countries 
may be providing donor funding for trade facilitation, such as the WTOs Aid-For-Trade 
initiative, to help poor countries overcome trade-related constraints in order to enter 
export markets.  
                                                           
7 For earlier applications of the Theil, Herfindel and other concentration indices to patterns of export 
diversification, see Cadot, Carrère & Strauss-Kahn (2010). 
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DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Our data on non-tariff measures are from the NTM database coordinated by 
UNCTAD.8  These data were collected in 2014 (for the European Union and the United 
States) and in 2015 (for Canada and New Zealand). There is not yet a time series 
dimension available that can be exploited in the analysis.  
In constructing variables from the UNCTAD database, we distinguish between 
non-tariff measures imposed for sanitary and phytosanitary reasons (Chapter A of the 
UNCTAD classification), and non-tariff measures imposed for other reasons classified 
as technical barriers to trade (UNCTAD Chapter B). This distinction is important 
because SPS and TBT tend to be imposed for different reasons and are disciplined by 
separate WTO agreements. Moreover, we further distinguish between those NTMs that 
impose a performance or quality/safety requirement while minimizing the compliance 
costs in assessing compliance, for instance through recognition of suppliers’ 
declarations, and those that additionally specify a way of assessing conformity which 
imposes additional burdens on firms, through either testing, certification, or 
inspection.9   
In our econometric analysis, described later in this section, we use dummy 
variables to capture the presence of these different types of NTMs. We create five 
dummy variables, one for each type of non-tariff measure, where the dummy is set to 
                                                           
8 Data are available at http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DITC/Trade-Analysis/Non-Tariff-Measures/NTMs-
Data.aspx  
9 Cadot, Malouche & Saez (2009) discuss the importance of streamlining conformity assessment 
procedures, including adopting a “risk based” approach. In the dataset, each conformity requirement is 
coupled with a SPS or TBT requirement, which is the requirement that is being tested for compliance. 
The existence of a matched SPS or TBT requirement was checked as part of the data quality assurance 
process, with a limited number of SPS or TBT measures added where a SPS or TBT compliance 
measure was recorded in the database without a matching measure. 
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equal one, if for each subheading of the Harmonized System (HS) (described below), 
at least one NTM applies to some products within this subheading. Table 1 describes 
each of these NTM dummy variables. 
Table 1: NTM Variables 
SPS Compliance 
Measure 
At least one of the following requirements is applied for 
SPS reasons: testing (UNCTAD grouping A82); 
certification (UNCTAD grouping A83); or inspection 
(UNCTAD grouping A84). 
Geographical 
Restriction 
A geographical restriction on origin for SPS reasons is 
present (UNCTAD grouping A12). As this type of NTM 
restriction by definition reduces the number of countries 
exporting it is treated separately. See Webb, Strutt, & Rae 
(2017) for a discussion of this type of NTM. 
SPS Measure At least one SPS measure other than testing, certification, 
inspection and geographical restrictions applies i.e. 
UNCTAD grouping A1 (prohibitions/restrictions) 
(excluding A12), A2 (tolerance/substance limits), A3 
(labelling, packaging etc.), A4 (hygienic requirements), 
A5 (treatment requirements), A6 (production 
requirements), A8 (excluding A82, A83 and A84 i.e. 
production registration, traceability and quarantine) and 
A9 (other SPS). 
TBT Compliance 
Measure 
At least one of the following requirements is applied for 
TBT reasons: testing (UNCTAD grouping B82); 
certification (UNCTAD grouping B83); or inspection 
(UNCTAD grouping B84). 
TBT Measure At least one TBT measure other than testing, certification, 
inspection and geographical restrictions applies i.e. 
UNCTAD grouping B1 (prohibitions/restrictions), B2 
(tolerance/substance limits), B3 (labelling, packaging 
etc.), B4 (production requirements), B6 (identity 
requirements), B7 (performance requirements, B8 
(excluding B82-B84) i.e. production registration, 
traceability and quarantine), B9 (other TBT). 
 
 
The number of exporting countries is calculated based on data on imports into 
each of the four markets that we focus on, using data at the six-digit level of the 
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Harmonized System (HS) from the UN COMTRADE database.10 We use the year 
corresponding to when the NTM data were collected i.e. 2014 for the EU and the 
United States and 2015 for Canada and New Zealand. The six-digit level is the most 
detailed level at which trade data are available in COMTRADE with classifications 
uniformly applied by customs agencies around the world. The NTM data were 
collected at the HS six-digit level for the United States, but are available at a more 
detailed eight-digit level for Canada, the European Union, and New Zealand. We use 
the six-digit data for our main results but report a sensitivity analysis with the eight-
digit data. 
As products in some sectors may naturally be supplied by fewer countries, it 
was important to control for the sector when estimating count data regressions of how 
many exporting countries there are. To do this, we constructed “sector” variables using 
a mapping of six-digit HS subheadings to 42 goods sectors in the widely used Global 
Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database.11 However, we do not control for tariffs when 
modelling the number of exporters because the bilateral variation that results from 
preferential trade agreements and other preferences means that there is not a single 
measure of tariffs that is applied on all imports. Beyond controlling for differences 
between the 42 sectors, we do not split the sample to separate agricultural and non-
agricultural subsamples. While SPS measures are mainly thought of as applying to 
                                                           
10 https://comtrade.un.org/  
11 The concordance is available from http://wits.worldbank.org/product_concordance.html. Further 
information on the GTAP database is available at www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/databases/v9/. While 
there are 44 goods sectors, raw milk is a domestic only sector in the GTAP database and electricity is 
not traded as a good. 
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agricultural trade, they can also apply to non-agricultural products (e.g. farm 
machinery) and TBTs are found in many sectors.12 
Summary statistics for our data are reported in Table 2. As the HS six-digit 
subheadings are common across countries, we have 5204 observations for each 
country. New Zealand typically has the fewest countries exporting to it, with a mean 
of 15 and a maximum of 88 exporting countries supplying a product. In contrast, the 
European Union typically has the most countries exporting to it, with a mean of 38 and 
a maximum of 180 exporting countries supplying a product. The data appear over-
dispersed, with a conditional variance much larger than the conditional mean. As we 
discuss later, this over-dispersion has implications for the choice of estimator. 
Table 2: Summary Statistics  
Canada EU NZ USA 
Number of Observations 5204 5204 5204 5204 
Mean: Number of Exporters 25.82 37.69 14.65 25.75 
Variance: Number of Exporters 502.61 787.37 208.69 439.08 
Standard Deviation: Number of Exporters 22.42 28.06 14.45 20.95 
Conditional Mean: Number of Exporters (where > 0) 26.08 37.96 16.24 26.13 
Conditional Variance: Number of Exporters (where > 0) 500.86 782.77 205.52 435.62 
Maximum: Number of Exporters 173 180 88 157 
Dummy Variables (Frequency):  
   
SPS Measure 1268 1555 1590 2019 
SPS Compliance Measure 598 853 1065 1516 
TBT Measure 4086 4837 3003 5053 
TBT Compliance Measure 3766 3953 340 4005 
Geographical Restriction 15 709 163 157 
 
As data on the number of exporters is a count variable, we use econometric 
estimators that are designed for such data.  A common starting point with count data is 
                                                           
12 In our robustness analysis we do consider differences between agricultural and non-agricultural 
sectors for exports to the United States. 
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the Poisson regression model, in which the number of exporters is explained by the 
following model: 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 =  exp(∝ 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 1 + ⋯ +∝ 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 42 + 𝛽 𝑆𝑃𝑆 +
 𝛽 𝑆𝑃𝑆 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽 𝐴12 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽 𝑇𝐵𝑇 𝑒𝑡𝑐 +
 𝛽 𝑇𝐵𝑇 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝜀 )  (1) 
Where Exporters is the number of exporters exporting product i to the market 
that is the  focus in each regression, εi is the error term, and the other variables are the 
sector and NTM variables described earlier. 
The Poisson model is based on each event – in our case at least one firm in a 
country exporting to a market over the course of a year – occurring based on a Poisson 
framework.13 The exploratory variables are those that affect the probability of the event 
occurring through affecting the profitability of exporting to the destination market.  
Our approach can be compared with gravity modeling which is typically used 
to explain the value of trade between two countries. Gravity models based on Heckman 
selection models adopt the same approach as our Poisson framework in the first step of 
their estimation: the “selection equation” in which the exploratory variables are derived 
as those that affect the probability of it being profitable for the most productive firm in 
a country to export to a given market (see Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein, 2008).14 
Under the Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008) approach the “selection equation”, 
                                                           
13 See Long and Freese (2014) for a detailed explanation of the Poisson framework. 
14 It should be noted that unlike a Poisson distribution which is based on counting occurrences over a 
fixed time period - in our case a year - the approach outlined in Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein 
(2008) is based on a single occurrence i.e. firms selecting an export market for a year.    
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which is estimated through Probit estimation, explains incidences of zero trade between 
countries.  
 As an alternative to approaches based on the Heckman selection approach, 
many papers in the gravity model literature employ a Poisson estimator to explain the 
value of trade between two countries, building on the seminal work of Santos Silva and 
Tenreyro (2006).15 In doing so, they treat the value of trade as count data. Despite 
employing the Poisson estimator, these papers are based on different underpinnings to 
our approach, and to the Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008) approach, because 
they do not explicitly account for the threshold issue of whether any firms in an 
exporting country find it profitable to export to a given market. 
A practical advantage of our specification over gravity formulations is that we 
use observations on the number of exporting partners rather than on whether each 
potential exporter actually exports a given product to the market under investigation. 
This reduces the number of observations in the dataset by a factor of up to 194 – the 
number of potential exporter pairs when using the widely used CEPII gravity dataset. 
Moreover, we do not need to include exporter and exporter-importer pair specific 
variables such as the GDP of the exporting and importing country and the distance 
between these countries. Our specification is therefore tractable in situations where 
gravity estimation fails, which is more likely when data for only a single year are used. 
For example, we encountered computational issues when attempting to implement the 
                                                           
15 Burger, Van Oort and Linders (2009) provide a useful survey of this gravity model literature. 
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Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator or Heckman selection 
equation to estimate the gravity model formulation associated with equation 1.16 
We note that estimates from our approach may be conservative. The 
endogenous protection literature emphasizes that higher levels of import penetration 
may lead to greater protection through more non-tariff barriers, and therefore estimates 
of the effect of non-tariff barriers may be biased downwards, with estimated 
coefficients smaller in magnitude than would otherwise be the case (Trefler, 1993; Lee 
& Swagel, 1997). We expect, however, any bias to be relatively small for three reasons. 
First, papers such as Trefler (1993) and Lee & Swagel (1997) focus on non-tariff 
barriers which are the subset of non-tariff measures used for protectionist intent, such 
as quantitative restrictions; in contrast, we consider all regulations which may affect 
trade, even if protection is not their intent. Second, our dependent variable is not the 
level of imports but rather the number of countries who export to a market. Third, our 
sector dummy variable will capture the effect of any variation in the strength of 
protectionist pressure at the sectoral level. While it is quite common for papers in this 
area to not control for endogeneity (see the meta-analysis of Li & Beghin, 2012), those 
that do often make use of panel data features which are not available in our data set 
(see the discussion in Baier & Bergstrand, 2007, which focuses on the major issue of 
endogeneity with respect to free trade agreements) or utilize country-pair 
characteristics which are not captured in our approach (Vigani, Raimondi, & Olper, 
2012).          
                                                           
16 The Heckman selection equation requires that a variable included in the “selection” equation be 
omitted in the “outcome” equation. In the formulation that we tried, the omitted variable was the 




Our main results are shown in tables 3 and 4, where table 3 shows the 
coefficients and standard errors and table 4 sets out the average percentage impact of a 
change in each variable. Given that the data appear over-dispersed, with a conditional 
variance much larger than the conditional mean, we also estimate a Negative Binomial 
Regression (NBREG). This extends the Poission framework by enabling the variance 
to differ from the mean in the count data process. The NBREG results are also reported 
in tables 3 and 4.17 
We find – almost consistently – a statistically significant negative effect of 
compliance measures, applied for either SPS or TBT reasons. For example, a 
compliance measure applied for SPS reasons is expected to lead to a 12 percent 
decrease in the number of countries exporting to the European Union. A compliance 
measure that is applied for TBT reasons is expected to lead to a 11 percent decrease in 
the number of countries exporting to the European Union (table 4, NBREG results). 
This result is statistically significant at the 1 percent level (table 3). 
  
                                                           
17 Long and Freese (2014) provide a detailed explanation of the differences between the Poisson and 
Negative Binomial Regression. 
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Table 3: Estimation Results (Coefficients) 
 Canada Canada EU EU NZ NZ USA USA 
VARIABLES Poisson NBREG Poisson NBREG Poisson NBREG Poisson NBREG 
SPS Measure 0.120*** 0.191*** 0.115*** 0.101*** 0.0836** 0.142*** -0.0278 0.001 
 (0.035) (0.042) (0.034) (0.037) (0.0416) (0.046) (0.036) (0.038) 
SPS Compliance Measure -0.655*** -0.628*** -0.142*** -0.122*** -0.0692 -0.0611 0.137*** 0.170*** 
 (0.068) (0.072) (0.046) (0.047) (0.0673) (0.082) (0.049) (0.047) 
Geographical Restriction 0.207 0.307 -0.177*** -0.161** -0.0787 0.132 -0.0273 -0.106 
 (0.320) (0.374) (0.067) (0.066) (0.179) (0.162) (0.146) (0.121) 
TBT Measure 0.220*** 0.170*** 0.069 0.084 0.0668** 0.0986**
* 
0.173*** 0.151*** 
 (0.048) (0.049) (0.049) (0.051) (0.0332) (0.034) (0.051) (0.055) 
TBT Compliance Measure -0.296*** -0.307*** -0.081** -0.116*** -0.379*** -0.315*** -0.041 -0.064* 
   (0.048)   (0.050) (0.036) (0.039) (0.0589)    (0.064) (0.034)    (0.035) 
alpha  0.536***  0.405***   0.839***  0.481*** 
    (0.012)  (0.009)     (0.020)     (0.011) 
         
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sector fixed effects are not shown. 
 
Table 4: Percentage Change in Expected Number of Exporting Countries 
 Canada Canada EU EU NZ NZ USA USA 
 Poisson NBREG Poisson NBREG Poisson NBREG Poisson NBREG 
SPS Measure 12.8 21.0 12.2 10.6 8.7 15.2 -2.7 0.1 
SPS Compliance 
Measure -48.1 -46.6 -13.2 -11.5 -6.7 -5.9 14.7 18.6 
Geographical 
Restriction 23.0 36.0 -16.2 -14.9 -7.6 14.2 -2.7 -10.0 
TBT Measure 24.5 18.6 7.1 8.7 6.9 10.4 18.9 16.3 
TBT Compliance 
Measure -25.6 -26.4 -7.8 -11.0 -31.6 -27.0 -4.0 -6.2 
 
On the other hand, we typically find statistically significant positive effects for 
NTM measures lacking compliance components, for instance, performance 
requirements, hygienic or treatment requirements.18 This is perhaps not surprising 
given that the literature shows that NTMs can be either trade facilitating or trade 
restricting. As shown in table 3, there is a statistically significant estimate of alpha in 
all cases, confirming that the Negative Binomial Regression should be preferred to 
Poisson estimation, as the Poisson model constrains alpha at zero.  
                                                           
18 Full descriptions of the types of NTMs which do not include a compliance requirement can be found 
in UNCTAD (2013). 
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In interpreting our results, it is important to account for the fact that compliance 
measures are always associated with either a TBT or SPS measure, which is tested or 
inspected against. We therefore calculate marginal effects that allow for this 
conditional nature.19 Table 5 shows the marginal effect of the imposition of a TBT 
compliance measure when a TBT measure is already in place. Focusing on the Negative 
Binomial Regression results, we see statistically significant effects at the 1 percent 
level for all countries, except the United States where the results are statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level.  
The effects seem to diminish as market size increases. A compliance measure 
imposed by New Zealand or Canada is expected to reduce the number of exporting 
countries by 26-27 percent, compared to the situation where only a TBT measure is in 
place. The corresponding decreases for the European Union and United States are 11 
and 6 percent, respectively. The differences in the size of the effect may be due to the 
fact that there is a smaller incentive to adjust production processes or incur transaction 
costs to meet the New Zealand and Canadian requirements, as compared to the 
European Union or the United States, because of either: (i) their relatively small market 
size; or (ii) that Canadian and New Zealand standards are not often adopted by many 
other countries. In contrast, exporters have greater incentive to adapt to EU or US 
standards, especially because those standards might be adopted by other importers.  
  
                                                           
19 We use the Stata mchange command, detailed in Long and Freese, 2014. 
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Table 5: Marginal Effect of the Imposition of a TBT Compliance Measure* 
Data Estimator From To Change 
Percentage 
Change p-value 
Canada Poisson 24.504 18.219 -6.285 -25.65% 0.000 
Canada NBREG 24.230 17.830 -6.400 -26.41% 0.000 
EU Poisson 34.948 32.251 -2.727 -7.80% 0.018 
EU NBREG 35.017 31.170 -3.847 -10.99% 0.002 
NZ Poisson 13.000 8.896 -4.104 -31.57% . 
NZ NBREG 13.166 9.608 -3.558 -27.02% 0.000 
USA Poisson 23.620 22.668 -0.952 -4.03% 0.213 
USA NBREG 23.586 22.121 -1.465 -6.21% 0.059 
* When a TBT measure is already in place. 
Table 6: Marginal Effect of the Imposition of a SPS Compliance Measure* 
Data Estimator From To Change 
Percentage 
Change p-value 
Canada Poisson 25.612 13.299 -12.313 -48.08% 0.000 
Canada NBREG 26.991 14.403 -12.588 -46.64% 0.000 
EU  Poisson 37.725 32.727 -4.998 -13.25% 0.001 
EU  NBREG 37.356 33.063 -4.293 -11.49% 0.007 
NZ Poisson 13.393 12.497 -0.896 -6.69% . 
NZ NBREG 13.933 13.107 -0.826 -5.93% 0.445 
USA Poisson 23.105 26.510 3.406 14.74% 0.006 
USA NBREG 23.497 27.864 4.367 18.59% 0.000 
* When an SPS measure is already in place. 
Table 6 shows the change in the number of exporting countries due to the 
imposition of a SPS compliance measure when a SPS measure is already in place. We 
see large and negative effects for the European Union (an 11 percent reduction) and 
Canada (a 47 percent reduction) whereas the effects for New Zealand, while negative, 
are not statistically significant. 
While our results are consistent, finding that both TBT and SPS compliance 
measures reduce the number of countries exporting to a market, the differences 
between the effects of SPS and TBT measures in Canada and New Zealand could be 
explained by differences in their frequency and focus. (See tables 1 and A1.1 in the 
appendix.) In contrast to the other countries in this study, New Zealand applies more 
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SPS compliance measures than TBT compliance measures. The relatively widespread 
nature of New Zealand SPS compliance measures may make it less likely to find a 
statistically significant negative effect, given there is less variation across product 
groups. In contrast, Canada applies relatively few SPS compliance measures but – as 
shown in table A1.1 - these are focused in food and agriculture, which has traditionally 
been protected and supported by Canadian Government policies, including producer 
support, tariffs and supply management schemes (see, for instance, Anderson and 
Martin, 2005). This could compound the earlier mentioned effects of Canada being a 
relatively small market. 
Somewhat unexpectedly, a SPS compliance requirement has a positive effect 
on the number of countries exporting to the United States. While this could be 
explained by a different regulatory regime, and/or consumer preferences, whereby 
certification either reduces costs to firms e.g. through added certainty – or assists them 
in the market, it is a result that warrants further attention, which we explore as part of 
the robustness checks.  
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 
US data: Different Effects for Different Sectors 
A key feature of United States NTMs is the much higher incidence of SPS 
compliance measures outside of the food and agriculture sectors, where they are 
typically concentrated for most other countries, see table A1.1 in appendix 1. It is 
therefore useful to examine if SPS compliance measures have a different effect on non-
agricultural sectors in the United States. To do this, we add an interaction term between 
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the food and agriculture sectors and SPS compliance measures, where our dummy 
variables (SPS Measure and SPS Compliance Measure) are multiplied by a dummy 
variable equal to unity if the product is classified as part of the food and agriculture 
sector. This gives four new variables: SPS Measure (on a Food or Agricultural 
Product); SPS Measure (on a Non-Agricultural Product); SPS Compliance Measure 
(on a Food or Agricultural Product); SPS Compliance Measure (on a Non-Agricultural 
Product).  
The results of regressions using these four new variables, also including the 
food and agriculture dummy variable, are set out in table A1.2. We now find a 
statistically significant negative effect of SPS compliance measures in the food and 
agricultural sectors where these are expected to reduce the number of countries 
exporting to the United States from 44 to 29 compared to the case where a SPS measure 
without a compliance element is in place, a decrease of 35 percent. While this enables 
us to say that in the food and agriculture sectors, SPS compliance measures decrease 
the number of countries exporting to the United States, which is the pattern we observe 
in the other markets, it leaves unresolved how these measures affect the non-
agricultural sector given that we still find statistically significant positive effects of 
measures in these sectors. As we discuss in the next section, the explanation may lie in 
taking into account “partial coverage” i.e. where a NTM does not affect all products 
within a HS subheading. 
Partial Coverage 
 A challenge for NTM data collection is that the coverage of a NTM may not align 
with the tariff codes, with only some products in a tariff line affected. In this case, the 
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data collector assigns a “partial coverage” indicator to the NTM data.20 This is 
particularly an issue where the NTM only applies to a small subset of the goods; as an 
example, part 94 of title 9 of the US Code of Federal Regulations requires certification 
and inspection of the absence of dirt on used farm equipment imported from regions 
where rinderpest or foot-and-mouth disease exists.21 As there is no separate HS code 
for used farm equipment, a wide variety of HS codes for equipment that may be used 
on a farm is classified as subject to a certification requirement, even though the 
majority of imports are expected to be new and not subject to this requirement. 
The choice in econometric estimation is whether to include partial coverage 
NTMs and run the risk of classifying too many products as subject to an NTM, or omit 
them and run the risk of classifying too few products as subject to an NTM. On balance, 
we expect it to be preferable to include partial coverage NTMs on the basis that a NTM 
which applies to a related product is still expected to “chill” trade and for the most part, 
the effect would be to reduce the estimated coefficient. However, as a robustness check 
and to investigate further the results for the United States non-agricultural sector, we 
ran regressions excluding NTMs with partial coverage. In addition to excluding NTMs 
with partial coverage, we also excluded NTMs that do not cover all tariff lines in an 
HS subheading.22  
Results from this econometric specification are set out in appendix 2. In general, 
we see a larger effect when NTMs with partial coverage are excluded from the analysis. 
                                                           
20 No partial coverage indications are present in EU data. 
21 https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2014-title9-vol1/xml/CFR-2014-title9-vol1-part94.xml 
22 As US NTM data are at the HS 6 digit level, partial coverage already takes into account NTMs that 
do not cover all tariff lines in an HS subheading. 
66 
 
In this framework, a TBT compliance requirement reduces the number of countries 
exporting: to the European Union by 18 percent (compared to 11 percent when NTMs 
with partial coverage were included); to New Zealand by 32 percent (compared to 27 
percent when NTMs with partial coverage were included); to the United States by 35 
percent (compared to 6 percent when NTMs with partial coverage were included). A 
SPS compliance requirement reduces the number of countries exporting: to the EU by 
17 percent (compared to 11 percent when NTMs with partial coverage were included); 
to Canada by 55 percent (compared to 47 percent when NTMs with partial coverage 
were included); to New Zealand by 27 percent (compared to 6 percent when NTMs 
with partial coverage were included) – a result that is now statistically significant. 
Moreover, we now see a negative effect of SPS measures in the United States, although 
this result is not statistically significant. 
On the other hand, we do find one counter-intuitive result; when measures with 
partial coverage are excluded we find that a TBT compliance measure has a statistically 
significant positive effect on the number of countries exporting to Canada. Such a 
counter-intuitive result can be explained by the fact that some TBT compliance 
measures that have a significant negative effect on trade only have partial coverage so 
the results are distorted by their omission. This supports our initial approach of 
including NTMs with partial coverage, except where the data suggest that these NTMs 
might be distorting the results – as was the case with United States NTM data, 
particularly in the non-agricultural sector. 
As a specific check of whether the statistically positive effect of SPS 
compliance measures in the non-agriculture sector can be explained by partial 
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coverage, we estimate equation 2 excluding NTMs with “partial coverage”. Results are 
shown in table A2.5 in appendix 2. We now find a negative effect of SPS compliance 
measures in this sector – although the result is not statistically significant. 
Using Eight-Digit New Zealand Data 
While we used data at the six-digit level in the harmonized system, for many 
countries - other than the United States – both tariff and NTM data are available at a 
more detailed level. Beyond the six-digit level, codes are not harmonized between 
countries. Therefore most cross-country work is done at the six-digit, or more 
aggregated level, for instance Crivelli & Gröschl (2016) undertook their analysis at the 
four-digit level. As a robustness check to determine the effect of using more detailed 
data, we compare our results using six-digit data for New Zealand to results obtained 
using eight-digit data. Our overall results on the effect of TBT or SPS compliance 
measures are consistent, although effects of a TBT restriction are slightly lower with 




Our study finds relatively robust evidence that compliance measures affect the 
number of countries exporting to developed country markets, even with just the one 
year of NTM data that are available. We generally find a statistically significant 
negative effect of compliance measures, applied for either SPS or TBT reasons. 
Conversely, there is a positive effect for NTM measures that do not have a compliance 
                                                           
23 Results are available on request from the authors. 
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component. This lends further support to the literature showing that NTMs can be trade 
facilitating in some circumstances and trade restricting in others. Our results are market 
specific, with findings differing by importer as well as for TBT and SPS compliance 
measures.  
In the case of TBT measures, we find that Canadian and New Zealand TBT 
compliance measures reduce the number of exporting countries by 26-27 percent 
compared to the situation where no compliance requirement is imposed. This is a 
substantially larger effect on the number of exporting countries than for measures 
imposed by the European Union or the United States. Two possible explanations for 
this are: (i) the relatively small size of the Canadian and New Zealand markets reduces 
the incentive to meet these requirements; (ii) Canadian and New Zealand standards are 
not often adopted by many other countries, unlike the case for United States or 
European standards. Since the standards imposed by Canada and New Zealand do not 
have a global reach, meeting these requirements may require relatively costly changes 
to standard production processes.  
SPS compliance measures have the largest effect in Canada and the European 
Union, reducing the number of countries exporting to these markets by 47 and 11 
percent, compared to the situation where a SPS measure was in place with no testing, 
certification or inspection requirements. Given the relatively high incidence of SPS 
compliance measures outside the food and agriculture sector in the United States, we 
undertake a regression allowing for measures to have different effects in these sectors. 
We find that SPS compliance measures on food and agricultural products in the United 
States are expected to lead to a 35 percent decrease in the number of countries 
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exporting, compared to the situation where a SPS measure was in place but there was 
no testing, certification or inspection associated with the measure 
The differences in results for different markets may have implications for future 
researchers. Since this is a new database, this research examining individual country 
data may help to provide an important validity check for researchers who undertake 
analyses in the future, particularly for studies where the data are pooled across 
countries. While pooling of countries is likely to be necessary in many empirical 
applications, particularly where a gravity model is desired, for instance to analyze 
effects on the value of trade, the differences in results that we find for our selection of 
developed countries markets suggests that pooling should be done carefully, using 
groups of countries that are as similar as possible.  
Our results have significant policy implications. Regulators in importing 
countries that are considering imposing compliance measures should be aware that 
these are likely to reduce the number of exporters to their country. This is likely to 
affect product variety and, potentially, competition and so may lower the welfare of 
their own consumers. On the other hand, policy makers in exporting countries should 
not only be concerned with NTMs in the markets that they export to, but also note the 
likelihood that NTMs – particularly compliance measures – may be preventing their 
firms from profitably exporting to other new markets. Finally, to the extent that rich 
countries are concerned with ensuring access of poor countries to their markets, 
compliance measures may hinder this access. Of particular note may be when importer 
blocs splinter, as will occur with Brexit; if breakaway countries impose different 
compliance measures, it is likely to reduce the number of exporters, who may be the 
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Appendix 1: Allowing for Different Effects on Different Sectors 
Table A1.1: Breakdown of Dummy Variables by Food and Agriculture, and Non-
Agricultural Sectors 
 Canada EU NZ USA 
Dummy Variables (in Food and Agriculture Sectors) 
SPS Measure 873 876 873 897 
SPS Compliance Measure 517 638 837 888 
TBT Measure 839 896 820 892 
TBT Compliance Measure 810 323 4 462 
Dummy Variables (in Other Sectors) 
SPS Measure 395 679 717 1122 
SPS Compliance Measure 81 215 228 628 
TBT Measure 3246 3940 2182 4160 
TBT Compliance Measure 3629 3629 336 3542 
 
Table A1.2: Coefficients from Estimation of United States Results with Interaction 
between Food and Agriculture Dummy and SPS Compliance Measures 
VARIABLES Coefficient 
  
Food and Agriculture Dummy  -0.944*** 
 (0.340) 
SPS Measure (on a Food or Agricultural Product) 0.750* 
 (0.387) 
SPS Measure (on a Non-Agricultural Product) -0.012 
 (0.038) 
SPS Compliance Measure (on a Food or Agricultural Product) -0.429* 
 (0.255) 
SPS Compliance Measure (on a Non-Agricultural Product) 0.190*** 
 (0.048) 
Geographical Restriction -0.102 
 (0.124) 
TBT Measure 0.146*** 
 (0.055) 
TBT Compliance Measure -0.061* 
 (0.035) 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients for sector dummy 





Appendix 2: Excluding Partial Coverage 
Table A2.1: Comparison of Dummy Variables When Partial Coverage is Excluded 










Dummy Variables in Food and Agriculture Sectors 
SPS Measure 854 92.21% 869 99.20% 805 92.21% 844 94.09% 
SPS Compliance Measure 491 81.84% 616 96.55% 685 81.84% 324 36.49% 
TBT Measure 696 96.22% 896 100.00% 789 96.22% 782 87.67% 
TBT Compliance Measure 105 25.00% 284 87.93% 1 25.00% 254 54.98% 
Geographical Restriction 9 59.24% 646 97.58% 93 59.24% 105 68.18% 
Dummy Variables in Non-Agriculture Sectors 
SPS Measure 81 61.23% 596 87.78% 439 61.23% 132 11.76% 
SPS Compliance Measure 71 54.39% 202 93.95% 124 54.39% 63 10.03% 
TBT Measure 963 51.47% 3927 99.67% 1123 51.47% 1927 46.32% 
TBT Compliance Measure 613 22.02% 3596 99.09% 74 22.02% 507 14.31% 
Geographical Restriction 0 16.67% 42 89.36% 1 16.67% 0 0.00% 
All Dummy Variables 
SPS Measure 935 78.24% 1465 94.21% 1244 78.24% 976 48.34% 
SPS Compliance Measure 562 75.96% 818 95.90% 809 75.96% 387 25.53% 
TBT Measure 1659 63.67% 4824 99.73% 1912 63.67% 2709 53.61% 
TBT Compliance Measure 718 22.06% 3881 98.18% 75 22.06% 761 19.00% 
Geographical Restriction 9 57.67% 688 97.04% 94 57.67% 105 66.88% 
* Total NTMs include those with partial coverage  
76 
 
Table A2.2: Estimation Results (Coefficients): Partial Coverage is Excluded 
 Canada Canada EU EU NZ NZ USA USA 
VARIABLES Poisson NBREG Poisson NBREG Poisson NBREG Poisson NBREG 
         
SPS Measure 0.262*** 0.265** 0.103*** 0.0891** -0.0323 -0.0166 -0.175** 0.0229 
 (0.095) (0.109) (0.035) (0.0376) (0.044) (0.053) (0.078) (0.0842) 
SPS Compliance Measure -0.792*** -0.798*** -0.202*** -0.186*** -0.286*** -0.310*** -0.061 -0.0809 
 (0.069) (0.0741) (0.046) (0.0467) (0.080) (0.077) (0.085) (0.0778) 
Geographical Restriction -0.585*** -0.573*** -0.275*** -0.269*** -0.452*** -0.233 -0.725*** -0.802*** 
 (0.125) (0.121) (0.064) (0.0620) (0.165) (0.177) (0.110) (0.128) 
TBT Measure -0.065 -0.0727 0.110** 0.145*** 0.107*** 0.150*** 0.185*** 0.163*** 
 (0.044) (0.0454) (0.048) (0.0503) (0.034) (0.038) (0.032) (0.032) 
TBT Compliance Measure 0.201*** 0.255*** -0.146*** -0.204*** -0.524*** -0.389*** -0.424*** -0.425*** 
 (0.054) (0.0561) (0.036) (0.0381) (0.116) (0.118) (0.041) (0.042) 
         
Alpha  0.531***  0.400***  0.838***  0.466*** 
  (0.012)  (0.009)  (0.020)  (0.011) 





Table A2.3: Marginal Effect of a TBT Compliance Measure (When a TBT Measure is 
Already Applied): Partial Coverage is Excluded 
Data Estimator From To Change 
Percentage 
Change p-value 
Canada Poisson 22.318 27.286 4.968 22.26% 0.000 
Canada NBREG 22.172 28.613 6.441 29.05% 0.000 
EU Poisson 35.019 30.250 -4.768 -13.62% 0.000 
EU NBREG 35.088 28.619 -6.469 -18.44% 0.000 
NZ Poisson 13.508 7.998 -5.510 -40.79% 0.515 
NZ NBREG 13.875 9.405 -4.470 -32.22% 0.000 
USA Poisson 25.452 16.659 -8.793 -34.55% 0.000 
USA NBREG 25.182 16.460 -8.722 -34.64% 0.000 
 
Table A2.4: Marginal Effect of a SPS Compliance Measure (When a SPS Measure is 
Already Applied): Partial Coverage is Excluded 
Data Estimator From To Change 
Percentage 
Change p-value  
Canada Poisson 28.920 13.092 -15.827 -54.73% 0.000 
Canada NBREG 28.962 13.041 -15.921 -54.97% 0.000 
EU  Poisson 37.397 30.565 -6.831 -18.27% 0.000 
EU  NBREG 37.016 30.720 -6.296 -17.01% 0.000 
NZ Poisson 12.315 9.252 -3.063 -24.87% 0.518 
NZ NBREG 12.460 9.135 -3.325 -26.69% 0.000 
USA Poisson 20.199 19.009 -1.190 -5.89% 0.469 





Table A2.5: Comparison Coefficients from Estimation of United States Results with 









   
Food and Agriculture Dummy  -0.944*** -0.940*** 
 (0.340) (0.133) 
SPS Measure (on a Food or Agricultural Product) 0.750* 0.261** 
 (0.387) (0.129) 
SPS Measure (on a Non-Agricultural Product) -0.012 -0.0195 
 (0.038) (0.131) 
SPS Compliance Measure (on a Food or Agricultural Product) -0.429* -0.022 
 (0.255) (0.086) 
SPS Compliance Measure (on a Non-Agricultural Product) 0.190*** -0.222 
 (0.048) (0.188) 
Geographical Restriction -0.102 -0.824*** 
 (0.124) (0.130) 
TBT Measure 0.146*** 0.159*** 
 (0.055) (0.032) 
TBT Compliance Measure -0.061* -0.419*** 
 (0.035) (0.042) 
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ABSTRACT  
This paper explores the trade effects of New Zealand restricting, for biosecurity 
reasons, the countries from which particular fruit and vegetable products can be 
imported. We propose a new index to quantify the extent to which fruit and vegetable 
exports from each region are constrained by these restrictions. This index is validated 
econometrically and simulations are undertaken to determine expected imports if all 
fruit and vegetable products could be imported from all countries. In this counterfactual 
scenario, we expect increased fruit and vegetable imports from Europe, Middle East 
and Africa, the Americas (excluding the United States), and East Asia at the expense 
of imports from Oceania, Australia, the United States, South East Asia and South Asia. 
 
Keywords: Non-tariff barriers; Sanitary and phytosanitary measures; Gravity modelling; 
Computable general equilibrium modelling 
 
JEL classification: D58, F14; Q17 
INTRODUCTION 
Non-tariff measures (NTMs),1 including sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures, 
can have significant impacts on international trade, creating barriers to trade that are often 
much higher than tariffs (Shepherd 2016). The estimated effects of NTMs can vary widely, 
depending in part on the type of measures, the sectors considered and the methodology used 
(Beghin, Maertens, and Swinnen 2015). However, in general, SPS regulations have been 
found to be more likely to impede agricultural and food trade exports from developing 
countries (Li and Beghin 2012). 
To date, the literature on quantifying NTM impacts has generally focused on aggregate 
measures of NTMs that do not capture important differences in their nature. In the current 
                                                        
 Corresponding author: Associate Professor Anna Strutt, Department of Economics, University of Waikato, 
Private Bag 3105, Hamilton 3240, New Zealand, Ph +64 7 838 4958, anna.strutt@waikato.ac.nz. 
1 Non-tariff measures, of which non-tariff barriers (NTBs) are a subset, are defined as “policy measures, other 
than customs tariffs, that can potentially have an economic effect on international trade in goods, changing 
quantities traded, or prices or both” (UNCTAD 2014).  
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paper, we focus on the particular example of fruit and vegetable phytosanitary measures 
applied by New Zealand, specifically, the restriction preventing non-authorized countries 
from exporting these products to New Zealand. We develop a novel method to model the 
impact of these types of geographically restrictive NTMs. This enables comparison of 
current import profiles with the counterfactual scenario where all fruit and vegetable 
products can be imported, regardless of their origin. In addition to examining the impacts 
on New Zealand, we are able to quantify which regions are most likely to benefit from 
increased exports of these products, including impacts on developing countries. 
A growing body of work is focused on incorporating NTMs into computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) models (see, for instance, Fugazza and Maur 2008, Winchester 2009, 
and Vanzetti, Peters and Knebel 2014, which utilized econometric work published in Cadot, 
Asprilla, Gourdon, Knebel and Peters 2015). Various other studies also focus on 
geographical restrictions, using a CGE framework to study an NTM applied by a single 
country. These include two recent analyses of Russia’s import ban on specified agri-food 
products from certain countries (Boulanger, Dudu, Ferrari and Philippidis 2015 and 
Kutlina-Dimitrova and Narayanan 2015), as well as studies of a hypothetical EU import 
ban on GM soybeans and maize/oil seeds from Argentina, Brazil and the USA (Philippidis 
2010 and Henseler et al. 2013). Our geographical restrictions focus is much broader, 
exploring the impact of a policy that differentially affects all exporting countries. 
In addition to offering insights into the effect of New Zealand’s SPS restrictions on 
different exporting regions, this paper contributes to the more general NTM literature by 
presenting a new approach to modelling, within a CGE framework, NTMs that restrict 
imports. This has potentially wide application to other types of NTMs. The approach is 
well-suited to analyzing policies that affect countries to different extents, for instance, 
where there are geographical restrictions on eligibility preventing the import of specified 
products from particular countries. 
The paper is organized as follows. The New Zealand SPS regime is outlined in section 
2. Section 3 develops our new Geographical Restrictions Index and explains how it can be 
used to estimate the trade effects of extending phytosanitary access. This index is used, in 
section 4, as an explanatory variable in a gravity model of New Zealand fruit and vegetable 
imports over the period 1994-2013 to assess the validity of the approach. In section 5, we 
present CGE simulation results, using the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model to 
assess the potential impact of New Zealand approving all fruit and vegetable imports from 
all countries. The final section concludes. 
THE NEW ZEALAND SPS REGIME 
Under the World Trade Organization’s SPS Agreement, countries are able to set their 
own measures for food safety and animal and plant health, which should be based on: 
recognized international standards; science, including a scientific approach and a temporary 
precautionary principle in the absence of international standards or scientific evidence.2 
The New Zealand SPS regime, established by the Biosecurity Act 1993, reflects that New 
Zealand is a major agricultural producer and an island nation, free from many diseases and 
pests affecting international animal and plant product trade.3 Animal and plant products 
that present a potential biosecurity risk for the introduction of pests and diseases cannot be 
                                                        
2 See https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm4_e.htm. 
3 See WTO Trade Policy Review of New Zealand 2009, particularly the Record of Meeting with Questions and 
Answers from Members. http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp_rep_e.htm. 
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imported until a risk analysis assessment, consistent with international standards, has been 
completed. This process, triggered by a request from a country interested in exporting the 
product, involves the development of an import health standard that mitigates the risk 
associated with importing that product. As fresh produce can serve as vectors for the 
introduction of pests, such as fruit flies, that affect other products, import health standards 
also cover products that are not grown commercially in New Zealand, such as bananas. 
There are approximately 200 import health standards that cover a particular commodity or 
category of commodity; these may be generic, covering all countries, or country-specific.4  
The development of an import health standard is resource intensive for both New 
Zealand and the potential exporting country. The responsible government agency, the 
Ministry for Primary Industries, notes that they “set priorities for developing new import 
health standards, and it may take some years to finalise [a] request.”5 More specifically, the 
Ministry for Primary Industries explains that requests are prioritised by assessing the 
following: importance to New Zealand; strategic fit with New Zealand government goals; 
net benefit for New Zealand in the longer term; feasibility of being able to do the work; 
whether the barriers can be surmounted; and the amount of work expected.6 Government-
funded resources are allocated to the top priority import health standard work with 
remaining applicants offered the option of funding the cost of their application themselves. 
An implication of New Zealand’s approach of not allowing imports of potentially risky 
animal and plant products until an import health standard is in place, is that many countries 
are unable to export particular commodities to New Zealand. In other words, this NTM can 
be a binding restriction on exports. While this may seem restrictive, similar processes apply 
in other countries, for instance the United States requires exporting countries to be 
authorized for each fruit and vegetable exported (see Jouanjean, Maur, and Shepherd 2012, 
Karov, Roberts, Grant and Peterson 2009, and Seale, Zhang and Traboulsi 2013) and 
Australia has, for many years, applied strict phytosanitary requirements (James and 
Anderson 1998). Phytosanitary restrictions in Europe are discussed in Helmy (2010).  
Detailed information on New Zealand’s phytosanitary measures has recently been 
collated as part of an international effort to collect comprehensive data on NTMs.7 The data 
use a common classification methodology to consistently categorize non-tariff measures 
for a wide range of countries at a given point in time (UNCTAD 2013 and 2014). Within 
this classification framework, countries that are unable to export a particular product to 
New Zealand, due to the absence of import health standards, are recorded as facing a 
measure classified as A12 “Geographical Restrictions on Eligibility.” The focus of the 
current study is on this measure.  
The New Zealand import health standard approach has the advantage of being 
transparent about the import conditions, including through establishing a date from which 
specified countries can export particular products; therefore, we are able to extend the 
UNCTAD NTM data to provide a time series covering approval dates for imports of fresh 
fruit and vegetables (see Appendix 1). The current study is timely as the New Zealand 
Ministry for Primary Industries – which administers New Zealand’s biosecurity regime - is 
                                                        
4 See http://www.mpi.govt.nz/importing/overview/import-health-standards/. The countries that are covered by 
New Zealand’s import health standards for the products in the fruit and vegetable sector that we model, 
along with the relative importance of each commodity are summarized in Appendix 1. 
5 https://www.mpi.govt.nz/importing/food/fresh-fruit-and-vegetables/steps-to-importing/ 
6 https://www.mpi.govt.nz/importing/overview/import-health-standards/requesting-a-new-ihs/. 
7 The New Zealand data were collected by two authors of the current paper, as part of a project led by UNCTAD 
and the World Bank. These data are publicly available: http://i-tip.unctad.org/. 
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moving towards a new format for import health standards that will enable additional 
countries to be more readily approved for each commodity.8 
A GEOGRAPHICAL RESTRICTIVENESS INDEX 
The first step in our analysis is to calculate an index of the degree to which each 
country’s fruit and vegetable access to New Zealand is impeded by geographical 
restrictions on eligibility.9 We propose a Geographical Restrictions Index for each 







where the subscript i denotes the exporter and the subscript j denotes each individual 
Harmonized System (HS6)10 subheading within the much broader fruit and vegetable sector 
that we model using the GTAP database. Xij is the value of total exports to the world of 
country i in HS subheading j. Dij is a dummy that is equal to 1 if country i is authorized to 
export products in HS subheading j to New Zealand i.e., an import health standard is in 
place.11  
This Geographical Restrictions Index summarizes the proportion of a region’s total 
fruit and vegetable exports that are comprised of products that are eligible for export to 
New Zealand. As shown in Table 1, generally this index is higher for countries that have 
close trade and biosecurity links with New Zealand. For instance, the GRI was 0.97 for 
Pacific Island countries in 2011; this can be interpreted as products accounting for 97% of 
the Pacific’s total fruit and vegetable exports to all countries were approved for export to 
New Zealand. The GRI is also relatively high for regions such as Australia (0.89) the United 
States (0.85) but is much lower for other regions, particularly for some countries in Africa 
and Latin America. The GRI is also relatively low for Europe, with only a small number of 
countries having access for a limited number of fruits.  
The Geographical Restrictions Index can be used to adjust current exports of fruit and 
vegetables to New Zealand to obtain an estimate, for each region i, of the value of exports 
to New Zealand assuming the region had access to export all fruit and vegetable products 
to New Zealand. We refer to this as unrestricted exports, ui:  
 
𝑢 = 𝑥 𝐺𝑅𝐼⁄  (2) 
 
where xi = total current fruit and vegetable exports to New Zealand from region i. (We use 
                                                        
8 While this new format is not currently used for fruit and vegetables, an example for meat products is the 
standard for turkey meat, available at https://www.mpi.govt.nz/document-vault/1978. 
9 Recall that when there is no import health standard covering a particular product from a particular country, that 
country cannot export to New Zealand. 
10 The HS uses code numbers to define traded products, with six-digit codes (HS6) being the most detailed level 
at which common (harmonized) codes are used by all countries. 
11 The data to calculate this index are HS6 import data obtained from the UN COMTRADE Database, see 
http://comtrade.un.org/. Import Health Standards are often applied to highly specific products, thus a 6 digit 
HS subheading may contain both products that do, and do not have access to New Zealand. We use data 
for 2011 to correspond to version 9 of the GTAP database that we use in our simulations. Where a country 
was approved to export a commodity in 2011, we weight exports by the number of months for which the 
country had access. We classify a country as having access for a given HS 6 digit subheading if they have 
access for at least one product in this subheading. The index will be too high (i.e., will understate the level 
of restrictions) if a region is only approved for some products within a HS 6 digit sub-heading or for exports 
from some parts of the region, however, this distortion is generally likely to be small.  
Impacts of Geographical Restrictions 5
a lower case x for exports to New Zealand to distinguish from exports to the world which 
is denoted with a capital X.) The rationale for this formula is as follows. The proportion of 
total fruit and vegetable exports that region i exports to New Zealand is  but the ratio of 
fruit and vegetable exports to New Zealand to total exports of fruit and vegetables that 
region i is approved to export to New Zealand is this value divided by the GRI i.e., 
.
. 
Therefore, if we assume that a region would export the same proportion of total exports of 
fruit and vegetables to New Zealand for products for which it currently does not have access 
as for products for which it does have access, we can obtain an estimate of unrestricted 
exports by dividing current exports by the GRI i.e., equation 2.12 Table 1 summarizes 
current fruit and vegetable exports to New Zealand, the GRI and unrestricted exports for 
our base year 2011.  
 
Table 1. Current exports, the Geographical Restrictions Index and export expansion 
(based on 2011 data) 
 
Region Current Fruit and Veg 
Exports to NZ (xi) 
(US$ millions) 
Average GRI Unrestricted Fruit and Veg 
Exports to NZ (uxi)  
(US$ millions) 
Australia 55.30 0.89 62.07 
Oceania (Pacific 
Island Countries) 
13.51 0.97 13.92 
East Asia 9.75 0.56 17.34 
South East Asia 75.24 0.83 91.12 
South Asia 3.55 0.64 5.50 
USA 68.46 0.85 80.21 
Rest of Americas 26.55 0.32 82.52 
Europe 3.48 0.16 21.93 
Middle East and 
Africa 
23.18 0.22 106.31 
World 279.02 0.58 NA 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the GTAP version 9 database and UN COMTRADE data for the GRI.  
  
                                                        
12 Implicit here is the assumption that, for each region, the access conditions in new import health standards for 
products currently without access are on average as stringent as the import health standard conditions for 
products that are currently approved. Sections 4 and 5 allow for the case where, for products not previously 
approved, a smaller proportion of the exporter’s total global exports would be exported to New Zealand 
than was the case for products previously approved. 
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It should be noted that the estimate of “unrestricted exports” if a region had access for 
all fruit and vegetable products to New Zealand does not take into account potential 
substitution between exporters if other regions also have improved market access, or shifts 
of productive resources between competing uses within a country. As some countries gain 
market access, other countries may lose market share. To obtain an estimate of exports if 
SPS access for all products were approved for all countries, we need a framework that 
allows for substitution between exporting regions and ensures the resource constraints of 
each economy hold. This is provided by the CGE framework presented in Section 5. Before 
turning to the CGE analysis, we first use econometric estimation to validate our approach.  
GRAVITY ANALYSIS 
Econometric analysis of the effect of an increase in the GRI on exports to New Zealand 
provides an opportunity to assess our approach to obtaining unrestricted exports. We 
examine this through a modified version of the conventional gravity model. 
Methodological underpinnings of gravity modelling and estimation issues are addressed in 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and Helpman, Melitz 
and Rubinstein (2008) among others. A useful summary is provided by Shepherd (2013), 
while van Bergeijk and Brakman (2010) present a contemporary survey of gravity models. 
While using the same framework, our approach differs slightly from most gravity 
model applications in two ways. First, while most gravity models include a number of 
importing countries, we only include New Zealand. Examples of gravity models with a 
single country include Alam, Uddin, and Taufique (2009) which considers Bangladesh’s 
imports and Li, Saghaian, and Reed (2012) which examines US seafood exports. Second, 
our model focuses on a single sector, fruit and vegetables, which has implications for how 
we control for productive capacity in the exporting country – see Schlueter, Wieck, and 
Heckelei (2009), and Karov et al. (2009) for examples of sector specific applications. The 
model estimated is; 
 
𝑥 =  𝛽 ln(𝐺𝑅𝐼 ) + 𝛽 ln(𝑋 ) + 𝛽 ln(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 ) + 𝛽 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔  + 𝛾 + 𝜃 + 𝜀  
 (3) 
 
where xit is New Zealand fruit and vegetable imports from country i in year t; GRIit is the 
Geographical Restrictiveness Index for country i in year t. Each exporting country’s fruit 
and vegetable productive capacity is captured by Xit which is the total export of fruit and 
vegetables of country i to the world in year t. We use total fruit and vegetable exports 
because a nominal measure of fruit and vegetable production (both for domestic 
consumption and exports) across all countries is not available. As we are only concerned 
with the fruit and vegetable sector – and are only explaining exports to New Zealand – this 
is a more appropriate measure of the productive capacity of the exporting country than the 
GDP variable more commonly used for gravity model estimations, particularly for 
aggregate trade. As is typical in gravity models, we include observable factors affecting 
trade between two countries: their geographic distance (distancei) and a dummy variable 
reflecting whether New Zealand and the exporting country have a common language 
(comlangi). Other variables commonly used in gravity modelling such as a common border 
or a "land locked" variable are inappropriate given that New Zealand is the only importer 
and an island state. Similarly, sharing a common or past colonial link was inappropriate as 
it only covers two countries - New Zealand was a British colony and Samoa was a colonial 
territory of New Zealand. We did not include a FTA variable as this may be endogenous, 
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see the discussion in Li, Saghaian and Reed (2012). Multilateral trade resistance, discussed 
in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) is accounted for through exporter fixed effects (𝛾 ). 
Time fixed effects (𝜃 ) account for, inter alia, changes in New Zealand fruit and vegetable 
demand. 
Trade data are obtained from the UN COMTRADE database - using values reported 
by importers. The gravity variables are obtained from the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et 
d’Informations Internationales (CEPII).13 In particular, we use CEPII’s widely used 
distance measure that calculates distance between major cities weighted by each city’s 
population (Mayer and Zignago 2011). We use data from 1994 (the year after the New 
Zealand Biosecurity Act came into force) until 2013. As there is no change in the products 
for which all countries have access, we confine our analysis to the 30 countries which have 
gained (or lost) access for specific fruit and vegetables. Appendix 1 summarizes the 
countries that have access for each product as well as the date this was granted.  
We apply the widely used Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood approach (Santos Silva 
and Tenreyro 2006; Schlueter, Wieck, and Heckelei 2009; Li, Saghaian and Reed 2012; 
Zenebe, Wamisho, and Peterson 2013; and Owen and Winchester 2014, provide relevant 
applications). This is one of two main methods used in contemporary gravity model 
applications: it avoids issues of heteroscedasticity which are particularly problematic with 
instances of zero trade as is typically found in sectoral applications of the gravity model 
(see Santos Silva and Tenreyro 2006 and Yang, Reed, and Saghaian 2013 for a discussion 
of these issues). The Heckman selection approach (Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein 2008), 
which is also widely used in contemporary gravity analysis, is not suitable for our purposes: 
since we are only examining exports to one country, New Zealand, we do not have 
sufficient variation to identify a regressor that affects only the probability that a country 
exports but not the volume of trade. 
Our estimation results are summarized in Table 2. In this framework, all variables are 
statistically significant at the 1% significance level. The coefficients for regressors 
expressed in log form can be interpreted as elasticities (Santos Silva and Tenreyro 2006). 
Therefore the method of obtaining “unrestricted exports” presented in the previous section 
i.e., the value of exports if all countries had access to export all products, implies a 
coefficient on ln (GRI) of unity: a country will export the same proportion of total exports 
of fruit and vegetables to New Zealand for products for which it currently does not have 
access as for products for which it does have access. A coefficient of less than unity implies 
that, for products not previously approved, a smaller proportion of the exporter’s total 
global exports would be exported to New Zealand than was the case for products previously 
approved. While our point estimate is 0.677, the standard errors are relatively large, with 
the difference between 1 and 0.677 being slightly over one standard deviation – thus a 
coefficient value of unity is comfortably within the confidence intervals and the 
econometric evidence is not inconsistent with our approach to calculating “unrestricted 
exports”. Nevertheless, as a robustness check, our CGE simulations make use of both 




                                                        
13 See http://www.cepii.fr/cepii/en/bdd_modele/bdd.asp  
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Table 2. Gravity equation estimates for New Zealand fruit and vegetable imports 
  
Coefficient Estimate Z Value 
ln (GRI) 0.677 2.085 
(0.325) 
 
ln (X) 0.923 6.538 
(0.141) 
 
ln (distance) -2.314 -9.67 
(0.239) 
 
Comlang 1.904 7.694 
0.247 
 
Exporter Fixed Effects Yes 
 




Pseudo R2 0.943 
 
MODELLING FRAMEWORK AND RESULTS 
A CGE framework is able to capture interactions between sectors and economies in a 
fully consistent framework. This enables us to account for substitutions between potential 
exporters as well as other inter-sectoral and inter-regional linkages. We use the GTAP 
model (Hertel 1997), along with the version 9 data base (Aguiar, Narayanan and 
McDougall 2016). GTAP is a well-known and fully-documented CGE model that has been 
widely used for a variety of policy applications.14 The GTAP model specifies trade 
bilaterally, with imperfect substitution between foreign and domestic goods and between 
imports from different sources. The version 9 database used offers a base year of 2011 for 
140 countries or regions and 57 sectors.15 We aggregate the GTAP sectors to “fruit and 
vegetables” along with eight others, while we aggregate the regions to New Zealand along 
with nine other regions of interest.  
Our approach involves first applying, separately to each region, the percentage shock 
to real exports that would increase exports to the unrestricted export value. From this 
simulation we can calculate the endogenously determined shifter needed for New Zealand’s 
imports from each country.16 We then simultaneously incorporate the shifters derived for 
each individual region to simulate an overall estimate of the change in exports from each 
region to New Zealand, accounting fully for price adjustments and substitution between 
exporters.  
A similar approach to achieve an empirically derived change in bilateral imports was 
undertaken in Trewin, Vanzetti and Thang (2015). Their modelling results indicated that a 
1% decrease in the stringency of the tetracycline standard in pork increases trade by 0.59%. 
A conceptual framework for this can be found in Andriamananjara, Ferrantino and Tsigas 
(2003) which discusses how SPS measures, technical barriers to trade and other regulatory 
measures may create efficiency losses, describing these as institutional frictions or “sand 
                                                        
14 See www.gtap.org for detailed and updated information on the model and database, along with wide-ranging 
applications. 
15 This latest version 9 database is particularly useful since it includes updated input-output data for New Zealand 
(Strutt and Siameja, 2015). 
16 See Minor (2013) for in-depth discussion of modelling changes in trade facilitation within the GTAP 
framework. 
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in the wheels.” Further discussion of approaches to incorporating NTMs into the GTAP 
model can be found in Fugazza and Maur (2008).  
Our simulation results are summarized in Table 3 and Figures 1 and 2. We estimate, 
based on the theoretically derived coefficient of unity, that extending SPS access to all 
countries would lead to increased fruit and vegetable imports from Europe (302% increase), 
Middle East and Africa (255% increase), the Americas (excluding USA) (127% increase), 
and East Asia (10% increase) at the expense of imports from Oceania (37% decrease), 
Australia (30% decrease), USA (26% decrease), South East Asia (22% decrease) and South 
Asia (5% decrease). Some of these increases are, however, from a low base: Europe in 
particular still only accounts for 4.2% of New Zealand fruit and vegetable imports. This is 
shown in Figure 2 and discussed in more detail below. 
 
Table 3. Results of implementing the Geographical Restrictions Index:  
Estimated change in real fruit and vegetable exports to New Zealand, percentage  
change and millions of 2011 USD  
 
Region Estimates based on direct 
calculation (coefficient = 
1) 
Utilizing point estimate 












Australia -29.9 -16.5 -22.4 -12.4 
Oceania (Pacific Island Countries) -36.9 -5.0 -27.8 -3.8 
East Asia 10.4 1.0 9.0 0.9 
South East Asia -22.0 -16.5 -16.4 -12.3 
South Asia -5.1 -0.2 -3.0 -0.1 
USA -25.8 -17.7 -19.3 -13.2 
Rest of Americas 126.8 33.7 92.7 24.6 
Europe 302.2 10.5 233.5 8.1 
Middle East and Africa 255.6 59.2 183.1 42.4 
World 17.4 48.6 12.3 34.3 
 
The changes are more modest (on average 70% of the magnitude) if the point estimate 
from the gravity equation is used, which reflects that this estimate is 0.677 rather than 1.17 
These estimates, together with results calculated from the 95% confidence interval of 
estimates of the coefficient on ln (GRI) in our gravity equation are shown in the vertical 
line in Figure 1.18  
Changes in market share are illustrated graphically in Figure 2. The major changes 
stem from the increase in market share of the Middle East and Africa (from 8% to 25%) 
and the Rest of Americas (from 10% to 18%), whereas market shares of South East Asia, 
USA and Australia decrease (from a collective total of 72% of New Zealand fruit and 
vegetable imports, these reduce to 46%). The fact that South Africa, Zimbabwe and 
Zambia, the three African countries holding country-specific approvals to export fruit or 
vegetable products to New Zealand, all utilize their access shows that improved access can 
lead to increased imports from such regions. 
                                                        
17 Given the general equilibrium interactions in the GTAP model, the changes will not be not exactly 67.7% of 
the original. 
18 For clarity of exposition, we do not present sensitivity analysis for our assumed coefficient of unity; the results 
from the gravity estimation (and confidence intervals) show the effect of different values of this coefficient. 
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Figure 1. Estimated change in fruit and vegetable exports if all products from all 
countries were approved19. 
 
Figure 2. Change in share of NZ fruit and vegetable imports. 
In aggregate, the 17.4% increase in real imports of fruit and vegetables (Table 3) is 
associated with a 3.2% contraction of real output in the New Zealand fruit and vegetable 
sector, while the New Zealand processed food sector expands by 0.5% (based on the 
assumed coefficient of unity). New Zealand increases its own real fruit and vegetable 
                                                        
19 In this figure, the height of bar shows results using the theoretically derived coefficient of one, whereas the 
black rectangle shows results using the econometric point estimate with the vertical line showing results 
from the 95% confidence interval around this point estimate. 
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exports to other regions by between 0.1 and 0.6%, with processed food exports increasing 
by 0.7% in aggregate.  
CONCLUSION 
This paper examined a particular feature of the New Zealand biosecurity regime: the 
requirement for animal and plant products presenting a biosecurity risk to be covered by an 
import health standard. In the absence of an import health standard, a country cannot export 
a particular commodity. Our new approach shows not only how such geographical 
restrictions on export eligibility for SPS reasons can be modelled but, more generally, how 
NTMs that lead to foregone or reduced trade may be incorporated within a CGE framework, 
thus providing a more general contribution to the NTM literature.  
We proposed a new Geographical Restrictions Index as a way of quantifying the extent 
to which fruit and vegetable trade from individual trading partners is restricted by these 
geographical restrictions on eligibility. We found that for regions such as Australia, the 
USA and Pacific Island countries in Oceania, with which New Zealand has a relatively 
extensive trade and biosecurity relationship, there is a relatively high Geographical 
Restrictions Index. In contrast, some African and Latin American states can only 
potentially export a relatively small proportion of their global fruit and vegetable trade to 
New Zealand. We were able to use the Geographical Restrictions Index to obtain an 
estimate of how New Zealand fruit and vegetable imports would shift if a country had 
access for all products, validating this approach with econometric estimation. Import shifts 
are incorporated into a CGE framework, using the GTAP model, with simulations 
quantifying the projected aggregate changes in real imports of fruit and vegetables if all 
countries were approved to export any fruit and vegetables to New Zealand. 
Our analysis does not take into account the costs of developing import health standards 
covering all countries and all products, nor does it take into account the risks of damage to 
New Zealand’s horticultural industry, should changes in phytosanitary policy lead to the 
introduction of damaging pests and diseases. Rather, we show how New Zealand’s 
phytosanitary regime influences the sources of New Zealand’s fruit and vegetable imports.  
We find that if all countries were able to export all fruit and vegetables, imports from 
Europe, Latin America, Middle East and Africa and East Asia would increase at the expense 
of imports from Australia, Oceania, South East Asia, South Asia and North America. This 
pattern holds even if we vary the strength of the response of New Zealand fruit and 
vegetable imports from a country to changes in that country’s Geographical Restrictions 
Index. 
Our results show a more nuanced view of the impact of phytosanitary restrictions than 
has previously been found in the literature, which often suggested that developing countries 
are most impacted by such food and agricultural measures (Li and Beghin 2012). From our 
results, we cannot say that developing countries are more adversely affected by the 
regulations than developed countries as we find substantial variation between impacts on 
different developing regions. In particular, we find that if New Zealand were to remove 
current restrictions, the largest negative effect would be on exports from developing Pacific 
Island countries, whereas the developed region of Europe is expected to be see the largest 
percentage growth in exports. The relatively privileged position of Pacific Island countries 
in the current regime, in terms of access to markets requiring import health standards, can 
perhaps be explained by New Zealand’s geographic proximity, close relationship and 
development objectives in the Pacific. The methodology in this paper provides a way of 
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obtaining a relatively detailed picture of how different regions may be affected by SPS 
measures. 
Our simulations show that the development of import standards which enable all 
countries to export all fruit and vegetables to New Zealand are likely to lead to an 
approximate 17% overall expansion of New Zealand’s imports in this sector. This is not as 
dramatic a change as some might expect, suggesting that approvals currently in place 
already provide reasonable coverage of potential exporters of particular fruit and vegetables 
to New Zealand. Nevertheless, there may well remain significant opportunities to enable 
greater imports from the Americas, Africa and the Middle East, which will benefit New 
Zealand consumers and industry (including processed food manufacturers). This may be 
facilitated through recent changes to the format of New Zealand’s import health standards, 
enabling additional countries to be more readily approved for exporting each commodity. 
APPENDIX 1: COVERAGE OF NEW ZEALAND FRUIT AND 
VEGETABLE IMPORT HEALTH STANDARDS 
HS 
Code 
Product Countries covered by 
Import Health 
Standards (in 2011)  
NZ Imports 
2011 (US$) 
Share of total 
NZ imports in 
Fruit and 
Vegetable 




Trade in 2011  
070110 Seed potatoes None20 144 0.00% 0.68% 
070190 Other potatoes, 
fresh or chilled 
None 0 0.00% 2.81% 
070200 Tomatoes, fresh 
or chilled 
Tonga (1998) and 
Australia (1993) 
4,235,768 1.46% 6.23% 
070310 Onions and 
shallots, fresh or 
chilled 
USA (1993) and Japan 
(1993). Both only for 
onions. 
1,575,297 0.54% 2.11% 
070320 Garlic, fresh or 
chilled 
USA (1993) and China 
(1993) 
3,939,158 1.36% 1.49% 
070390 Leeks and other 
alliaceous 
vegetables, nes 
Fiji (1993) 0 0.00% 0.27% 
070410 Cauliflowers and 
headed broccoli, 
fresh or chilled 
Australia (1993) 531,869 0.18% 0.63% 
070420 Brussels sprouts, 
fresh or chilled 
Australia (1993) 0 0.00% 0.08% 




Samoa (1993), Tonga 
(1993), Vanuatu 
(2012). All only for 
Island cabbage/pele. 
27,787 0.01% 1.01% 
HS 
Code 
Product Countries covered by 
Import Health 
Standards (in 2011)  
NZ Imports 
2011 (US$) 
Share of total 
NZ imports in 
Fruit and 
Vegetable 




Trade in 2011  
070511 Cabbage lettuce, 
fresh or chilled 
New Caledonia (1993) 0 0.00% 0.64% 
070519 Lettuce, fresh or 
chilled, (excl. 
cabbage lettuce) 
Australia (1993), China 




976,752 0.34% 0.89% 
                                                        
20 The recording of imports in this subheading may be an error or reimports of New Zealand products. In general 
the values are relatively low.  
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070521 Witloof chicory, 
fresh or chilled 
None9 44 0.00% 0.08% 
070529 Chicory, fresh or 
chilled,  
(excl. witloof) 
None 0 0.00% 0.11% 
070610 Carrots and 
turnips, fresh or 
chilled 
Australia (1993), China 
(1993), South Africa 









Fiji (1993) 15,001 0.01% 0.42% 
070700 Cucumbers and 
gherkins, fresh 
or chilled 
Australia (1993), New 
Caledonia (1993) and 
Vanuatu (1999). All 
only for cucumbers. 
143,689 0.05% 1.48% 
070810 Peas, fresh or 
chilled 
USA (1993), South 
Africa (1997), Zambia 
(894) and Zimbabwe 
(1997) 
774,193 0.27% 0.26% 




South Africa (1999), 
New Caledonia (1999) 
and Vanuatu (1998) 
5,151,909 1.77% 0.64% 
070890 Leguminous 
vegetables, fresh 
or chilled, nes 
None9 81,260 0.03% 0.06% 
070920 Asparagus, fresh 
or chilled 
USA 301,958 0.10% 0.87% 
070930 Aubergines, 
fresh or chilled 
Vanuatu, Fiji, New 
Caledonia, Samoa and 
Tonga 
983,120 0.34% 0.32% 
070940 Celery, fresh or 
chilled 
None 0 0.00% 0.17% 
070951 Mushrooms, 
fresh or chilled 
None9 787 0.00% 0.78% 
070952 Truffles, fresh or 
chilled 
All 124,429 0.04% 0.48% 
070960 Fruits of genus 
Capiscum or 
Pimenta, fresh or 
chilled 
Australia (1993), 
Netherlands (1993) and 
New Caledonia (1999). 
All for capsicum only. 
Cook Islands (1993), 
Fiji (1993) and Tonga 
(2001). All for chilli 
only. 
2,408,691 0.83% 3.31% 










Product Countries covered by 
Import Health 
Standards (in 2011)  
NZ Imports 
2011 (US$) 
Share of total 
NZ imports in 
Fruit and 
Vegetable 




Trade in 2011  
070990 Other vegetables, 
fresh or chilled, 
nes 
Australia (1993), Fiji 
(1993), New Caledonia 
(1993), Niue (1993), 
5,792,872 2.00% 2.16% 
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Papua New Guinea 
(2006), Samoa (1993), 
South Africa (1997), 
Thailand (1993), Tonga 
(1993), Vanuatu (1998) 
and Zimbabwe (1997) 
all have at least one 
vegetable in this group 
approved. 
071310 Dried peas, 
shelled 
All 413,845 0.14% 1.38% 
071320 Dried chickpeas, 
shelled 
All 1,685,747 0.58% 0.67% 
071331 Dried beans, 
shelled 
All 0 0.00% 0.00% 
071332 Dried adzuki 
beans, shelled 
All 0 0.00% 0.00% 
071333 Dried kidney 
beans, incl. white 
pea beans, 
shelled 
All 6,403,931 2.21% 1.12% 
071339 Dried beans, 
shelled, nes 
All 486,379 0.17% 0.32% 
071340 Dried lentils, 
shelled 
All 893,991 0.31% 1.03% 
071350 Dried broad 
beans and horse 
beans, shelled 





All 283,951 0.10% 0.46% 
071410 Manioc, fresh or 
dried 
Cook Islands (1993), 
Fiji (1993), Niue 
(1993), Papua New 
Guinea (1993), Samoa 
(1993), Solomon 
Islands (1993), Tonga 
(1993), Vanuatu (1993) 
787,441 0.27% 1.25% 
071420 Sweet potatoes, 
fresh or dried 
Fiji (1993), Niue 
(1993), Papua New 
Guinea (1993), Samoa 
(1993), Tonga (1993), 
Vanuatu (1993) 
141,204 0.05% 0.15% 
071490 Roots and tubers 
with high starch 
content, fres 
Cook Islands (1993), 
Fiji (1993), Niue 
(1993), Papua New 
Guinea (1993), Samoa 
(1993), Solomon 
Islands (1993), Tonga 
(1993), Vanuatu (1993) 
8,597,055 2.96% 0.27% 
080111 Coconuts, 
desiccated 
All 5,887,267 2.03% 0.53% 
HS 
Code 
Product Countries covered by 
Import Health 
Standards (in 2011)  
NZ Imports 
2011 (US$) 
Share of total 
NZ imports in 
Fruit and 
Vegetable 




Trade in 2011  
080119 Coconuts (excl. 
desiccated) 
Cook Islands, Fiji, 
Kiribati, New 




664,451 0.23% 0.20% 
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Tokelau, Tonga, 
Tuvalu and Vanuatu. 
As older HS 
nomenclatures 
combined desiccated 
and fresh coconuts, all 
were treated as 
approved in our 
analysis. 
080121 Brazil nuts in 
shell, fresh or 
dried 
All 0 0.00% 0.01% 
080122 Brazil nuts, 
shelled, fresh or 
dried 
All 2,997,711 1.03% 0.18% 
080131 Cashew nuts in 
shell, fresh or 
dried 
All 888 0.00% 1.36% 
080132 Cashew nuts, 
shelled, fresh or 
dried 
All 18,424,644 6.35% 1.80% 
080211 Almonds in 
shell, fresh or 
dried 
All 1,155 0.00% 0.50% 
080212 Almonds without 
shells, fresh or 
dried 
All 12,035,769 4.15% 2.00% 
080221 Hazlenuts in 
shell, fresh or 
dried 
All 0 0.00% 0.07% 
080222 Hazlenuts 
without shells, 
fresh or dried 
All 1,748,222 0.60% 1.09% 
080231 Walnuts in shell, 
fresh or dried 
All 1,184 0.00% 0.46% 
080232 Walnuts without 
shells, fresh or 
dried 
All 3,844,148 1.32% 0.82% 
080240 Chestnuts, fresh 
or dried 
All 22,053 0.01% 0.18% 
080250 Pistachio, fresh 
or dried 
All 1,040,771 0.36% 1.45% 
080260 Macadamia nuts All 4,272,579 1.47% 0.26% 
080290 Other nuts, fresh 
or dried, nes 






Ecuador (1993), Fiji 
(1999), Mexico (1993), 
Niue (1993), Panama 
(1993), Philippines 
(1993), Samoa (1993) 
and Tonga (1993) 
62,039,979 21.37% 10.06% 
080410 Dates, fresh or 
dried 





Product Countries covered by 
Import Health 
Standards (in 2011)  
NZ Imports 
2011 (US$) 
Share of total 
NZ imports in 
Fruit and 
Vegetable 




Trade in 2011  
080420 Figs, fresh or 
dried 
All 672,544 0.23% 0.28% 
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080430 Pineapples, fresh 
or dried 
Australia (1993), 
Ecuador (1999), Fiji 
(1999), New Caledonia 
(1993), Philippines 
(1993), Thailand (1993) 
and Vanuatu (1999). 
(Malaysia has access 




7,101,755 2.45% 1.76% 
080440 Avocados, fresh 
or dried 
Australia (1998) and 
Tonga (1999) 




fresh or dried 
Australia (2004), Cook 
Islands (1997), Ecuador 
(1999), Fiji (1993), 
Mexico (1993), New 
Caledonia (1999), Peru 
(1999), Philippines 
(1993), Taiwan (2004), 
Thailand (1993), Tonga 
(1998), USA (2011), 
India (2012), Vietnam 
(2011), Indonesia 
(2013). Samoa has 
access for peeled and 
chopped mango as an 
"approved processed 
commodity". 
5,718,572 1.97% 1.21% 
080510 Oranges, fresh or 
dried 
Australia (1993), Egypt 
(2006), Mexico (1993), 
Spain (1999), USA 
(1993) and Vanuatu 
(2006). 




fresh or dried 
Australia (1993), Egypt 
(2006), Japan (2000), 
USA (1993) and 
Vanuatu (2006) 
7,448,704 2.57% 3.09% 
080530 Lemons and 
limes, fresh or 
dried 
Australia (1993), Egypt 
(2006), New Caledonia 
(1993), Samoa (2009), 
USA (1993) and 
Vanuatu (2006) 
362,994 0.13% 0.74% 
080540 Grapefruit, fresh 
or dried 
Australia (1993), Egypt 
(2006), USA (1993) 
and Vanuatu (2006) 
2,667,055 0.92% 1.51% 
080590 Citrus fruit, fresh 
or dried, nes 
None 80,450 0.03% 0.04% 
080610 Fresh grapes Australia (1993), Chile 
(1993), China (2010), 
Italy (2002), Mexico 
(1993), Korea (2011) 
and Peru (2012). 




Product Countries covered by 
Import Health 
Standards (in 2011)  
NZ Imports 
2011 (US$) 
Share of total 
NZ imports in 
Fruit and 
Vegetable 




Trade in 2011  
080620 Dried grapes All 20,459,107 7.05% 1.27% 
080711 Watermelons, 
fresh 
Australia (1993), New 
Caledonia (1993) and 
Tonga (1993). 
2,289,645 0.79% 0.79% 
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080719 Melons (excl. 
watermelons), 
fresh 
Australia (1993) and 
New Caledonia (1993) 
(both for honey dew 
and rock melon only) 
3,721,773 1.28% 1.22% 
080720 Papaws 
(papayas), fresh 
Australia (2006), Cook 
Islands (1993), Fiji 
(1999), Philippines 
(2000), Samoa (2004), 
Tonga (1998), USA 
(1993) and Vanuatu 
(2006). 
1,719,402 0.59% 0.18% 
080810 Apples, fresh Chile (1993), Japan 
(1993) and USA (1993) 
1,729,275 0.60% 4.77% 
080820 Pears and 
quinces, fresh 
Australia (1993), China 
(1993), Korea (1999) 
and USA (1993) 
4,389,950 1.51% 2.00% 
080910 Apricots, fresh USA (1993) 3,440 0.00% 0.31% 




USA (1993) 2,895,576 1.00% 1.59% 
080940 Plums and sloes, 
fresh 
Chile (1993), USA 
(1993) 
1,033,081 0.36% 0.64% 
081010 Strawberries, 
fresh 
Australia (1993), New 
Caledonia (1993) and 
USA (1993) 









None9 42,178 0.01% 0.89% 
081050 Kiwifruit, fresh Italy (1993) and USA 
(1993). As older HS 
nomenclatures 
combined 081050, 
081060 and 081090 our 
analysis also had to 
combine them.  
1,101,963 0.38% 1.53% 




081060 and 081090 our 
analysis also had to 
combine them. 
97,732 0.03% 0.31% 
081090 Other fruit, fresh, 
nes 
Australia (2008), Fiji 
(1999), New Caledonia 
(2000), Samoa (2004), 
Taiwan (2007), 
Thailand (1993), Tonga 
(1999) and 
 




080620 Dried grapes All 20,459,107 7.05% 1.27% 
  USA (1993) all have at 
least one fruit in this 
HS subheading 
approved. As older 
nomenclatures 
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combined 081050, 
081060 and 081090 our 
analysis also had to 
combine them. 
081310 Dried apricots All 7,498,448 2.58% 0.34% 
081320 Dried prunes All 3,315,492 1.14% 0.33% 
081330 Dried apples All 555,714 0.19% 0.14% 
081340 Other dried fruit, 
nes 
All 2,334,544 0.80% 0.41% 
081350 Mixtures of dried 
fruit and nuts, 
nes 
All 1,120,920 0.39% 0.19% 
Source: Trade data are import data obtained from the UN COMTRADE database and information on countries covered 
by Import Health Standards is based on the authors’ extension of the UNCTAD NTM database for New Zealand. 
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Abstract 
This paper explores the impact of non-tariff measures (NTMs) on supply chains in 
the Asia-Pacific region, with a focus on exports to major ASEAN countries. 
Generally defined, NTMs are policy measures, other than tariffs, which may have 
an impact on international trade. The database of NTMs used was compiled as part 
of a multi-agency project led by UNCTAD. This database contains detailed and 
comprehensive data on NTMs obtained from teams of researchers working 
systematically through all laws, rules and regulations which may affect 
merchandise trade. These measures are then set within a common classification 
framework and assigned to tariff lines within the World Customs Organization’s 
Harmonized System. 
We first use the detailed NTM database to obtain econometric estimates of the 
effect of different types of NTMs on imports into major ASEAN countries, using a 
gravity model framework. We then use these econometric estimates in a global 
computable general equilibrium model to examine the impact of unilaterally 
eliminating the types of NTMs that are found to have significant negative effects 
on trade. We use a newly available Global Supply Chain Model, based on the well-
known Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP model). By utilizing this model, we 
can capture the effects of reducing NTMs identified as particularly problematic 
separately on products sold for intermediate production and those sold to final 
consumers. Moreover, we can separate the effects of NTM liberalization depending 
on whether the obligation and its cost is directed at exporters or importers. This 
facilitates quantification and in-depth analysis of the impact of NTMs on supply 
chains. 
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Non-tariff measures (NTMs) are generally defined as policy measures, other 
than tariffs, which may have an impact on international trade in goods and services 
(UNCTAD, 2013). They constitute a wide variety of measures imposed for a wide 
range of reasons, including legitimate public policy objectives such as the 
protection of consumer health or for biosecurity reasons. Nevertheless, such 
measures do affect trade; see Beghin, Maertens, and Swinnen (2015) for a useful 
survey of NTM research. The impact of NTMs on “supply” or “global value” chains 
is attracting increased attention by researchers (Cadestin, Gourdon, and Kowalski, 
2016, and Kowalski, Lopez Gonzalez, Ragoussis, and Ugarte, 2015).  The effects 
of NTMs and other trade costs can compound in a supply chain where semi-finished 
goods cross international borders multiple times: “the effect of a marginal increase 
in trade costs everywhere in the supply chain is much larger than would be the case 
if there were a single international transaction” (Ferrantino, 2012).  
While there are now many examples of studies which incorporate 
econometric estimates of the effect of NTMs into computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) models, there remains significant scope to refine the methodologies used in 
both the econometric estimation and the CGE modelling of NTMs, as well as the 
link between them (see the discussion in Walmsley and Minor, 2015; Berden and 
Francois, 2015 for a survey of recent CGE work; and Walmsley et al., 2018 for a 
recent application). Some key issues, addressed in this paper, include the 
importance of differentiating between NTMs on intermediate versus final goods, 
and the need to distinguish between NTMs that impose costs on the importer and 
those that impose costs on the exporter. Moreover, this paper estimates the 
restrictiveness of NTMs for direct application in a CGE framework. This is in 
contrast to modelling applications which may use econometric estimates originally 
developed in another context or for another purpose. 
In this paper we use a detailed NTM database to obtain econometric 
estimates of the effect of different types of NTMs on imports into six major ASEAN 
countries, using a gravity model framework. We then use these econometric 
estimates to identify the types of NTMs that are found to have significant negative 
effects on both imports of products sold for intermediate production and those sold 
to final consumers in these ASEAN countries. Next, we consider the extent to which 
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these NTMs can be eliminated, as well as whether the NTMs are more likely to 
impact the importer or exporter’s costs. Finally, we simulate a reduction in these 
NTMs using the ImpactECON Global Supply Chain Model (IESC) based on the 
well-known Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model. 
Our approach is novel because we estimate the effect of different types of 
NTM, both on intermediate inputs and final consumption. Moreover, we model the 
effect of the removal of burdensome NTMs differently depending on whether the 
effect is predominately on exporter or importer costs. 
We focus on the six largest ASEAN countries. These major ASEAN 
economies are well linked into regional and global supply chains and are likely to 
have a broadly similar regulatory environment; thus we are not combining a 
disparate group of countries from different regions. Updated NTM data have 
recently been collected and publicly released for these countries, while data for 
many other major Asian economies, including Japan, Korea, China and India, are 
not currently available.  
 
ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
The NTM database 
The database of NTMs that we use has been compiled in a multi-agency 
project led by UNCTAD.1 This database - recently relaunched with expanded and 
updated country coverage - contains detailed and comprehensive data on NTMs 
obtained from teams of researchers working systematically through all laws, rules 
and regulations which may affect merchandise trade.2 These measures are then set 
within a common classification framework as well as assigned to tariff lines within 
the World Customs Organization’s Harmonized System (HS). Cadot and Gourdon 
(2016), Cadot, Asprilla, Gourdon, Knebel and Peters (2015), Strutt et al. (2018) and 
Vanzetti, Peters, and Knebel (2014) provide examples of applications of this 
database.  
The classification developed by UNCTAD and the Multi-Agency Support 
Team (MAST) which underpins the NTM database has 16 chapters (UNCTAD 
                                                 
1 http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DITC/Trade-Analysis/Non-Tariff-Measures.aspx 




2013 and UNCTAD 2014), as presented in table 1. Within each chapter, there is a 
hierarchy of classification, for instance the grouping A5 Treatment for elimination 
of plant and animal pests and disease-causing organisms in the final product e.g. 
post-harvest treatment includes the subgroupings: A51 Cold/heat treatment, A52 
Irradiation, A53 Fumigation and A59 Treatment for elimination of plant and 
animal pests and disease-causing organisms in the final product, n.e.s. (UNCTAD, 
2013).  
 
Table 1: Classification of non-tariff measures 
Technical 
measures 
A Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary Measures 
B Technical Barriers To Trade 
 C Pre-Shipment Inspection And Other Formalities 
Non-technical 
measures 
D Contingent Trade-Protective Measures 
E Non-Automatic Licensing, Quotas, Prohibitions And 
Quantity-Control Measures Other Than For SPS Or 
TBT Reasons 
F Price-Control Measures, Including Additional Taxes 
And Charges 
G Finance Measures 
H Measures Affecting Competition 
I Trade-Related Investment Measures 
J Distribution Restrictions 
K Restrictions On Post-Sales Services 
L Subsidies (Excluding Export Subsidies Under P7) 
M Government Procurement Restrictions 
N Intellectual Property 
O Rules Of Origin 
Exports P Export-Related Measures 
Source: UNCTAD (2013) 
 
Estimation methodology and data 
Our research examines the effect of NTMs on imports in six major ASEAN 
markets (Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Viet Nam and the Philippines). 
We use a gravity model framework which is commonly used for this type of 
application (see Beghin, Disdier, and Marette, 2015,  Carrère and De Melo, 2011 
and the widely cited paper Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga, 2009).  
We apply the most widely recognized gravity model estimator, the Poisson 
pseudo maximum likelihood estimator (ppml) proposed by Santos Silva and 
Tenreyro (2006). This estimator, which adapts a count data framework, is widely 
used in gravity model applications because it is robust to heteroskedasticity and also 
addresses the issues of zero trade values which arise in disaggregated trade data 
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given not all countries export all goods.3 In contrast to negative binomial regression 
and zero inflated negative binomial estimators, the ppml estimator is scale invariant 
(Shepherd, 2013) 
 
We adapt the estimator proposed in Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) to 
provide the following gravity equation (equation 1): 
𝑚
=  𝛽NTM_ 𝐷 _ + 𝛽 ln consumption + 𝛽 ln production
+  𝛽 AVE tariff + 𝛽 specific tariff + 𝛽 ln(distance ) 
+  𝛽 ln(contiguity ) + 𝛽 ln(common legal )  
+  𝛽 RTA + 𝛽exporter_ 𝐷 _ + 𝛽importer_ 𝐷 _  
+ 𝛽sector_ 𝐷 _ + 𝛽 ln(world imports ) + 𝜀  
The UNCTAD NTM data are cross-sectional, capturing up to 62 different types of 
NTMs in force in our ASEAN countries of interest in 2015. Our econometric 
framework is therefore also cross-sectional. Therefore, in equation 1, 𝑚  is 
imports of product i (at the HS 6 digit level), by importer d, from exporter e in 
2015.4 Our error term is denoted 𝜀 , and other variables are described in the 
section that follows. 
We examine imports that originate from any one of a group of 119 exporting 
countries. This corresponds to the almost all individual countries included in 
version 9 of the GTAP database, including the 6 major ASEN countries (Aguiar, 
Narayanan, and McDougall, 2016).5 With 6 importing countries, 118 possible 
partners, and 5,203 HS level 6 “products” in the 2012 version of the HS system that 
                                                 
3 Google scholar lists over 3,500 papers that cite Santos Silva & Tenreyro (2006). 
4 While the UNCTAD data are collected at the more detailed tariff line level, the harmonized system 
is only consistent at up to the HS 6 digit level, with countries able to adopt their own codes at the 
more detailed (i.e., HS 8 or HS 10 levels etc.) level. We therefore work with data at the HS 6 digit 
level for consistency across countries. Moreover, the widely used UN COMTRADE database, which 
we use as the source of import data, is only available at the 6 digit level (https://comtrade.un.org/).  
5 We, however, exclude the US territory of Puerto Rico as gravity data variables are not available 
and we also exclude Taiwan, which is not widely internationally recognized as a country and 
therefore is not included in the UN COMTRADE database.  
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we use, our gravity database includes almost 3.7 million observations although most 
of these involve zero trade.6  
Our NTMs are incorporated through dummy variables (DNTM_k,id) for each 
different type of NTM; these equal to unity if the importing country d applies NTM 
k on imports of product i from at least one exporting country. 
The gravity model framework requires data on “consumption” in the 
importing country and production in the exporting country. As we do not require 
time series data, we are able to make use of sectoral data from the GTAP database 
for 2011 (Narayanan et al., 2015). In this database, each HS 6 digit product is 
mapped to one of 43 aggregate sectors (denoted with a subscript j in equation 1). 
For “consumption” data (consumptionjd), we use data on private consumption (VPA 
in the GTAP database) when estimating the impact of NTMs on imported 
consumption goods, and firm purchases (VFA) when estimating the impact on 
imported intermediates. We use sectoral output data from the GTAP database for 
“production” data in the exporting country (productionje).7 
Tariff data is obtained from the WTO and World Bank, depending on 
availability. 8 Data for Viet Nam, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines for 2015 
is obtained from the WTO. Data for Malaysia and Thailand are not available 
directly from the WTO, so we use data from the World Bank WITS database, which 
has data for Thailand (for 2015) and Malaysia (for 2014). With data from both 
databases, we incorporate applied ad valorem equivalent (AVE) rates (AVE 
tariffide) and include a separate dummy variable where a specific tariff applies 
(specific tariffide). As the gravity model works with logarithms and the logarithm of 
a zero tariff is undefined, some transformation is required; we apply an inverse 
hyperbolic sine transformation whereby 𝑖ℎ𝑠(𝑥) =  ln(𝑥 + (𝑥 + 1) . ) gives an 
identical result to using logarithms for non-zero values while avoiding the need to 
make ad hoc adjustments to zero values (Gibson, Datt, Murgai, and Ravallion, 
2017). 
                                                 
6 88 percent of our observations are zero. It should also be noted that we exclude HS subheadings 
27.05.00 and 27.16.00 as these are typically classified as services.  
7 Given the theoretical underpinnings of the gravity model are based on using nominal GDP, we 
multiply both our consumption and production data by the ratio of 2015 nominal GDP to 2011 
nominal GDP from the World Bank World Development Indicators to generate sectoral data by 
country that takes account of both the growth of the economy and changes in exchange rate. 
8 http://tariffdata.wto.org and http://wits.worldbank.org/  
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Other gravity data variables typically included as controls - distance 
(distancede), contiguity (contiguityde), common legal system (common legalde) and 
the existence of a regional trade agreement (RTAde) - are obtained from the widely 
used CEPII database.9 As data on the existence of a RTA are only available until 
2006, we update this by adding new agreements that enter into force from 2006 to 
1 January 2015 and which are notified to the WTO.10  
We control for importer, exporter and sector fixed effects, through the 
dummy variables 𝐷 _ , 𝐷 _ ,  Dimporter_d,idedie and Dsector,ji. 
Moreover, as some HS subheadings contain a lot of products potentially traded and 
others contain fewer, we include the natural log of the value of world imports of 
product i by country d (ln(world importsid)).11 This is an alternative to using product 
level fixed effects (as used in, for instance, Crivelli and Gröschl, 2016 and Kee and 
Nicita, 2016). We prefer to control for world imports because it avoids the issues 
of multicollinearity that we encountered with product fixed effects, where NTMs 
applied by ASEAN countries on any given product were found to be correlated. 
Moreover, the use of the world imports as an independent variable is possible in 
our paper as we only look at a small number of importing countries, whereas the 
above-mentioned papers, which look at a larger set of countries, are not able to 
avoid endogeneity through excluding imports from the countries of focus. 
We estimate separately the effects of NTMs on two broad sectoral 
aggregations: Food and Agriculture, and Non-Agriculture Products, based on 
aggregations of the GTAP sectors as set out in appendix 1. NTMs in these two broad 
sectors are applied for different reasons and can have different effects, hence 
separation improves the accuracy of estimates.  
For our two broad sector aggregations, we further estimate separately the 
effects of NTMs on imports of consumer goods and intermediate/capital goods. We 
distinguish between these two categories of products through a conversion table 
between HS2012 subheadings and the Broad Economic Classification (BEC) 
available from the UN Statistical Division.12 Under the BEC framework, products 
are classified as either intermediate, consumer or investment (capital goods) or are 
                                                 
9 http://www.cepii.fr/cepii/en/bdd_modele/bdd.asp. 
10 http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx. 





listed as “not classified”. This is consistent with the approach taken in compiling 
the IESC database detailed in Walmsley and Minor (2016), although they 
supplement the concordance with additional information from the GTAP database. 
We consequently run four separate regressions. 
 
Estimation results 
Our estimation results with the ppml estimator for consumer goods and 
intermediate/investment goods in both the agriculture and food and non- agriculture 
product groupings are summarized in tables 2 and 3. As can be seen in table 2, our 
control variables are generally as would be expected, for instance: trade decreases 
with distance, particularly for food and agricultural products that are inputs for 
further processes; and higher ad valorem tariffs decrease trade (although the effect 
is only statistically significant for food and agricultural products for final 
consumption and for non-agricultural intermediate inputs).  
Table 2: Econometric estimates (control variables) 
 Food and Agriculture Non Agriculture 
 
VARIABLES Consumption Intermediates Consumption Intermediates 
     
Preferential tariff -0.131*** 0.00817 -0.0763 -0.134*** 
 (0.0371) (0.0601) (0.0494) (0.0394) 
Specific tariff 0.0251 -0.616 -0.0663 0.743** 
 (0.326) (0.686) (0.677) (0.289) 
Consumption/use -0.105 -0.0144 0.0466 0.559*** 
 (0.0987) (0.0720) (0.0822) (0.0747) 
Production 1.026*** 1.099*** 0.672*** 0.955*** 
 (0.122) (0.137) (0.0743) (0.0654) 
World imports 0.931*** 1.133*** 0.810*** 0.893*** 
 (0.0378) (0.0852) (0.0337) (0.0210) 
Distance -0.541*** -1.055*** -0.409*** -0.505*** 
 (0.180) (0.386) (0.144) (0.166) 
Contiguity 0.187 0.428* 0.137 0.227 
 (0.228) (0.248) (0.154) (0.203) 
Common legal system -0.173 -0.355*** 0.0205 0.150 
 (0.132) (0.127) (0.115) (0.105) 
RTA 0.0119 0.284 0.269 -0.0535 
 (0.173) (0.191) (0.179) (0.162) 
     
R-squared 0.110 0.324 0.131 0.340 
Importer/Exporter/Sector FE YES YES YES YES 
N (including zero trade obs) 422430 200368 527730 2.483e+06 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3 shows the NTM coefficients, converted to percent changes in 
imports that would result from elimination of the NTM.13 These illustrate the effects 
of diverse types of NTMs and how these effects vary, including depending on 
whether they are applied to food and agricultural products or non-agricultural 
products and whether they are applied on products for final consumption or to 
intermediate inputs. To illustrate, applying a microbiological (hygiene) requirement 
(a410) to imports of food and agricultural for final consumption is expected to 
decrease imports by 63 percent, whereas applying a certification requirement 
(b830) to a non-agricultural intermediate good is expected to decrease imports by 
32 percent. Of the NTMs that have a statistically significant impact, their effect is 
greatest on agricultural intermediates (an average impact of 74 percent on affected 
products) and smallest for non-agricultural products for final consumption (an 
average of 49 percent on affected products). 
  
                                                 
13 Given the log-linear nature of the model, coefficients of dummy variables provide percent change 
through the following formula: 𝛽 =  𝑒 − 1 (See WTO, 2012). 
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Table 3: Estimated effect of NTM reductions (for NTMs found to reduce trade that 
are statistically significant at the 90 percent level) 
  Food and Agriculture Non-Agriculture 
NTM Description 
 
Consumption Intermediates Consumption Intermediates 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
a110 Temporary geographic prohibitions 65%*** 59%*** --- --- 
a140 
Authorisation requirements (for 
importers) 62%** --- --- 49%*** 
a210 Residue tolerance limits 49%* --- --- --- 
a220 Restricted use of substances --- --- 36%*** --- 
a320 Marking requirements --- --- --- 78%** 
a330 Packaging requirements --- 43%** --- --- 
a410 
Hygienic requirements: 
microbiological requirements 63%*** --- --- --- 
a490 Hygienic requirements --- 97%*** --- 93%** 
a590 Treatment requirements nes --- 81%*** --- --- 
a640 Storage and transport requirements 38%** --- --- 78%** 
a690 Other production requirements --- --- --- 98%*** 
a820 Testing requirements --- --- --- 60%* 
a840 Inspection requirements --- --- --- 62%*** 
a851 Traceability (origin) 65%*** --- --- --- 
a852 Traceability (processing history) --- --- --- 49%*** 
a859 Other traceability requirements 49%*** --- --- --- 
a890 Other conformity requirements --- 82%* 90%* --- 
Technical Barriers to Trade 
b110 Prohibitions --- 86%*** --- --- 
b210 Residue tolerance limits --- --- --- 80%** 
b320 Marking requirements 62%* --- --- --- 
b330 Packaging requirements --- --- --- 32%** 
b410 Production process requirements --- --- --- 48%** 
b420 Storage and transport requirements --- --- 43%*** --- 
b700 Performance standards --- --- 40%** --- 
b810 Product registration requirements --- 54%*** --- --- 
b830 Certification requirements --- --- --- 32%*** 
b840 Inspection requirements 49%** --- --- --- 
b850 General traceability requirements --- --- 30%* --- 
b859 Other traceability requirements --- 90%** 54%** --- 
b890 Conformity assessments nes 84%*** --- 52%** 37%** 
b900 Other TBT requirements 93%*** --- --- 71%*** 
c300 Direct consignment requirements 47%*** 48%* --- --- 
c400 Import monitoring requirements --- 88%*** --- --- 
c900 Customs formalities --- 87%* --- --- 
Number of statistically significant NTMs 11 10 7 14 
Number of NTMs in regression 61 62 40 61 
Percentage of statistically significant NTMs 20% 18% 18% 23% 
Average estimated effect of a statistically 
significant NTM 68% 74% 49% 65% 




Approximately 20 percent of NTMs are found to have a statistically 
significant negative effect on trade at the 10 percent level. This is less than we 
would expect, which is likely to reflect the somewhat limited statistical power of 
our estimations given we do not have access to panel data; comprehensive NTM 
data is available for a single year. If panel data are available in future, more precise 
estimates would be possible and we would expect to find more NTMs having a 
statistically significant negative impact on trade. 
On the other hand, the relatively large number of NTM variables does 
introduce the statistical implication that a number of statistically insignificant 
coefficients could be treated as significant. With a 10 percent significance level we 
would expect to fail to reject the null hypothesis of no effect for one in every 10 
variables that did not in fact affect the dependent variable. However, controlling for 
these “family wise” errors, such as through a Holm sequential Bonferroni regressive 
procedure is often seen as too conservative and not appropriate in all circumstances.  
(Roback and Askins, 2005 and Fiedler, Kutzner, and Krueger, 2012).   
From the discussion above, we are also conscious that the statistical power 
of our tests is somewhat limited given we only have cross-sectional NTM data. 
(This is illustrated by the low proportion of coefficients that are statistically 
significant at the 5 or 1 percent level). Moreover, as discussed earlier, there is a 
clear theoretical rationale to expect negative effects given NTMs raise costs. This 
contrasts with many applications of multiple hypothesis testing which are based on 
analysis of scientific experiments for which there may not be an underlying 
theoretical explanation for the effect of each coefficient.   
We therefore chose not to utilize family-wise error corrections as we do not 
consider the inherent tradeoff, between reducing the number of coefficients found 
(incorrectly) to be statistically significant at the expense of discounting too many 
potential NTMs, to be appropriate for our application.14 Instead, we address the 
                                                 
14 The Holm sequential Bonferroni correction divides the α value for the most significant coefficient 
in each family by the number of variables in the family e.g. for a family of 3 variables the α for a 10 
percent significant level is reduced from .1 to 0.033, so a variable significant at the 5 percent level 
may no longer be significant. As can be seen in table 3, many of our coefficients are significant at 
the 5 or 10 percent level, so would no longer be statistically significant following this correction. 
When applying this procedure, we did, however, find some coefficients to still be significant 
depending on how we defined a “family” for the purposes of this procedure. For instance, when we 
treat certification requirements within each of the UNCTAD chapters as a “family” for the purposes 
of the Holm sequential correction, we still obtain some statistically significant estimates (at the 10 
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issue through our actionability assumption – as discussed in the following section 
we only assume that 20 percent of the gains from NTM elimination are realizable. 
This allows a margin in case we have included NTMs that in fact have zero impact 
on trade. Multiple testing issues could be addressed more fully in the future if panel 
data on NTMs were available, which would significantly increase the power of our 
tests. 
 
CGE MODELLING OF NTM LIBERALIZATION 
 
The next stage in the analysis incorporates the economic estimates of the 
effect of NTMs into the IESC model (Walmsley and Minor, 2016), which is a 
modified version of the GTAP model using its own database alongside the GTAP 
version 9 databases (Aguiar, Narayanan and McDougall, 2016). We conduct our 
simulations of the effect of NTM liberalization by the ASEAN countries on all 
trading partners in a specification with seven sectors; two from the Food and 
Agriculture grouping and four from the Non Agriculture grouping, as well as a 
services sector – see appendix 1. Our specification of the IESC model has 15 
regions.15  
 
Channels to incorporate NTMs: Importer and exporter effects 
An important innovation that we use in the current study is the inclusion of 
a CGE modelling mechanism to shock export efficiency (Walmsley and Strutt, 
2018). This channel is the counterpart of the import augmenting technological 
change described below, as it reduces the amount of exports needed to meet a given 
level of import demand. When modelling reductions in NTMs through this 
mechanism, the principal benefits accrue to exporting countries. This is appropriate 
for the liberalization of many NTMs which directly affect the cost of exporting. 
In other cases, however, the obligation of meeting NTM requirements falls 
on the importer. For these types of NTM we use an approach to incorporating NTM 
reductions, which is widely used in the literature: import-augmenting technological 
                                                 
percent level). Similarly, treating the four NTMs within the UNCTAD classification chapter C (Pre-
shipment inspection and formalities) as a family and applying a Holm sequential Bonferroni 
correction retains some coefficients as statistically significant. 
15 The regions are Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Viet Nam, Philippines, Indonesia, Other ASEAN, 
New Zealand, Australia, Japan, Korea, China, India, United States and the Rest of the World. 
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shocks (see, for instance, Hertel, Walmsley, and Itakura, 2001, and Francois, Van 
Meijl, and Van Tongeren, 2005). 16 As explained in Walmsley and Minor (2015) 
this has two main effects: (1)  it reduces the importers price causing a substitution 
towards that good and an increase in quantity demanded and (2) it reduces the 
amount that needs to be imported to satisfy a given demand. As a result of the 
second effect, firms in the importing country require less imported intermediates 
for a given production level and households and governments can satisfy an initial 
demand with less imports (from the perspective of the exporter); this increases GDP 
in the importing countries. These effects mean that the principal benefits accrue to 
the importing countries affected.  
By modelling benefits accruing to both exporters and importers, our 
approach is a significant advance on previous approaches where benefits of NTM 
liberalization principally accrue to importers, even when this is not consistent with 
economic theory or empirical evidence. Other ways to enable exporters to be 
affected include incorporating NTMs as import tariffs or export taxes. (See Fugazza 
and Maur, 2008 for a discussion and Arita, Beckman, and Mitchell, 2017, 
Kawasaki, 2015, and Andriamananjara, Ferrantino, and Tsigas, 2003, for three 
illustrative examples of how this separation is made in practice.) The challenge with 
this approach is that NTMs are generally not associated with an additional tax or 
fee collected by government. In contrast, our approach captures these as 
inefficiencies affecting the cost of exporting or importing in a manner that is 
consistent with the conventional GTAP framework. 
  
Obtaining NTM quantity shocks to calibrate the IESC model 
To calibrate the IESC model we need four sets of shocks: (i) import-
augmenting technological shocks to imports of intermediate goods (including 
capital goods); (ii) import-augmenting technological shocks to imports of 
consumption goods; (iii) import-augmenting technological shocks to imports of 
goods for government consumption; (iv) exporting efficiency shocks to exports of 
                                                 
16 An alternative approach is the “willingness to pay” framework proposed in Walmsley and Minor 
(2015). We, however, focus on the technological shock variables to enable a direct comparison 
between these approaches. See Walmsley and Strutt (2018) for detailed exploration of the impact of 
alternative CGE modelling mechanisms. 
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all goods.17 These shocks differ across importing and exporting region to reflect the 
different NTMs applied by different importers, and differences in the products 
imported from different regions. 
The three different import-augmenting shocks reflect the three different 
agents who use imported goods in the IESC model. The division between the first 
three sets of shocks (the import-augmenting shocks) and the exporting efficiency 
shock depends on our analysis of whether the cost of meeting an NTM is directed 
at the exporter or importer, or is split between both (in which case a weighting of 
between 25 and 75 percent is applied). As an example, production requirements 
impose costs on exporters, whereas the cost of meeting importer registration 
requirements is expected to fall on the importer. In some instances, for example 
testing requirements, we split the cost of NTM compliance between importers and 
exporters.18 Our separation between importers and exporters is shown in appendix 
2. 
 
Weighting by imports 
As each of the identified NTMs only apply to some products within a sector, 
we need to weight the shock by the proportion of imports, from each exporting 
region, that are covered by a particular NTM. These are then aggregated to obtain 
the effect of the removal of all problematic NTMs on a particular sector.  As firms 
are the only agent who exports, the exporting efficiency shock is calculated in the 
following way:  
∆𝑀 =
∑ ∑ _ . ,_ ∙∈
∑ ∈
      (2) 
Where: mi is imports of product i by importer d from exporting region e 
(using COMTRADE import data at the HS 6 digit level); ΔMjed is the change in 
imports of all products mapped to the aggregate sector j (43 aggregate commodities 
in GTAP) by importer d from exporting region e;  𝛽 _  is the elasticity calculated 
from the coefficient for NTM k that has been found to have a statistically significant 
                                                 
17 Unlike with imports, where there are different purchasers of intermediates and consumption 
goods, there is only one agent involved in exporting in the IESC model (firms). Therefore, while the 
IESC model provides for different import-augmenting technological shocks for imports of 
intermediates and consumption goods, there is only one type of export-augmenting technological 
shock.  
18 A more precise separation of division of these costs could be obtained from surveys of exporters 
and importers, and thus is an area for future research. 
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effect on trade (as discussed above); and DNTM_k,id is a dummy variable equal to one 
if importer d applies NTM k on product i and – as discussed below – not all major 
ASEAN countries apply this NTM (see discussion above). For each aggregate 
sector j, we therefore have separate values of ∆𝑀  for the change in imports by 
each of the 6 major ASEAN importing countries (d) from each of the 15 exporting 
regions (e).  
The calculation of the three import-augmenting technological shocks is 
more complex because the calculation is done separately for goods classified as 
intermediate goods (including capital goods) and private consumption goods:  
∆𝑀 , =
∑ ∑ _ . _ ∙ ,∈
∑ ,∈
       (3) 
∆𝑀 , =
∑ ∑ _ . _ ∙ ,∈
∑ ,∈
       (4) 
 
Restrictions on the effect of NTMs and actionability assumptions 
We limit the effect of NTMs in three ways. First, we only consider NTMs 
that have a statistically significant negative effect on the level of imports at the 90 
percent level.19 Second, we do not simulate the removal of an NTM from a product 
when all six major ASEAN countries apply this NTM to that product. This reflects 
the fact that the NTM – despite being found to be “problematic” in that it  negatively 
affects trade – might be the only feasible way to address a legitimate public policy 
concern.20  
Third, we assume that only a portion of the set of NTMs identified as 
problematic through our econometric estimation can be removed. There is an 
emerging body of literature on the extent to which NTMs are actionable, given they 
frequently target public policy objectives, for instance, Berden and Francois (2015) 
suggest that approximately 50 percent of NTMs are actionable. In our simulations, 
we assume that 20 percent of the potential increases in imports from full NTM 
liberalization are realizable through targeted efforts, including as part of economic 
integration initiatives. This is comparable with similar studies, for instance, 
                                                 
19 This is a conservative approach that could be missing the effect of some NTMs which could have 
a negative effect (including those for which we might find a statistically significant effect if we had 
access to panel data on NTMs i.e. with a time dimension). 
20 This is a conservative assumption in some cases all 6 countries might apply an NTM for which 
there is a non, or less, trade restricting alternative. 
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Fontagné et al. (2013) use a 25 percent reduction for their reference scenario. Our 
assumption is at the lower end because the universe of NTMs we consider for 
potential liberalization is larger than other studies, because of the breadth of NTM 
data collected in the UNCTAD database; in contrast, other studies often focus on a 
subset of NTMs, for instance those identified in surveys.21 Our NTM liberalization 
scenario can be interpreted as any combination of the following: removing some 
requirements i.e. removing some regulations; applying existing to rules to fewer 
products; or applying these in a less onerous way e.g. inspecting a smaller 
proportion of total shipments or harmonizing requirements to make it easier for 
traders to comply.22  
 
Calculated shocks 
Our approach therefore takes econometric estimates of the effect of different 
types of NTMs and allocates them to the different channels in the IESC model 
depending on the type of good affected (consumption, intermediate or government 
purchase) and by whether the NTM obligation falls on importers or exporters. As 
these are weighted by the value of imports affected these import quantity shocks 
vary by importer and also across the regions exporting to each major ASEAN 
county to reflect their different export profile. Appendix 3 shows, for each ASEAN 
country, the trade weighted average shocks to quantities of imports from the other 
14 regions that are allocated to each of the four transmission channels modelled.23 
In other words, these tables show the estimated percentage change in imports that 
would result from implementing each of these shocks. The overall effect on imports 
is their combined effect from each of these channels.  
Table 4 shows the relative contribution of the three main shocks and 
summarizes the contribution of the three main types of shocks (exporter, consumer 
imports and firm imports) to the overall estimated change in imports in the 
modelling described subsequently.24 While we have allocated NTMs depending on 
                                                 
21 Moreover, as noted above, this also includes a margin to allow for the statistical possibility that 
we can fail to reject a null hypothesis of no effect, for some variables that do not in fact affect trade. 
22 While the UNCTAD database does not summarize information on the stringency of requirements 
or other procedural details, a liberalization scenario can assume that less burdensome application of 
some types of existing NTMs will reduce the trade effects of these NTMs. 
23 While the appendix shows a trade weighted average, we calculate and use separate shocks for 
imports from each exporting region. 
24 Government purchases are excluded from this table due to their small value (see table 5). 
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our assessment of whether exporters and importers are targeted, and their effect is 
calculated depending on the value of trade in products affected, our detailed 
analysis provides a useful rule of thumb for future work: approximately half of 
NTM shocks can be allocated to the exporter channel with the other half allocated 
to an importer channel. 
 
Table 4: Percentage of shocks and effects corresponding to NTM channels  
Exporter effect (%) Consumer imports 
effect (%) 
Firm imports effect 
(%) 
Singaporean imports 57 24 19 
Thailand imports 62 19 20 
Malaysia imports 39 42 19 
Viet Nam imports 53 11 36 
Philippines imports 43 17 40 
Indonesia imports 51 30 19 
Total import shocks 51 20 29 
 
IESC model calibration 
The approach outlined in the previous section provides an estimate of the 
change in imports which is exogenous in the CGE framework. We then utilize the 
IESC model to take account of the general equilibrium interactions by endogenizing 
the change in imports. To do this, we implement the shocks summarized in 
appendix 3 into the IESC model to calibrate, for each exporting region, the 
necessary import-augmenting technological change required to achieve each of the 
required changes in consumption, firm use and government purchases i.e. those that 
correspond to 20 percent of the change in imports implied by the econometric 
results for full elimination of all “problematic” NTMs whose cost is directed at 
importers.25 Likewise, in separate simulations, we calibrate, for each exporting 
region, the necessary exporting efficiency change required to achieve each of the 
required changes in exports i.e. those that correspond to 20 percent of the change 
in bilateral imports implied by the econometric results for full elimination of all 
                                                 
25 In the IESC framework, we consider separately the estimated increases in imports of consumption 
goods (qpms), intermediate inputs (qfms) and government purchases (qgms). As government 
purchases are a mixture of products classified as consumption and intermediate goods in the BEC 
framework, we weight these shocks based on each countries’ imports within each aggregated sector. 
In our simulations, the calibration exogenises exports to all six ASEAN countries by one exporting 
region at a time to determine the necessary technological change variables. We create new variables 
that remove the “iceberg” productivity/efficiency effects from qpms, qfms and qgms when 
calibrating the shocks. 
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“problematic” NTMs whose cost falls on exporters.26 This provides the import 
augmenting technological shocks and exporting efficiency changes. This approach, 
for calibrating import augmented technological shocks, is discussed in further detail 
in Webb et al. (2017). 
 
Results: Examining the impact of reducing NTMs 
To obtain the overall effect of NTM liberalization by major ASEAN 
countries, we apply the import augmenting technological shocks and exporting 
efficiency change, calibrated in the manner described in the previous section, into 
the IESC model. These are implemented simultaneously to enable general 
equilibrium interactions between sectors and regions. While imports from all 
regions are stimulated through the reduction in ASEAN NTMs, there is 
considerable variation in the changes in each region’s exports to the six major 
ASEAN countries. With the inclusion of general equilibrium interactions in our 
modelling, some regions export less of particular products to ASEAN countries.  
The effects on GDP, welfare, output and trade of our simulated NTM 
liberalization are shown in tables 5-7.  
  
  
                                                 
26 Given the direct link between exports and imports, we have to conduct the calibration separately 
for import-augmenting and exporting efficiency shocks as otherwise we would effectively be trying 
to identify two unknowns in a single equation. 
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Singapore 686 0.25 0.049 0.115 0.086 0 
Thailand 721 0.209 0.086 0.06 0.063 0 
Malaysia 824 0.285 0.075 0.144 0.066 0 
Viet Nam 1,739 1.283 0.311 0.263 0.708 0.001 
Philippines 974 0.434 0.042 0.122 0.27 0 
Indonesia 744 0.088 0.033 0.033 0.021 0 
Other ASEAN 35 0.037 0.036 0.001 0 0 
New Zealand 70 0.043 0.041 0.001 0.001 0 
Australia 165 0.012 0.012 0 0 0 
India 263 0.014 0.013 0.001 0 0 
Japan 107 0.002 0.002 0 0 0 
Korea 93 0.008 0.009 0 -0.001 0 
China 635 0.009 0.008 0 0 0 
US 207 0.001 0.001 0 0 0 
ROW 1,304 0.004 0.004 0 0 0 
 
 
We find that real GDP increases in all countries as a result of NTM 
liberalization in ASEAN (see table 5). As expected, the greatest gains are to the 
ASEAN 6 countries who liberalize NTMs, particularly Viet Nam and the 
Philippines. For our scenario of a 20 percent reduction in “problematic” NTMs we 
find an increase in Viet Nam’s GDP of 1.3 percent and a 0.4 percent increase for 
the Philippines. For ASEAN 6 countries, the majority of this increase in GDP 
occurs through the import augmenting technological shocks channels which reflects 
that importing countries themselves benefit directly from NTM liberalization. (This 
ranges from 59 percent for Thailand to 90 percent for the Philippines.) While the 
percentage of overall GDP and welfare gains that the IESC model attributes to 
import augmenting technological shocks aligns with their contribution to total 
shocks (49 percent, as shown in table 4), these import augmenting shocks account 
for a higher contribution to welfare and GDP gains in the ASEAN 6 since their 
effect is concentrated on the ASEAN 6 countries who liberalize NTMs and 
therefore benefit from import augmenting technological shocks.  
The GDP gains to countries other than the ASEAN 6 are relatively modest, 
with the largest percentage increases accruing to New Zealand (0.043%) and the 
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“Other ASEAN grouping” (0.037%).27 The modest effects on countries other than 
the ASEAN 6 can be understood by noting that there are two effects: on one hand 
they benefit from increased export efficiency (with the exporting efficiency change) 
when ASEAN countries reduce NTM barriers to all trading partners. However, this 
impact is dampened since ASEAN competitors become more competitive as a result 
of using imported intermediates more efficiently. In contrast, ASEAN countries 
liberalizing their NTMs benefit from both increased export and import efficiency.   
 
Table 6: Simulated changes in welfare (2011 US$m)  









Singapore 35 651 504 1,191 
Thailand 150 572 261 982 
Malaysia 34 790 70 894 
Viet Nam 456 1,289 1,281 3,026 
Philippines 107 867 628 1,602 
Indonesia 116 628 85 829 
Other ASEAN 2 33 -15 19 
New Zealand 6 64 -21 49 
Australia -1 166 -170 -5 
India 28 235 -151 112 
Japan -36 142 -208 -102 
Korea -27 120 -151 -58 
China 29 606 -551 84 
US -2 209 -397 -190 
ROW 0 1,304 -1,165 139 
* Changes in relative prices of exports and imports (including small impacts due to investment and 
savings prices).  
 
Almost all countries see an increase in welfare (as measured by an 
equivalent variation in income (EV) (see table 6). Consistent with our GDP results, 
the largest gains are to the ASEAN 6 countries who liberalize NTMs, particularly 
Viet Nam and the Philippines. In general, the greatest contribution is from 
“improved trade efficiency” which incorporates the efficiency gains to both 
exporters and importers from NTM liberalization. Some countries, particularly Viet 
Nam, Thailand and Indonesia also see significant changes in allocative efficiency 
as NTM elimination leads to improved allocation of resources. The contribution to 
                                                 
27 The other ASEAN grouping comprises Brunei, Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia which have 
distinctly different economies to the major ASEAN countries.  
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welfare of changes in the terms of trade, due to changes in the relative prices of 
imports and exports, can also be sizable. In some cases, particularly Singapore, Viet 
Nam and the Philippines, changes in the terms of trade make relatively strong 
contributions to welfare. Negative terms of trade effects can dampen the positive 
efficiency gains, even leading to small decreases in total welfare for some regions: 
Australia, Japan, Korea and the United States. 
 
Table 7: Simulated changes in output and exports (%) 














Singapore 9.9 18.6 0.4 9.1 9.7 0.1 4.2 -1.7 0.1 
Thailand 4.0 5.2 0.4 1.0 0.9 0.0 -0.3 -0.4 0.1 
Malaysia 6.1 -2.2 0.3 1.9 4.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.8 0.1 
Viet Nam 12.7 -2.3 0.1 1.0 2.9 -0.4 -1.3 -0.9 0.9 
Philippines 0.9 1.0 0.4 2.2 2.0 -0.3 -1.7 -0.2 0.4 
Indonesia 3.6 10.5 0.6 0.8 1.9 0.3 -0.2 -0.5 0.1 
Other 
ASEAN 2.7 -2.1 1.1 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
New Zealand 3.1 11.2 1.5 -0.4 -0.7 -0.4 -0.1 0.6 0.0 
Australia 2.9 6.5 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.0 
India 8.4 18.1 0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 
Japan 6.7 -2.0 -0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Korea 2.9 -1.4 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
China 5.8 5.1 0.7 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
US 0.2 4.9 0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
ROW 3.1 4.0 1.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
Overall, regions typically increase their exports of most products to the 
ASEAN 6 region as a result in the reduction in NTMs. The largest effects are in the 
plant and animal products sectors, which are the sectors most affected by NTMs. 
For instance, Japan, China and India all increase their exports of plant products to 
ASEAN 6 countries by between 6 and 8 percent while Australia, New Zealand and 
India increase their exports of animal products to ASEAN 6 countries by between 
7 and 18 percent (see left-hand columns of table 7). For countries already closely 
linked to the ASEAN 6 countries (New Zealand, Australia, India and other ASEAN 
countries), we see a modest substitution away from exporting to other markets as 
the reduction in NTMs makes ASEAN 6 countries more attractive markets (see 
center columns of table 7). 
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 Looking at changes in sectoral output – right-hand columns of table 7 – we 
typically see a modest decrease in real output in ASEAN 6 countries in sectors most 
affected by NTMs as imports become relatively cheaper. Resources are shifted to 





This paper illustrates the effects, both on the major ASEAN countries 
themselves and their trading partners, from partial liberalization by the major 
ASEAN countries of their most trade distorting types of NTMs. Such liberalization 
increases the GDP of all countries, and is particularly pronounced for the major 
ASEAN countries, especially Viet Nam and the Philippines. As trade in plant 
products and animal products is particularly affected by NTMs, these sectors show 
the largest expansion of trade. We find a modest decrease in output in major 
ASEAN countries in these sectors as imports become relatively cheaper, with 
resources shifted to other sectors in the economy.  
The paper takes a novel approach of allowing different types of NTM to 
have different effects, including for these effects to differ depending on whether 
they are applied to intermediate production or final consumption or to food and 
agriculture, or other sectors. This is an important advance in recognizing and 
accounting for the heterogeneity of NTMs: there is no such thing as a typical NTM.  
By modelling the impact of different types of NTMs separately we are able 
to consider whether their cost is directed at exporters or importers. This 
consideration has generally been overlooked in the literature, but can have 
significant effects, as shown in our results. Reductions in NTMs that affect 
importers in major ASEAN countries have only a minimal effect on the GDP of 
countries other than the six major ASEAN countries examined in this paper. In 
contrast, we find much larger effects, for other regions, from reductions in NTMs 
that affect exporters when ASEAN countries reduce NTM barriers to all countries. 
The fact that importers are the principal beneficiaries of shocks modelled through 
the import augmenting channel is often obscured by the fact that most applications 
involve liberalization on both sides. In focusing solely on NTM reduction by 
ASEAN countries, we can see how modest the gains to exporting countries are from 
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liberalization incorporated through the import augmenting channel. From detailed 
assessment of the extent to which exporters and importers are targeted by different 
types of NTMs, and calculating their effect depending on the value of trade in 
products affected, our analysis provides a useful rule of thumb for future work with 
this model – approximately half of NTM shocks can be allocated to the exporter 
channel. 
Our paper has significant policy relevance, demonstrating the channels 
through which both importing countries and their trading partners can benefit from 
reducing the trade implications of NTMs. In particular, we demonstrate that it is the 
ASEAN importing countries themselves who can expect to see the largest increases 
in GDP and welfare. This helps demonstrate that improvements in regulatory 
regimes - including finding less trade distorting ways of achieving the same 
regulatory objectives - should not be seen as a concession to trading partners, 
including in trade agreements, but rather a tool for encouraging economic growth.  
Our approach also lays the groundwork for future studies that can examine 
more closely which types of NTMs are harmonized or liberalized as a result of 
economic integration objectives, including ASEAN’s efforts working towards a 
common market as well as its active network of FTAs, including the ongoing 
negotiations for the Regional Comprehensive Market. Approaches such as ours, 
which recognize the different types of NTMs, are well positioned to incorporate 
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Appendix 1: GTAP Sectors and Aggregations 
 




PDR - Paddy rice; WHT - Wheat; GRO - Cereal grains n.e.c.; V_F - 
Vegetables, fruit, nuts; OSD - Oil seeds; C_B - Sugar cane, sugar beet; 
OCR - Crops n.e.c.; VOL - Vegetable oils and fats; PCR - Processed 





CTL - Bovine cattle, sheep and goats, horses; OAP - Animal products 
n.e.c.; RMK - Raw milk; FSH – Fishing; CMT - Bovine meat prods; 
OMT - Meat products n.e.c.; MIL - Dairy products 
Wood products 
(Non Agriculture) 
FRS - Forestry; LUM - Wood products; PPP - Paper products, 
publishing 
Textiles, apparels, 
leather etc (Non 
Agriculture) 
PFB - Plant-based fibers; WOL - Wool, silk-worm cocoons; TEX - 
Textiles; WAP - Wearing apparel; LEA - Leather products; FRS - 




MVH - Motor vehicules and parts; OTN - Transport equipment n.e.c.; 




COA – Coal; OIL – Oil; GAS – Gas; OMN - Minerals n.e.c.; P_C - 
Petroleum, coal products; CRP - Chemical, rubber, plastic products; 
NMM - Mineral products n.e.c.; I_S - Ferrous metals; NFM - Metals 
n.e.c.; FMP - Metal products; OMF - Manufactures n.e.c.; ELY - 






















Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
a100 
General 
prohibitions/restrictions 0 1 
Since these do not impose any 




prohibitions 0 1 
Since these do not impose any 




on eligibility 0 1 
Since these do not impose any 
costs on exporters who are able 
to export. 
a130 Systems approach 0.5 0.5 
Since involves a combination of 
measures, which may affect 




importers) 0 1 




requirements 0 1 
Since the importer has to register 
a190 
Prohibitions/restrictions 
nes 0 1 
Since these do not impose any 
costs on exporters who are able 
to export. 
a210 Residue tolerance limits 1 0 
Since affect production 
processes 
a220 
Restricted use of 
substances 1 0 
Since affect production 
processes 
a310 Labelling requirements 0.75 0.25 
As labelling can be done by 
either the importer or the 
manufacturer, but is more likely 
to be done by the manufacturer 
a320 Marking requirements 1 0 
Since would be done prior to 
shipment i.e. by exporter 
a330 Packaging requirements 0.75 0.25 
As packaging can be done by 
either the importer or the 
manufacturer, but is more likely 




requirements 0.5 0.5 
Since cover the process until 
final sale, therefore affecting 
both importers and exporters 
a420 
Hygienic requirements 
during production (until 
final consumption) 0.5 0.5 
Since cover the process until 
final sale, therefore affecting 
both importers and exporters 
a490 Hygienic requirements 0.5 0.5 
Since cover the process until 
final sale, therefore affecting 
both importers and exporters 
a500 
General treatment 
requirements 0.5 0.5 
Since this treatment can be done 
by either the exporter or the 
importer 
a510 Cold/heat treatment 0.5 0.5 
Since this treatment can be done 




a520 Irradiation requirements 0.5 0.5 
Since this treatment can be done 
by either the exporter or the 
importer 
a530 Fumigation requirements 0.5 0.5 
Since this treatment can be done 




nes 0.5 0.5 
Since this treatment can be done 
by either the exporter or the 
importer 
a610 Plant-growth processes 1 0 




requirements 1 0 
Since affect production 
processes 
a630 
Food and feed processing 
requirements 1 0 
Since affect production 
processes 
a640 
Storage and transport 
requirements 0.5 0.5 
Since cover the process until 
final sale, therefore affecting 
both importers and exporters 
a690 
Other production 
requirements 1 0 




requirements 0.5 0.5 
As the cost may be borne by 
either the importer or the 
exporter 
a820 Testing requirements 0.5 0.5 
As the cost may be borne by 
either the importer or the 
exporter 
a830 Certification requirements 0.5 0.5 
As the cost may be borne by 
either the importer or the 
exporter 
a840 Inspection requirements 0.5 0.5 
As the cost may be borne by 




requirements 0.5 0.5 
Both importer and exporters 
need to keep records 
a851 Traceability (origin) 0.5 0.5 
Both importer and exporters 
need to keep records 
a852 
Traceability (processing 
history) 0.5 0.5 
Both importer and exporters 
need to keep records 
a853 
Traceability (distribution 
and location after 
delivery) 0 1 




requirements 0.5 0.5 
Both importer and exporters 
need to keep records 
a860 Quarantine requirements 0.5 0.5 
As the cost may be borne by 




requirements 0.5 0.5 
As the cost may be borne by 
either the importer or the 
exporter 
a900 SPS measures nes 0.5 0.5 
As there is no information to 
identify whether the cost would 
be borne by the exporter or the 
importer 
Technical Barriers to Trade 
b110 Prohibitions 0 1 
Since these do not impose any 







importers) 0 1 




requirements 0 1 
Since the importer has to register 
b190 
Prohibitions/restrictions 
nes 0 1 
Since these do not impose any 
costs on exporters who are able 
to export. 
b200 Tolerance limits nes 1 0 
Since affect production 
processes 
b210 Residue tolerance limits 1 0 
Since affect production 
processes 
b220 
Restricted use of 
substances 1 0 
Since affect production 
processes 
b310 Labelling requirements 0.75 0.25 
As labelling can be done by 
either the importer or the 
manufacturer, but is more likely 
to be done by the manufacturer. 
b320 Marking requirements 1 0 
Since would be done prior to 
shipment i.e. by exporter 
b330 Packaging requirements 0.75 0.25 
As packaging can be done by 
either the importer or the 
manufacturer, but is more likely 
to be done by the manufacturer. 
b400 
General production or 
post-production 
requirements 0.5 0.5 
As there is no information to 
identify whether the cost would 




requirements 1 0 
Since affect production 
processes 
b420 
Storage and transport 
requirements 0.5 0.5 
Since cover the process until 
final sale, therefore affecting 
both importers and exporters 
b490 Production requirements 1 0 




requirement 1 0 
As goes to the product itself i.e. 
how manufactured 
b700 Performance standards 1 0 




requirements 0.5 0.5 
As the cost may be borne by 
either the importer or the 
exporter 
b820 Testing requirements 0.5 0.5 
As the cost may be borne by 
either the importer or the 
exporter 
b830 Certification requirements 0.5 0.5 
As the cost may be borne by 
either the importer or the 
exporter 
b840 Inspection requirements 0.5 0.5 
As the cost may be borne by 




requirements 0.5 0.5 
Both importer and exporters 
need to keep records 
b851 Traceability (origin) 0.5 0.5 
Both importer and exporters 
need to keep records 
b852 
Traceability (processing 
history) 0.5 0.5 
Both importer and exporters 
need to keep records 
b853 
Traceability (distribution 
and location after 
delivery) 0 1 






requirements 0.5 0.5 
Both importer and exporters 
need to keep records 
b890 
Conformity assessments 
nes 0.5 0.5 
As the cost may be borne by 
either the importer or the 
exporter 
b900 Other TBT requirements 0.5 0.5 
As there is no information to 
identify whether the cost would 
be borne by the exporter or the 
importer 
     
c100 Pre-shipment inspection 1 0 Since it is before shipment 
c300 
Direct consignment 
requirements 0.5 0.5 
As the cost may be borne by 




requirements 0 1 
As the cost is more likely to be 
borne by the importer. 
c900 Customs formalities 0 1 
As the cost is more likely to be 







Appendix 3: Allocation of changes in ASEAN6 imports (Trade weighted average increase) 
 
 




Importer Augmented Technological Change (Private Consumption) 
PlantProds 17.07 14.43 17.33 14.24 21.20 8.06 
AnimalProds 18.46 20.60 10.22 20.93 17.33 18.71 
WoodProds 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.90 
TexLeaWap 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.07 
MachinEquip 2.76 1.43 0.00 0.29 4.43 2.10 
OtherManuf 1.93 1.67 1.36 6.12 1.67 1.43 
Importer Augmented Technological Change (Firm Use) 
PlantProds 7.61 1.18 3.11 9.41 29.64 1.55 
AnimalProds 10.75 1.7152 2.6751 3.43 47.3933 4.97 
WoodProds 0.064 0.732 0.079 10.243 4.627 0.016 
TexLeaWap 0.00 0.02 0.73 4.11 1.09 0.00 
MachinEquip 0.02 0.50 0.18 3.34 0.64 0.67 
OtherManuf 0.56 0.33 0.28 4.52 3.05 0.27 
Importer Augmented Technological Change (Government Purchases)  
PlantProds 15.35 7.73 9.54 11.09 25.87 3.16 
AnimalProds 16.50 10.22 7.73 8.74 27.23 9.44 
WoodProds 0.05 0.64 0.06 9.82 3.62 0.09 
TexLeaWap 0.05 0.01 0.25 3.75 0.57 0.27 
MachinEquip 0.13 0.53 0.17 3.17 0.75 0.69 
OtherManuf 0.49 0.44 0.30 4.20 2.52 0.26 
Exporting Efficiency Change  
PlantProds 14.20 7.29 5.64 15.60 8.31 3.74 
AnimalProds 19.78 8.96 9.09 10.39 1.98 10.74 
WoodProds 0.05 0.75 0.02 6.79 2.94 0.32 
TexLeaWap 0.05 0.01 0.00 3.59 0.45 0.38 
MachinEquip 0.19 0.73 0.17 3.17 0.81 0.85 














The research presented in this PhD makes various significant contributions to 
the field concerned with investigating the impact of NTMs in trade. I proposed new 
approaches to econometrically estimating the effect of NTMs and took novel 
approaches to modelling these effects in a computable equilibrium (CGE) framework.  
In order to utilise these econometric and CGE techniques to contribute to an improved 
understanding on the impacts of NTMs it was necessary for me to gather new data on 
New Zealand NTMs. This data will assist future researchers, policy makers and 
businesses to be able to analyse NTMs of key importance to them. Moreover, the 
specific questions addressed in each chapter are of interest to both future researchers 
and policy makers. 
Chapter two examined the effect of foot and mouth disease (FMD) and bovine 
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) on beef trade. The approach in this chapter 
recognises that the barriers and costs placed on exporters - in other words NTMs - vary 
depending on the disease status of both importing and exporting countries, which can 
manifest itself in restrictions or requirements placed on some countries by others 
(typically by disease free countries on those that present risks). My approach therefore 
made a novel contribution, accounting for official FMD status and for the impact of 
recent disease outbreaks. My research found that during and after a FMD outbreak, 
exporting countries substitute away from markets recognised as FMD-free toward 
lower value markets not recognised as FMD-free. Similarly, my research found that a 
country that has experienced BSE will export less to markets that have not experienced 
BSE and more to markets that have. Regaining official recognition of FMD-free status 
may aid recovery but does not negate the effects of a recent FMD outbreak.  
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The chapter has implications for economic modelling of FMD impacts. I 
showed that models should incorporate these market-switching effects, while analysis 
of FMD outbreaks should not focus solely on the loss of markets but rather should 
incorporate our finding that these loses are somewhat mitigated by market substitution. 
Moreover, these results are of direct relevance to policy makers, who are concerned 
both with the impact of the disease but also the benefits of obtaining official recognition 
of a foot and mouth free status, which provides the opportunity to substitute towards 
higher value FMD-free markets. 
Chapter three used data from the UNCTAD NTM database for four developed 
markets (Canada, New Zealand, the European Union and the United States) to show 
that NTMs which impose a conformity requirement, i.e. testing, certification or 
inspection, will reduce the number of countries exporting to these markets in some 
cases by significant amounts. By concentrating on the number of countries exporting a 
product, I could utilise a parsimonious regression approach, which is novel in this area 
of the literature, and which abstracts from the level of detail about each of the importer-
exporter dyads that is required in gravity model estimation. The differences this 
application finds between countries is informative for other researchers suggesting that 
pooling of cross country panels should be done carefully, using groups of countries that 
are as similar as possible.  
My findings on the impact of NTMs on the number of countries exporting have 
significant policy implications. Regulators in importing countries that are considering 
imposing compliance measures should be aware that these are likely to reduce the 
number of exporters to their country. This is likely to affect product variety and, 
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potentially, competition and so may lower the welfare of their own consumers. On the 
other hand, policy makers in exporting countries should not only be concerned with 
NTMs in the markets that they export to, but also note the likelihood that NTMs – 
particularly compliance measures – may be preventing their firms from profitably 
exporting to other markets. Finally, to the extent that rich countries are concerned with 
ensuring access of poor countries to their markets, compliance measures may hinder 
this access. 
Chapter four used data that I collected on the geographical restrictions imposed 
by New Zealand, which mean that plant products presenting a biosecurity risk cannot 
be imported unless the exporting country is covered by an import health standard for 
that particular commodity. I found that if, in a counterfactual scenario, all countries 
were able to export all fruit and vegetables, imports from Europe, Latin America, 
Middle East and Africa and East Asia would increase at the expense of imports from 
Australia, Oceania, South East Asia, South Asia and North America. 
These results present a more nuanced view of the impact of phytosanitary 
restrictions than has previously been found in the literature, which often suggested that 
developing countries are most impacted by such food and agricultural measures. From 
the results in this chapter, it cannot be said that developing countries are more adversely 
affected by the regulations than developed countries as we found substantial variation 
between impacts on different developing regions. In particular, I found that if New 
Zealand were to remove current restrictions, the largest negative effect would be on 
exports from developing Pacific Island countries, whereas the developed region of 
Europe is expected to be see the largest percentage growth in exports.  
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Chapter five explored the impact of NTMs on supply chains, with a focus on 
exports to major ASEAN countries. I first used the detailed UNCTAD NTM database 
to obtain econometric estimates of the effect of different types of NTMs on imports 
into major ASEAN countries, using a gravity model framework. I then used these 
econometric estimates in a global computable general equilibrium model to examine 
the impact of eliminating the types of NTMs that are found to have significant negative 
effects on trade.  
This chapter illustrated the benefits, both to the major ASEAN countries 
themselves and to their exporting partners, from the partial liberalisation by ASEAN 
countries of their most trade distorting types of NTMs. Such liberalisation increases 
the GDP and welfare of all countries, and is particularly pronounced for the major 
ASEAN countries especially Viet Nam and the Philippines. As trade in plant products 
and animal products is particularly affected by NTMs, these sectors showed the largest 
expansion of trade.  
The chapter took a novel approach of allowing different types of NTM to have 
different effects, including for these effects to differ depending on whether they are 
applied to intermediate production or final consumption or to food and agriculture, or 
other sectors. My approach also took into account the degree to which the costs of 
meeting NTMs are directed at importers or exporters. These are important advances to 
accounting for the heterogeneity of NTMs.  
This research has significant policy relevance, in particular, it demonstrated that 
it is the importing countries themselves who could expect to see the largest increases 
in GDP and welfare from the liberalistion of NTMs. This helps show that 
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improvements in regulatory regimes – including finding a less trade distorting way of 
achieving the same regulatory objective - should not be seen merely as a concession to 
trading partners, including in trade negotiations, but rather a tool for encouraging 
economic growth.  
While gravity modelling techniques are fairly settled, my thesis makes various 
innovations particularly in terms of model specification and data. In Chapter two, these 
included building a dataset from information available in a range of sources, 
particularly the International Animal Health Organisation (OIE) to allow for official 
disease status and recent disease outbreaks to affect trade. In Chapter five, these 
included allowing different types of non-tariff measure to have different effects, 
including for these effects to differ depending on whether they are applied to 
intermediate production or final consumption or to food and agriculture, or other 
sectors. This is an important advance in recognising and accounting for the 
heterogeneity of NTMs – it is my firm view that there is no such thing as a typical 
NTM.  
Moreover, in chapter three, I showed how count data models, particularly the 
Poisson and Negative Binomial Regression model can be applied as a parsimonious 
regression approach, which abstracts from the level of detail about each of the importer-
exporter dyads that is required in gravity model estimation. 
There is scope for continued refinement of the approaches to incorporating 
NTMs into computable general equilibrium models. The methodology proposed for 
phytosanitary restrictions in Chapter four, can be used to model how NTMs that lead 
to foregone trade in some products from some countries can be incorporated within a 
139 
 
CGE framework. More generally, I proposed an approach that directly incorporates 
estimated partial equilibrium increases in imports into a CGE framework to allow for 
general equilibrium interactions. In Chapter five, through using a “supply chain 
model”, I could more accurately capture the effects of removing NTMs that affect 
exporters. 
There is also still substantial scope for further research utilising data from the 
UNCTAD database to which I contributed. For instance, if data is collected for 
additional years then panel data techniques can be applied to the data. A second area 
of further research could be to combine the NTM database with firm level data, which 
would build on papers such as El-Enbaby, Hendy, and Zaki (2016) and Fontagné, 
Orefice, Piermartini, and Rocha (2015) who examine the effect of examine sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures notified to, or raised as concerns at, on exports by Egyptian 
and French firms respectively. Third, research teams could utilise the UNCTAD NTM 
data for detailed econometric (and ultimately CGE analysis) of regulatory 
heterogeneity building on the work of Cadot et al. (2015) and Winchester et al. (2012).  
Fourth, there is considerable value in research exploring the extent to which NTMs 
can, or should, be removed or modified – their “actionability”. Finally, the detailed data 
collected on the measures themselves, with hyperlinks to the underlying rules provide 
the ability to use techniques based on textual analysis (see, for example, Allee, Elsig, 
and Lugg, 2017).  
In short, my PhD research developed new and more nuanced approaches for 
econometric and CGE modelling of NTMs, contributed an important body of data to a 
major international database, and also shed light on some of the policy questions that 
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can be investigated with these data and new techniques. A key theme of all my 
applications has been a desire to provide a more refined analysis of the impact of non-
tariff measures, and to avoid oversimplifying these considerations. My work on the 
impact of non-tariff measures on the extensive margin showed that NTMs that impose 
compliance measures have quite different effects to standards themselves, and that this 
effect can differ even amongst developing countries. My research on New Zealand 
phytosanitary restrictions provided a more nuanced view than the common view that it 
is developing countries who are disadvantaged by SPS measures, given the privileged 
access of Pacific Island countries. Research on NTMs in ASEAN breaks new ground 
in allowing for different types of NTM to have different effects. Finally, my research 
on FMD and BSE showedthat these animal diseases have persistent effects, so 
analysing their effects is not simply a case of considering whether or not there is a 
disease in the current year. I hope that with further improvements in data and 
methodologies, we can continue to address more sophisticated and nuanced questions 
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The report that follows provides information on the New Zealand NTM data 
initially collected between September 2014 and June 2015 and then updated with 
changes in NTMs to May 2016. The final version of this database (as at May 2016) 
includes 3,096 measures from 530 regulations made pursuant to 59 Acts. As detailed 
in the report that follows, this required an extensive investigation of all rules and 
regulations in force in New Zealand, as well as meetings with key regulatory agencies. 
The data is publicly available at http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DITC/Trade-
Analysis/Non-Tariff-Measures/NTMs-Data.aspx 
Each of the 3,096 measures was entered into a datasheet provided by UNCTAD. 
This required entering detailed information. In addition to detailed information about 
the measure, we were required to classify the NTM using the UNCTAD classification 
framework set out in UNCTAD (2012) and detailed throughout this PhD. Furthermore, 
all the tariff codes of products covered by the measures needed to be found. The tariff 
coding was a significant exercise because measures rarely listed the tariff lines affected. 
Indeed, this is a key contribution of the project. 
The table that follows shows the information for a single measure relating to 
product safety standards for cigarette lighters under the Product Safety Standards 
(Cigarette Lighters) Regulations 1998. 
Document Sheet 
Document_Title_Full Fair Trading Act 1986 
Document_Symbol Public Act 1986 No 121 
Document_Description 
The purpose of this Act is to contribute to a trading 
environment in which— (a)the interests of consumers are 
protected; and (b)businesses compete effectively; and 
(c)consumers and businesses participate confidently. To this 
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end, the Act— (a)prohibits certain unfair conduct and 
practices in relation to trade; and (b)promotes fair conduct 
and practices in relation to trade; and (c)provides for the 
disclosure of consumer information relating to the supply of 
goods and services; and (d)promotes safety in respect of 







Source_Name Legislation NZ 
Document_Title Fair Trading Act 1986 
Regulation_Title_Short 
Product Safety Standards (Cigarette Lighters) Regulations 
1998 
Regulatory_Agency 











Notes Pursuant to section 29 of the Fair Trading Act 1989 
Measures Sheet  
Document_Title Fair Trading Act 1986 
Regulation_Title_Short 






Safety standards (and compliance requirements) for cigarette 
lighters 
Measure_Reference Regulations 4,6,7 and 8 
Affected_Products_Description 
Cigarette lighter means a flame-producing device that is 
designed to light cigarettes, cigars, and pipes; and is either— 
(a)disposable; or (b)designed to be refilled with fuel and has 
a customs value of less than $3.50 
Affected_Regions_Description World 
Measure_Objectives Public Safety 
Measure_also_domestic Yes 
Notes 
Requires compliance with clauses of the International Safety 
Standard for Lighters—Safety Specification (ISO 
9994:1995E) set out in the Schedule together with the 
variations specified in that schedule, as well as imposes 
additional child resistance requirements. 
"Measures Affected Products" Sheet 
Product_Code_Type HS_Code HS_Code HS_Code 
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Product_Code 961310 961320 96138019 
Partial_Coverage No Yes Yes 
Partial_Coverage_Indication  
With a customs 
value of less than 
$3.50 
Cigarette lighters 
with a customs 
value of less than 
$3.50. (Cigarette 
lighters fall under 
the 10 digit 
statistical key 
9613.80.19.11H) 
Date_In 15/02/1999 15/02/1999 15/02/1999 
Date_Out    





"Measures Objectives" Sheet  
Objective Protection of human life and health 
 
Most regulations provide more than one measure. For instance, Product Safety 
Standards (Cigarette Lighters) Regulations 1998 also includes labelling requirements 
(classified as a B31 requirement in the UNCTAD framework) and a certification 
requirement classified as a B83 requirement in the UNCTAD framework). For these 
two measures, all the details are the same as in the above table except for the 
information in the “Measures sheet” section. 
Furthermore, the same measure may need to be listed various times as the 
database does not allow the assignment of specific products to specific countries; the 
same measure can be used only if the same set of products is covered for each country 
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New Zealand’s overall regulatory regime is well regarded internationally, for 
example, New Zealand ranks first in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business 
2018 Index.2 Non-tariff measures (NTM) are a subset of this regulatory regime: the 
regulations that may affect trade. A major feature of New Zealand’s NTM regime 
is the relatively stringent sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures, reflecting that 
that New Zealand is a major agricultural producer and an island nation, free from 
many diseases and pests affecting international animal and plant product trade (see 
Webb, Strutt and Rae, 2017). 
New Zealand has actively participated in the negotiation of free trade agreements 
(FTAs) which contain provisions covering both SPS and technical barriers to trade 
(TBT) issues. Bilateral agreements are currently in force with China, Australia, 
Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Korea. Regional agreement in 
force include the AANZFTA (with ASEAN members and Australia) and the P4 
Agreement (with Singapore, Brunei and Chile). New Zealand has also concluded 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, PACER Plus (with Pacific Island 
countries) and a FTA with the Gulf Cooperation Council. New Zealand is currently 
involved in negotiations for the Regional Comprehensive Partnership (RCEP) and 
the Pacific Alliance, as well as bilateral agreements with the European Union and 
India.3  
New Zealand is also an active member of international standard settings 
organisations, including Codex Alimentarius (the International “Food Code”) and 
the OIE (World Organisation for Animal Health), as well as a party to various 
international conventions that are relevant to the establishment of NTMs.4 
New Zealand’s legal system 
Legislation passed by Parliament, known as Acts, is the highest form of law in New 
Zealand’s legal system.5 Acts may contain detailed rules which serve as NTMs, for 
instance the Anti-Personnel Mines Prohibition Act 1998 prohibits the use (and 
                                                          
2 See http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings.   
3 https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/.  
4 These include the International Plant Protection Convention, Montreal Protocol and Vienna 
Convention, Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Chemical Weapons 
Convention, Basel Convention (on the control of transboundary movements of hazardous wastes 
and their disposal), Rotterdam Convention (for certain hazardous chemicals and pesticides) and the 
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants. Full details of New Zealand's international 
treaty obligations are available at http://www.treaties.mfat.govt.nz/.  
5 Further information is available at http://www.parliament.nz/en-nz/about-parliament/how-
parliament-works/our-system/00CLOOCHowPWorks111/our-system-of-government. All 




import) of anti-personnel mines. There are approximately 2000 Acts in force in 
New Zealand, of which 59 either contain or authorise NTMs. 
In practice, however, most legislation in New Zealand is not passed by Parliament, 
but rather by other persons or bodies under powers granted or delegated by Acts of 
Parliament.6 Such legislation is generally known as delegated legislation and all 
delegated legislation must be based on authority conferred by an Act of Parliament.  
There are various forms of delegated legislation in New Zealand, including Order 
in Council and “Notices” made by Ministers. For instance, Section 29 of the Fair 
Trading Act 1986 empowers the making, by Order in Council, of regulations setting 
Product Safety Standards. A specific example is the Product Safety Standards 
(Cigarette Lighters) Regulations 1998, which includes performance standards and 
labelling requirements for cigarette lighters. In some cases, delegated legislation is 
made by the head of a government department and published on their website. For 
instance, Import Health Standards with rules for the import of primary products are 
issued by the Director-General under the Biosecurity Act 1993 and are available on 
the website of the Ministry for Primary Industries.7 Most information on Acts and 
regulations is readily available and New Zealand Customs provides guides for 
exporters and importers. 
Some of New Zealand’s international obligations under FTAs and other 
international treaties are reflected directly in Acts. In other cases, international 
obligations are reflected in delegated legislation or the rules, practices and 
procedures of regulatory agencies. 
Data Collection and Update  
NTM data for New Zealand were initially collected by our team between September 
2014 and June 2015:8 these were included in the NTM database publicly launched 
in July 2016. For the current ERIA-UNCTAD project, we updated the data with 
changes made to measures between September 2014 and May 2016.  
Initial data collection process 
To gather comprehensive information on New Zealand’s NTMs, a five-stage 
process was initially used: 
1. We undertook a survey of the websites of all Government agencies considered 
likely to administer regulations that might affect trade.  
2. Official documents that purported to include an inventory of measures e.g. 
Schedules of Prohibited Imports and Exports from Customs New Zealand9 and 
                                                          
6 Further information is available at http://www.parliament.nz/en-nz/about-parliament/how-
parliament-works/ppnz/00HOOOCPPNZ_291/chapter-29-delegated-legislation.  
7 www.mpi.govt.nz.  
8 Under the guidance of UNCTAD, consistent with the guidelines and classifications in UNCTAD 
(2013) and (2014). This project was undertaken with support from the World Bank, and the “NTM 





a Standards New Zealand database of all standards referred to in legislation10 
were used to identify Acts and regulations. Additional regulations were then 
found through searching the Gazette and Legislation websites for regulations 
issued under the same Act, and by examining the information available on the 
websites of the regulatory agencies.  
3. Meetings were held with key agencies to raise awareness of the project, to 
identify possible gaps in information recorded and to follow up on any 
information that may not be publicly available. Meetings were held with: the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade; the Ministry of Business, Innovation 
and Employment; the Ministry for Primary Industries; and Standards New 
Zealand. There was strong interest and support for the project.11 
4. A search of all references to the word “import” and “export” in Acts and 
Legislative Instruments available from www.legislation.govt.nz was 
undertaken to find any legislation and measures that might otherwise have been 
missed.  
5. The database was then crosschecked against data available from Customs New 
Zealand showing the regulatory agency for each tariff line where “permits” or 
other authorisations might be necessary.12 While this did not identify any new 
measures, it identified extra tariff lines that had not been assigned to some 
measures. 
Data update  
In updating the data, we systematically worked through all regulations to look for 
changes since the data were originally collected. This was facilitated by the New 
Zealand Government legislation website (www.legislation.govt.nz), showing 
details and dates of any amendments and whether a regulation has been revoked. 
The following changes were identified: 
 The United Nations (Iran—Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) 
Regulations 2016 replaced the United Nations Sanctions (Iran) Regulations 
2010.  
 The Customs Import Prohibition Order 2014 replaced the Customs Import 
Prohibition Order 2011. 
 The Customs Import Prohibition (Trout) Order 2015 replaced the Customs 
Import Prohibition (Trout) Order 2010. 
 Customs Export Prohibition (Toothfish) Order 2015 replaced the Customs 
Export Prohibition (Toothfish) Order 2009. 
                                                          
10 http://shop.standards.co.nz/default.htm?mod=catalog&action=browseLegStandards.  






 The Hazardous Substances (Classes 6, 8, and 9 Controls) Regulations 2001 
were amended, leading to new measures applying to the poison “1080”, as 
recorded in the database. 
 The Product Safety Standards (Children’s Nightwear and Limited Daywear 
Having Reduced Fire Hazard) Regulations 2016 replaced the Product Safety 
Standards (Children’s Nightwear and Limited Daywear Having Reduced 
Fire Hazard) Regulations 2008. 
Moreover, we also identified two major sets of changes: (1) Changes to the 
Australia New Zealand Food Standards Code and (2) Changes Associated with the 
Food Act 2014. 
A major set of revisions needed to the New Zealand data in the 2016 update arose 
from a complete overhaul of the Australia New Zealand Food Standards Code that 
took effect from 1 March 2016 (see 
www.foodstandards.govt.nz/code/Pages/default.aspx and Box 1). While the 
structure remained largely the same, a significant number of changes have been 
made to various components in the database.  
The new Food Act 2014 came into force on 1 March 2016. This will gradually 
replace the previous Food Act 1981 as the principal Act governing food safety in 
New Zealand. There is a transition programme until the Food Act 2014 takes full 
effect on 28 February 2019.13 We used information from the Ministry for Primary 
Industries to identify which regulations previously in the database have been 
replaced by new regulations.14  
The following regulations under the Food Act 1981 have now been repealed: 
 Food (Importer Listing) Standard 2008 
 Food (Prescribed Foods) Standard 2007 
 Food (Importer General Requirements) Standard 2008 
 New Zealand Food (Supplemented Food) Standard 2013 
 Food (Imported Milk and Milk Products) Standard 2009 
 New Zealand (Maximum Residue Limits of Agricultural Compounds) Food 
Standards 2014 
The following new regulations have been included in the database: 
 New Zealand Food (Supplemented Food) Standard 2016 
 Food Notice: Maximum Residue Levels for Agricultural Compounds 
 Food Notice: Importing Food 






As part of the update process, we identified Acts that authorised the making of 
delegated legislation that could provide new regulations. These are the areas where 
new regulations could be added without passing or amending Acts of Parliament, 
as shown in Table 1.15  
Table 1: Acts that provide scope for new regulations 
Act  Delegated Legislation  
Fair Trading Act 1996 Unsafe Goods Notices, Product Safety 
Standards and Consumer Information 
Standards 
United Nations Act 1946 Sanctions (which may be passed as 
Acts) 
Gas Act 1992 Notices 
Resource Management Act 1991 National Environmental Standards 
Radiocommunications Regulations 2001 Notices 
Contraception, Sterilisation, and Abortion Act 
1977 
Standards 
New Zealand Horticulture Export Authority 
Act 1987 
Horticultural Prescribed Products 
Orders and New Zealand Horticulture 
Export Authority Orders 
Hazardous Substances and New Organisms 
Act 1996 
Group Standards, Regulations, 
Hazardous Substances Notices 
(following the Hazardous Substances 
and New Organisms Amendment Act 
2015) 
Biosecurity Act 1993 Import Health Standards – we included 
9 new Import Health Standards and 
revised measures where Import Health 
Standards were updated. 
 
In the 2016 update, with the exception of the aforementioned United Nations 
(Iran—Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) Regulations 2016 under the United 
Nations Sanctions (Iran) Regulations, there were no new regulations passed 
pursuant to any of these Acts.  
We also checked the websites of key agencies, to find any new types of regulations 
made under new powers conferred by changes to Acts of Parliament. This identified 
an amendment to the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996, which 
enabled the making of Hazardous Substances Notices, of which one has been 
enacted.  
                                                          
15 We recommend that researchers updating New Zealand NTM data in the future look for new 




Furthermore, we undertook a search of the Government legislation website for any 
new Acts passed which contain NTMs. In a relatively mature regulatory system 
such as New Zealand’s, we did not expect to find many (if any) instances of this. 
Any new regulatory issue that arises will generally be resolved either within the 
existing regulatory framework e.g. a new Unsafe Goods Notice, or will involve 
revoking/amending existing legislation so will be noted through that mechanism. 
In this update, we identified the Radiation Safety Act 2016; however, we did not 
include new measures under this Act since it does not enter into force until 2017. 
Box 1: Joint Food Standards and Australia New Zealand Economic 
Integration 
The current joint food standards regime between Australia and New Zealand stems 
from the Agreement between Australia and New Zealand establishing a System for 
the Development of Joint Food Standards signed in December 1995. This treaty 
aimed to harmonise food standards, reduce compliance costs and remove regulatory 
barriers to trade. It created a new agency — the Australia New Zealand Food 
Authority (ANZFA) — which was established in July 1996 and renamed Food 
Standards Australia New Zealand (FSANZ) in 2002. The joint Australia New 
Zealand Food Standards Code was developed over several years, guided by a 
Ministerial Council with representation from Australia and New Zealand. It was 
agreed in 2000 and phased in over a two-year period.a  
The Food Standards Code is given effect through domestic Australian and New 
Zealand legislation, and not all provisions apply to New Zealand (for instance, New 
Zealand sets its own maximum residue limits.) However, under the Trans-Tasman 
Mutual Recognition Arrangement, food - and other products - produced or imported 
into one country that meets that country's standards, may be legally sold in the other 
country. In practice, this means that most food exported to Australia from New 
Zealand is not assessed for compliance with Australian food standards, and vice 
versa.b  
The joint Australia New Zealand Food Standards Code, and Trans-Tasman Mutual 
Recognition Arrangement, are part of a wider project of economic integration 
between Australia and New Zealand. This stems from the Closer Economic 
Relations Treaty of 1983, which includes the freedom for Australians and New 
Zealanders to live and work in the other country. A current focus is the Single 
Economic Market project under which New Zealand and Australia are committed 
to creating a seamless trans-Tasman economic environment.c 
a  See www.foodstandards.govt.nz/about/foodlawandtreaties/history/pages/default.aspx 






NTM Data Summary 
Tables 2 - 4 provide overview statistics in a format consistent with other data 
collected as part of this project. In total, we collated and coded 3,096 measures from 
59 Acts, administered by 14 institutions. 
Table 2: Overview statistics 
Comprehensiveness Indicator Number 
Total number of coded regulations 530 
Total number of coded regulations reported to the WTO16    754 
Total number of coded NTMs  3,096 
Total affected products (HS lines, national tariff lines) 
a. Total number of affected products  5,082* 
b. Share of the number of affected products to the number of total 
products  
67.7%* 
Total number of issuing institutions 14 
* Note: all products are subject to a goods and services (value added) tax (measure F71) and an 
import entry transaction fee (measure F61). Moreover, any good that infringes copyright is subject 
to a NTM (measure E315). Therefore we exclude these in our calculations. 
                                                          




Table 3: Issuing institutions 
No Issuing Institution 
Number of 
NTMs 
% of total number of 
NTMs 
1 Ministry for Primary Industries 1705 55.07% 
2 Ministry for the Environment 1189 38.40% 
3 
Ministry of Business, Innovation and 
Employment 
63 2.03% 
4 Ministry of Health 35 1.13% 
5 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 28 0.90% 
6 Ministry of Transport 25 0.81% 
7 Ministry of Justice 16 0.52% 
8 New Zealand Customs 15 0.48% 
9 Department of Internal Affairs 6 0.19% 
10 Department of Conservation 5 0.16% 
11 Other institutions 4 0.29% 
  Total 3096 100.00% 
 
Due to its role in administering the Biosecurity Act 1993, the New Zealand Ministry 
for Primary Industries is responsible for issuing over half of all NTMs recorded for 
New Zealand.17 As we explain later, the high number of measures recorded is also 
a function of the database structure: different measures are recorded when different 
requirements apply to different products from different countries.  
Under the Biosecurity Act, animal and plant products that may present a biosecurity 
risk for the introduction of pests and diseases cannot be imported into New Zealand 
until a risk analysis assessment, consistent with international standards, has been 
completed.18 This process is triggered by a request from a country interested in 
exporting the product and involves the development, by the Ministry for Primary 
Industries, of an Import Health Standard that mitigates the risk associated with 
importing that product, pursuant to the Biosecurity Act 1993. There are 
approximately 200 Import Health Standards that cover a particular commodity or 
                                                          
17 It should be noted that the Ministry for Primary Industries has responsibility for Agriculture, 
Forestry, Fisheries and food safety more generally. 
18 The rationale for this is that New Zealand's geographic isolation and biosecurity measures have 
meant that it is free from many OIE listed diseases that are common throughout much of the world. 
See the WTO Trade Policy Review of New Zealand 2009, particularly the Record of Meeting with 




category of commodities: these may be generic, covering all countries, or country-
specific.19 They are all listed as distinct “regulations” within the database. 
The largest single source of New Zealand SPS measures is “MPI Standard 152.02: 
Importation and Clearance of Fresh Fruit and Vegetables into New Zealand”, 
covering fresh fruit and vegetables and consolidating a large number of country-
specific Import Health Standards for Fruit and Vegetables.20 Despite the existence 
of this consolidated standard for fresh fruit and vegetables, the data collation 
nevertheless required separate measures be listed for each exporting country. This 
is because the database does not allow the assignment of specific products to 
specific countries; the same measure can be used only if the same set of products is 
covered for each country (which is not the case).  
Over a third of the measures in the database stem from the Hazardous Substances 
and New Organisms Act 1996 (HSNO Act) which is administered by the Ministry 
for the Environment to regulate pesticides, dangerous goods, household chemicals 
and other dangerous substances.21 As with measures issued by the Ministry for 
Primary Industries, the high number of measures recorded is partly a function of 
the way in which regulations are structured and the database structure. While there 
are some general regulations under the HSNO Act, such as the Hazardous 
Substances (Identification) Regulations 2001, the precise conditions for the 
majority of hazardous substances are contained in Group Standards issued by the 
Environment Protection Agency pursuant to section 96A of the HSNO Act. Group 
Standards apply to 34 categories of goods such as "Cosmetic products" and 
"Surface coatings and colourants". For each category of substance, between 1 and 
24 Group Standards apply, depending on the combinations of hazards inherent in 
the substance e.g. whether they are combustible, corrosive, or combustible and 
corrosive.22 In total there are 172 Group Standards entered into the database as 
regulations, leading to 1164 measures. Moreover, some hazardous substances 
(fireworks, pesticides, veterinary medicines, timber treatment chemicals, fumigants 
or vertebrate toxic agents) are not covered by Group Standards, but instead are 
governed by specific rules that can be traced to regulations made under the HSNO 
Act. 
                                                          
19 See http://www.mpi.govt.nz/importing/overview/import-health-standards/.  
20 Available from http://www.biosecurity.govt.nz/files/ihs/152-02.pdf.  
21 http://www.epa.govt.nz/hazardous-substances/about/Pages/default.aspx.  




Table 4: NTMs by type 










Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) 
measures 
1,569 50.68% 2,592 34.51% 
B Technical barriers to trade (TBT) 1,424 45.99% 4,511 60.07% 
C 
Pre-shipment inspection and other 
formalities 
29 0.94% 87 1.16% 
D 
Contingent Trade Protective 
Measures 
3 0.10%   
E 
Non-automatic licensing, quotas, 
prohibitions and quantity control 
measures other than SPS or TBT 
reasons 
2 0.06% 7,510 100.00% 
F 
Price control measures including 
additional taxes and charges  
5 0.16% 7,510 100.00% 
J Distribution restrictions 3 0.10% 95 1.26% 
K Restriction on post-sales services     
L 
Subsidies (excluding export 
subsidies under P7) 




    
N Intellectual property     
O Rules of origin     
P Export related measures  61 1.97% 7,517 100.00% 
Total coded NTMs 3,096 100.00%  100.00% 
 
Table 5 sets out the most common NTMs applied in New Zealand. We have also 
calculated, using data on New Zealand import values from the world in 2016, the 
percentage of imports in tariff lines covered by these NTMs. We present these as a 
range because some NTMs have “partial coverage” i.e. they only apply to some 
products within a tariff line.23 
                                                          
23 In calculating the “minimum”, we excluded the value of all imports under tariff lines with partial 


















B310 Labelling requirements 42.7% 32.7% 43.1% 
B140 Authorisation requirements (for importers) 23.9% 31.4% 32.3% 
B700 Performance standards 18.9% 32.6% 44.7% 
A690 Other production requirements 18.5% 10.5% 11.6% 
A220 Restricted use of substances 17.1% 14.0% 14.9% 
B150 Importer registration requirements 16.9% 21.8% 24.1% 
B490 Production requirements 16.2% 13.7% 26.6% 
A590 Treatment requirements n.e.s. 16.0% 2.2% 30.5% 
A310 Labelling requirements 15.4% 9.3% 10.4% 
A210 Residue tolerance limits 14.9% 9.3% 9.3% 
 
Figure 1 shows how the incidence of multiple NTMs varies across sectors. We limit 
our analysis to UNCTAD chapters A, B and C because, as noted in Table 2, all 
products are subject to a goods and services (value added) tax (measure F71), an 
import entry transaction fee (measure F61) and any good that infringes copyright is 
subject to a NTM (measure E315).  
Figure 2 illustrates where individual tariff lines are affected by multiple different 
types of NTMs (in Chapters A, B or C the UNCTAD NTM classification). 
Approximately one third of all tariff lines are not subject to any NTM in these 
chapters. The most regulated products are meat, along with fresh fruit and 
vegetables; these are subject to a range of SPS measures for both biosecurity and 
food safety as well as some measures classified as TBT e.g. labelling requirements. 
Tariff lines that attract very high numbers of NTMs - i.e. more than 25 types of 
NTM – are generally miscellaneous categories such as food preparations n.e.s. (HS 
subheading 2106.90) and animal products n.e.s. (HS subheading 0511.99) or tariff 
lines that contain a range of different products e.g. tariff line 0804.50.00 that covers 
guavas, mangoes and mangosteens. 
                                                          
measure. The “maximum” assumes that all trade in a tariff line with partial coverage was affected 




Figure 1: Incidence of Multiple NTMs by Sector 
 
 






We are confident that we have collected comprehensive and high quality data for 
New Zealand.24 This is in part due to the relatively transparent legislative system 
operated by New Zealand, as well as key agencies being willing to provide 
information, including on NTMs.  
We note that regulations associated with NTMs are often dealing with complex 
issues and that some NTMs will be challenging to reduce or harmonise. We also 
note that progress has already been made by New Zealand in reducing the effect 
of regulations on trade, such as harmonised Food Standards with Australia, 
providing treatment options for fresh fruit and vegetables under Import Health 
Standards and choices of international standards, particularly in the vehicle sector. 
We suggest, however, that the following areas may be particularly useful for New 
Zealand policy makers to consider making further improvements: 
• Support the Ministry for Primary Industries’ efforts to move to a generic 
Import Health Standard for each product, rather than separate standards for 
each exporting country. 
• Further investigation could be undertaken of the complex regime for 
hazardous substances, with various standards depending on the properties 
of a substance e.g. if it is corrosive or flammable etc. It may be useful to 
explore the extent to which this poses a barrier to exporters and whether 
this regime can be simplified. 
• Further investigation could be undertaken of possibilities for 
harmonisation of regulations with Australia and other trading partners, 
building for example on experience with joint food standards between 
New Zealand and Australia. 
• Although already fairly widely practiced in New Zealand, investigation of 
scope to further recognize international standards might be useful in a 
range of areas. 
• As proposed by the New Zealand Productivity Commission (2014), all 
regulations should be available from a single source such as 
www.legislation.govt.nz. 
• Continue active involvement in FTA negotiations, particularly regional 
agreements such as RCEP, which may provide a basis for further 
regulatory alignment, including eventual harmonisation or mutual 
recognition. 
Given the potential gains from reducing NTMs, it will be important for policy 
makers and officials, in New Zealand and other countries, to carefully examine 
                                                          
24 Though of course there will be limitations to the data collected. For example, most of New 
Zealand’s NTMs do not indicate the particular tariff lines covered; therefore, some judgement is 
required in assigning tariff codes, particularly for complex areas such as those under the Hazardous 
Substances and New Organisms Act 1996. We also note that the database is just a snapshot in time, 




areas where non-tariff barriers to trade may be reduced, while still achieving 
legitimate objectives of the various NTMs. 
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